INTRODUCTION

What do we now know about the causes of democratization that we did not know nearly 50 years ago when Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) wrote his famous article linking development with democracy? The answer is: surprisingly little. Indeed, some of the things we thought we knew decades ago have been challenged by recent research. Very fine minds have worked on explaining democratization. They have used multiple methodological tools, including in-depth case studies, small-N research designs comparing events in several countries, large-N statistical tests using sophisticated specifications and newly available data sets, economic models, and game theory. And yet, we have accumulated only a small store of knowledge about which most scholars agree. Instead, serious, carefully done research challenges nearly all theories and findings, and they remain contested.

In this chapter, I suggest that one of the main reasons for the inability of careful researchers to arrive at consensus about the causes of democratization is that causes differ systematically depending on features of the economy of the old regime, the kind of authoritarian government that marks the starting point of the transition, and characteristics of the international political economy at the time of the transition. Since different kinds of autocracy dependent on different kinds of economic systems have clustered in time and space (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006), and the international political economy has also changed over time, the causes of early transitions tend to differ from later ones. If these observations are correct, they suggest the need for explanations of democratization that take these differences into account. In this chapter, I suggest several such arguments. I also suggest ways to interpret a number of empirical findings about the causes of democratization that makes sense of apparent inconsistencies.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section summarizes the current state of research on democratization in three parts: empirical findings; measurement issues; and theoretical models. The following one articulates in greater detail the starting characteristics that I believe systematically affect the democratization process. It also summarizes evidence supporting and challenging these interpretations. Finally, it discusses the usefulness of various theoretical arguments for explaining particular trajectories of democratization. The last section suggests a future research agenda and some new ways of testing arguments about democratization.

THINGS WE USED TO KNOW BUT NOW AREN'T SO SURE ABOUT

As Lipset (1959) showed, more developed countries are more likely to be democratic than the less developed. The correlation between democracy and development has been demonstrated repeatedly in the ensuing decades in increasingly sophisticated large-N studies (Barro, 1999; Bollen and Jackman, 1985; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Gasiorworski, 1995; Przeworski et al., 2000). Lipset's (1959) argument that various consequences of economic development cause democracy provoked controversy from the beginning, however, and that controversy continues. During the first ten or so years of what Samuel Huntington (1991) labeled the Third Wave of democratization, as the last West European holdouts and most of the more developed countries of Latin America joined the democratic club, the argument that development causes democratization seemed
confirmed, especially when the collapse of the Soviet Union brought most of the rest of the ‘misplaced’ countries into the club (Diamond et al., 1988). At about the same time as the Soviet collapse, however, a large number of poor, less developed countries in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America democratized, raising new doubts.

In seeming confirmation of these doubts, the very sophisticated large-N study by Przeworski and colleagues (2000) claims forcefully that development has no effect on democratization. Instead, they argue, it is the tendency of democratic governments in poorer countries to break down that leads to the correlation, not the greater likelihood that dictatorships in more developed countries will democratize. Using a different measure of democracy and a data set covering a much longer period of time, Gleditsch and Choung (2004) and Pevehouse (2002) also found no relationship between development and transitions to democracy after controlling for characteristics of countries' neighbors.

Other analysts, however, challenge these arguments. In a very careful reanalysis that extends the time period back to 1850, Boix and Stokes (2003) show that development does contribute to democratic transitions, though the average effect for the whole period is small relative to the effect of development on maintaining democracy. Boix and Stokes (2003) show that when the data set is divided by time periods, however, economic development is an extremely important predictor of transition prior to 1950, but has only a small (though statistically significant) effect in the post-1950 period. In short, we still know that democracy is correlated with development, but the causal reasons for the correlation remain contested.

Several other empirical associations have also achieved the status of stylized facts, though all have also been challenged. Multiple studies show that oil wealth is associated with autocratic government (Barro, 1999; Fish, 2002; Ross, 2001). Countries with large Muslim populations are less likely to be democratic (Fish, 2002). As with the relationship between development and democracy, controversy continues about whether these are causal relationships or correlations explained by something else. Among those who believe relationships are causal, there are disagreements about the processes through which the causes produce the outcome.

Many Middle East experts explain the correlation between oil wealth and dictatorship as a consequence of the ability of ‘rentier states’ to use revenues derived from the sale of natural resources to distribute subsidies to large parts of the population and thus to maintain popular compliance with authoritarian government (Anderson, 1987; Crystal, 1995). In a parallel argument, Dunning (2006) claims that oil rents can in some circumstances be used to sustain democracy, though Karl has claimed the opposite (1997). In contrast to the various arguments about the effects of oil on regime type, Herb (2005) shows that when a measure of development that excludes the effect of oil is used in place of GDP per capita in statistical analyses, oil rich countries fit the same patterns as other countries. Development, as Herb measures it, has a strong positive effect on changes in democracy scores, whereas rent dependence, measured separately, has no effect. In short, he challenges the existence of a relationship between oil wealth and regime type, as well as the rentier state argument per se.

Some observers have explained the correlation between adherence to Islam and autocracy as caused by an affinity between Muslim doctrine or the attitudes of believers and authoritarianism, but public opinion research done in countries with substantial Muslim populations shows that individual Muslims support democratic values (Sarkissian, 2006; Tessler, 2002). Fish (2002) suggests that Muslim countries tend to be authoritarian not for the reasons usually mentioned but because of the suppression of women’s rights.

DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT MEASUREMENT

The waters have been further muddied by disagreements about the appropriate measurement of democracy. The main disagreement is over whether dichotomous categorical or polychotomous measures are ‘better’ (Alvarez et al., 1996; Elkins, 2000). The answer to this question need not detain us: which is ‘better’ depends
on what question the analyst seeks to answer. In studies of democratization, in which the measure is generally used as the dependent variable, if the analyst seeks to explain incremental movement toward democracy, then a polychotomous ordinal scale is better. 3 If the dependent variable to be explained is completed transitions, then a categorical or dichotomized measure is useful. Likewise, if the analyst wants to use a measure to establish the universe within which to test an argument expected to hold only in one kind of regime, a dichotomous measure is required.

These measurement differences are one of the sources of contending claims about the causes of democratization, as analysts sometimes produce different results depending on whether they have measured ‘democratization’ as incremental steps toward democracy (using polychotomous measures) or as completed transitions (using categorical or dichotomized measures). For example, Epstein et al. (2006) show that using a trichotomous measure of democracy instead of the dichotomous indicator Przeworski et al. (2000) used changes their results; development does appear to cause democratization. Development seems to affect movement into and out of their intermediate category, which might be labeled mild authoritarianism, but not transitions from full dictatorship to full democracy. Since the word democratization can mean either steps toward the democratic endpoint or completed transition, neither measure is obviously right or wrong, but claims to have identified causes of democratization without specifying which meaning is captured by the measure used contribute to the plethora of claims and counterclaims.

Democratization can take place either in incremental steps or in a rapid leap from harsh dictatorship to fully competitive democracy. Since incremental steps in one direction can be followed by steps in the other, however, we cannot assume that reductions in repression or other changes that are reflected in incremental differences in democracy scales will lead to completed regime transitions – though they may. At the same time, citizens' lives can be much affected by these incremental changes, and there is certainly reason to explain them. Referring to incremental changes on democracy scales as democratization, however, causes confusion.

WHAT CAUSES THE CORRELATION BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY?

Moving beyond empirical correlations to explain why the correlations exist requires tests of arguments about the causal processes that have been suggested. Economic development is correlated with many other trends, and one or more of those may be the causal mechanism that accounts for the relationship between development and democracy. Lipset (1959) and other modernization theorists suggested that increasing education, equality, urbanization, experience working in factories, and the weakening of traditional loyalties to tribe and village – all correlates of economic development – would lead to more tolerant and participatory attitudes among citizens, who would then demand a say in government. Many of these arguments have been tested. A correlation between education, especially primary education, and democracy is well established (Barro, 1999). The results on urbanization are mixed. Working in factories contributes to more democratic attitudes (Inkeles and Smith, 1974). These studies test the implications of arguments linking individual traits to demand for democracy. They do not consider the interests that might oppose democratization (since the arguments they seek to test did not). They seem to assume that if citizens want democracy, they can achieve it, without giving much attention to the possible reluctance of elites to give up power.

Scholars influenced by Marx expect the middle class – which tends to grow as the economy develops – to be the carrier of the demand for democracy: ‘no bourgeoisie, no democracy.’ 4 Zak and Feng (2003) have modeled a process through which this relationship might unfold. Though Zak and Feng do not test their model, Barro (1999) shows a relationship between the income share of the middle class and democracy.

The development of theoretical models of democratization is an alternative response to the need to explain the correlation. In 1999, Barro noted: ‘Given the strength of the Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis as an empirical
regularity, it is surprising that convincing theoretical models of the relation do not exist. Thus development of such a theory is a priority for future research’ (S182). That has changed. Several scholars have proposed plausible deductive arguments that identify underlying causes of democratization. They model interactions between elites, who want to monopolize power, and citizens, who want to influence policy and therefore demand to share power. The advantage of explicit deductive models of the democratization process, besides clarity, is that they usually have many implications that can be tested against real-world experience. The next section discusses recent models of the process of democratization and the evidence supporting them.

**MODELS OF DEMOCRATIZATION AS STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ELITES AND CITIZENS**

Models of the interactions between ruling elites and others that may lead to democratization can be divided into two categories depending on their basic assumptions about who the relevant actors are and what their goals are. Some models assume that the most important division within society is between rich and poor, and that the rich form and maintain dictatorships in order to protect their assets. They also assume, as do many other economic models of politics, that the key policy decision that determines redistribution is the level of taxation on domestic capital. It is assumed that the median voter, who is poor, prefers high taxes in order to redistribute wealth. The more unequal the income distribution, the poorer the median voter and thus the more confiscatory the tax rate is expected to be in a democracy. (The median voter in these models has never met ‘Homer.’)

Autocratic elites only democratize because of the threat of violence or revolution. In these models political leaders are perfect agents of societal interests; they do not maximize their own revenue distinct from the revenue of the elite group they represent.

An alternative conception of autocracy assumes that the most important division in society is between the rulers (sometimes simplified to a single dictator) and the ruled. They assume that rulers maximize their own income from tax revenue at the expense of both rich and poor ruled. Rulers thus set taxes at the highest rate that does not deter economic effort by citizens. In these models, rulers offer increments of democracy when doing so can increase the credibility of their promises to provide public goods and other policies that will increase economic growth and thus benefit both rulers and ruled (Escribà Folch, 2003; North and Weingast, 1989; Weingast, 1997). Alternatively, rulers may offer democratic institutions as a means of directly increasing revenues (Bates and Lien, 1985; Levi, 1988; Rogowski, 1998). In these models, the ruled care about growth and the share of their own production they are allowed to keep. Taxation is not seen as a means to redistribute to the poor, but rather as a means of enriching rulers. Rulers become rich by ruling; they do not rule because they were rich before achieving power. They cling to power in order to continue collecting revenue from the productive population under their control, not to protect themselves from redistribution. The main constraint on rulers' pursuit of wealth is the threat of capital flight or reduction in economic effort.

**Rich rulers versus poor ruled**

Boix (2003), Acemoglu and Robinson (2001, 2005), and Zak and Feng (2003) argue that democratization is more likely when income distribution – which tends to even out as countries reach high levels of development – is more equal. Boix and Acemoglu/Robinson argue that elites fear redistribution, which they expect to result from democratization. But when income distribution is relatively equal, they fear it less because the median voter's tax preferences will then be less confiscatory. Elites are willing to cede some power rather than risk revolution when they expect democracy to lead only to moderate redistribution.

Boix (2003) also argues that capital mobility, which, like income equality, tends to rise with development, contributes to democratization. When capital is mobile, it can flee in response to high taxes. Knowing that, democratic governments are expected to refrain from heavy taxation; so elites need not fear democracy. Thus
elites' interests can be protected by either a relatively equal income distribution or capital mobility. Where capital mobility is low and income unequal, however, elites should be unwilling to negotiate democratization.

Boix's book (2003) is a seminal contribution to the literature on democratization because it provides plausible micro-foundations for the observed correlation between development and democracy. The analysis covers nineteenth and early twentieth century democratizations as well as more recent ones, and it includes a serious effort to test the argument. Nearly all other quantitative studies of democratization have looked only at the post-World War II period because of data limitations. Boix has made a huge effort to overcome those limitations. His study has not resolved all debates, however, because the empirical support for the argument is somewhat ambiguous. Although he finds that income inequality has a substantial effect on the likelihood of democratization in a data set that covers 1950–1990, some of the other evidence either fails to confirm expectations or can be interpreted in more than one way. In short, although Boix's argument is plausible and attractively simple, empirical support for it is modest.

Furthermore, it does not take into account the capacity of rulers to limit capital mobility, especially capital outflows. It treats capital mobility as exogenous, but governments in fact have substantial capacity to regulate capital outflows (Wong, 2007). If elites are more likely to acquiesce in democratization if they can protect themselves by sending their capital abroad, then why would dictators not limit capital outflows in order to prevent elite defections? The Boix argument fits well with the stylized facts of West European democratization, however, and redistributive changes followed democratization there, as the argument would predict (Lindert, 1994). Further tests of this argument deserve to be important items on the democratization research agenda.

Acemoglu and Robinson's (2001) argument begins with many of the same basic assumptions about the way the world works. It also gives a central role in resistance to democratization to elites' fear of redistribution when the starting income distribution is unequal. They limit the threat of revolution to periods of recession, however, which complicates predictions. In this argument, when the rich are threatened by revolution (which only occurs during recession), they can grant redistribution without changing the political system, grant democracy as a way of making the commitment to redistribution credible, or repress. Redistribution without regime change is not credible to the poor because they know that they cannot maintain the threat of revolution after the recession is over. According to Acemoglu and Robinson, democratization is a more credible commitment to maintaining redistribution over a longer time period. (Why the poor should accept democratization as credible when the model – conforming to reality – allows the rich to stage coups if they are dissatisfied by the later tax rate is unclear.)

In contrast to the Boix argument, Acemoglu and Robinson expect income inequality to lead to unstable regime changes, not continued authoritarianism. One of the attractive features of the Acemoglu and Robinson model is that it explains repeated transitions between democracy and dictatorship, a phenomenon that has characterized some parts of the developing world since the middle of the twentieth century. The model seems to be a plausible simplification of events in much of Latin America and in a few other developing countries. Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) provide some suggestive evidence to support their arguments, but do not carry out systematic empirical tests so we cannot assess their fit with the real world.

Models linking democratization to inequality seem highly plausible, but the empirical investigation of the relationship between regime type and income inequality does not support their basic assumptions nor does empirical investigation of the relationship between democracy and redistribution outside Europe. If these arguments were correct, we would expect to find the remaining dictatorships in the world more unequal on average than democracies, but there is little evidence that the current set of recalcitrant dictatorships is made up of countries with especially unequal income distributions (Bollen and Jackman, 1985). In fact, in the post-World War II period, longer lived dictatorships (excluding monarchies) have more equal income distributions
than brief ones. Przeworski et al. (2000) find a positive relationship between only one of three measures of inequality and transitions to democracy. They find a stronger relationship between inequality in democracies and democratic breakdown, which might explain any relationship that exists between democracy and equality (if one does exist), but does not support the idea that equality makes democratization more likely.

The models also assume that the main reasons elites fear democracy and ordinary citizens want it is that they expect it to lead to redistribution. Lindert (1994) has shown that the expected redistribution occurred in Western Europe after the first steps toward democratization were taken, but Mulligan et al. (2004) show that contemporary democracies do not on average redistribute more than dictatorships. We should not be surprised by this result. Income distribution varied greatly among late twentieth century dictatorships. Many, both communist and non-communist, expropriated traditional elites and redistributed income and opportunities through land reform, much increased public education, and industrialization policies that led to the movement of large numbers of people out of agriculture and into factories. It is hard to imagine that ruling elites in these kinds of authoritarian regimes would be motivated by fear of greater redistribution. They would fear loss of their own power and wealth, but not via redistributive taxation. Income equality would not reassure them because their power and wealth are tied to holding office, not to ownership of private resources protected by stable property rights.

Thus, neither of these models fit many of the struggles over democratization in excommunist and developing countries, where fear of redistributive taxation is not a plausible reason for resistance to democratization since substantial portions of productive assets were state or foreign owned for much of the late twentieth century. State elites who control a large portion of productive assets may certainly fear loss of power since their access to wealth depends on control of the state, but they will not suffer less dispossession with a more equal income distribution.

**Revenue maximizing rulers versus politically powerless citizens**

In this approach to the study of democratization, which owes much to seminal articles by North and Weingast (1989) and Olson (1993), rulers maximize their own individual revenue via taxation, and citizens prefer low taxes and share a desire for productivity-enhancing policies and public goods, regardless of their income. In this image of politics, taxes redistribute wealth from citizens to rulers, not from rich to poor. Rulers may want revenue in order to pursue wars, to buy support in order to stay in power, to pay for repression, or for personal consumption; their reason does not affect the logic of the argument. Rulers are motivated by their desire for revenue to offer public goods that increase productivity and to impose a tax rate that does not reduce investment or effort. Citizens demand regime change if they are taxed too heavily or dissatisfied with current leaders' provision of public goods and economic performance.

In some versions of this approach, societal elites or holders of private capital can do most to destabilize the regime if they are dissatisfied. Consequently, they are the ones most likely to be accommodated when the ruler offers an institutionalized form of participation in return for their cooperation. Rulers may offer representative institutions as a credible commitment to supply desired public goods (Escribà Folch, 2003; Levi, 1988; North and Weingast, 1989) or simply in exchange for wealth holders' contingent consent to the taxation of mobile capital (Bates and Lien, 1985). As in the Boix (2003) argument, democratization becomes more likely as capital becomes more mobile, but the reason for the relationship is different. The more mobile capital, according to Bates and Lien (1985), the harder it is to tax without contingent consent, and thus the more likely the ruler will offer representative institutions as a way of obtaining consent. Rogowski (1998) suggests a more general form of this logic in which citizens' ability to move away increases the likelihood that rulers will offer them representative institutions or good government in order to induce them, along with their productive capacity, to remain within the ruler's territory. Thus these models explain the first small steps toward democratization from...
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) suggest a more complicated general framework that extends these models to cover more contemporary transitions. Their model includes: a ruler supported by a winning coalition; a 'selectorate,' meaning those citizens who have some influence on who can join the winning coalition; and residents who play no role in selecting rulers. Rulers maximize personal revenue via taxation constrained by the need to provide private and public goods in order to maintain the support of the winning coalition. If members of the ruling coalition defect because they are dissatisfied with their share, the ruler loses office. Citizens outside the winning coalition benefit only from the public goods provided when the winning coalition is too large to be maintained by private goods alone.

Residents and members of the selectorate may hold demonstrations or join rebellions to challenge rulers who tax them too heavily or provide insufficient public goods, but rulers in this model always respond with repression. If revolutionary challengers win despite repression, the new rulers face the same incentives that other rulers have to narrow the winning coalition and keep resources for themselves. In other words, revolutions and popular uprisings in this model do not threaten redistribution or lead to democracy. Instead, they lead to a seizure of power by a new leader and winning coalition, who maximize their own wealth at the expense of those they exclude. One of the most useful and empirically realistic points made by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) is that participation in a coup, uprising, or revolution does not guarantee the participant an improved share of power or wealth after the fall of the old regime because those who lead such movements have incentives to renege on earlier promises after they win.

Thus democracy cannot arise as a response to popular uprising in this model. This result is reasonably consistent with reality. Rebellions and revolutions rarely lead to democracy; instead, they lead to new dictatorships, some of which are redistributive.

Democratization, in the Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) model, arises when the members of the winning coalition can improve their own welfare by expanding the coalition's size. This model, like those described above, portrays democratization as elite led. In the Bueno de Mesquita et al. model, however, winning coalition elites are motivated simply by wanting to improve their own welfare relative to that of the ruler. They are not responding either to a challenge from the excluded or the threat of capital strike.

In these models, democracy is given by leaders or other elites, not demanded or taken by ordinary citizens. The political mobilization of citizens can challenge rulers, but does not lead to democratization. This image is consistent with the many real world elite-led democratizations, but offers no insight into the transitions of the late twentieth century in which reluctant elites were pushed into democratization by popular upheaval.

**INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES ON DEMOCRATIZATION**

Although models of democratization and most large-N empirical investigations have focused on domestic causes, many observers of late twentieth century transitions have emphasized the importance of international influences, especially the diffusion of democratic ideas and pressure from international financial institutions (e.g., Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Dunning, 2004; Whitehead, 1996). If international forces have a major effect on democratization, and especially if there is an interaction between international and domestic factors, their exclusion from statistical tests may explain some of the limited and contradictory results obtained in these tests.

International factors have begun to be included in empirical investigations. Gasiorworski (1995), Gleditsch and Ward (2006) and Gleditsch and Choung (2004) show that the proportion of democratic neighbors increases the likelihood of transitions to democracy in the countries they surround, lending some support to the diffusion
argument. Pevehouse (2002) shows that membership in regional international organizations in which most other members are democratic increases the likelihood of democratization. Since membership in democratic regional organizations is likely to be correlated with having democratic neighbors, however, we cannot be sure whether organizations have an independent effect beyond the effect of living in a ‘good’ neighborhood. Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995), and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1992) show that war affects the survival of both political leaders and regimes. Gleditsch and Choung (2004) show that wars increase the likelihood of transition from one authoritarian government to another, but neither Gleditsch and Choung (2004) nor Pevehouse (2002) shows strong evidence that war in the neighborhood decrease the likelihood of democratization. Marinov (2005) shows that although sanctions are effective at bringing down democratic leaders, they have little effect on the survival of dictators and therefore, we can infer, little effect on authoritarian breakdown. These findings suggest that international influences should be included in explanations of democratization, especially post-World War II since international influences – both economic and political – have probably become more pronounced over time.

HOW DEMOCRATIZATION HAS CHANGED

In this section, I describe ways that authoritarian government and the context within which it exists have changed during the last two centuries in order to identify changes in the causes of democratization. Autocracies vary in terms of the most basic characteristics of leaders and the organizations through which they cooperate with each other, the economies from which they draw sustenance, the distribution of ability to influence political outcomes within the citizenry, and the international forces that buffet them. These differences, as I show below, affect the likelihood of transition and how it occurs. Nevertheless, we lump these disparate processes of regime change together for explanation because the end state for all is democratic government.

Assuming that there is one explanation of democratization despite these differences may be the reason that scholars continue to disagree about its causes. The findings of large-N studies differ from each other depending on specification, time period included, and cases used. Such varying results should be expected if single statistical models are being imposed on a set of disparate processes without efforts to model how the processes might differ over time or in different kinds of transitions. If quite different processes, involving different actors with different interests, can lead to democracy, more than one theory is needed. If we are trying to use the same simple statistical model, verbal argument, or game theoretic model to explain multiple disparate processes, we should not be surprised if only the most basic features can be clearly identified or if studies that focus on different regions, time periods, or samples produce different answers, since different processes predominate in different time periods and regions.

Many of the difficulties in theorizing the process of democratization stem from the under-theorized residual-category status of authoritarianism, which has led to the usually implicit assumption that characteristics of the old regime have no effect on transitions. If instead we classify democratization processes in terms of a few basic characteristics of the autocracy and setting prior to democratization, we can then see that a number of the arguments currently contending for preeminence fit one of the processes but not all of them. Others are more useful for explaining democratizations that began at other starting points.

In the following sections, I discuss three issues that affect autocratic elites and other political actors as they make choices that may or may not lead to democratization: the extent of state ownership and intervention in the economy; changes in the international economy and geopolitical world that alter the costs and benefits of autocrats’ domestic economic and political strategies; and differences in autocratic institutions that affect both their vulnerability to challenges and the costs of leaving office, which in turn influences their willingness to negotiate.
Market economy versus state ownership and regulation

In countries with predominately market economies, dictatorships have usually served the interests of the rich, consistent with the Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2001, 2005) arguments. The relationship is endogenous, however. Dictatorships with other goals have used expropriation, state investment, and extensive intervention in the economy to reduce both the predominance of market forces and the political influence of wealthy interests. The most common form of autocracy in market-dominated economies has been oligarchy, with or without monarchy, though military governments have also arisen in these contexts. Though levels of state ownership and regulation are determined by governments, oligarchies, as representatives of the owners of private wealth, have no incentive to expropriate and thus usually maintain private ownership. Historically, such regimes tended to fade away as economies developed. This may have occurred through the kinds of processes identified by Lipset and other modernization theorists; as more citizens became educated, joined the middle class, and went to work in factories, they demanded the vote, and in many countries of Latin America and Western Europe, eventually got it. The process may also have been aided by the mechanisms identified by Boix and Acemoglu/Robinson. Elites may have been more willing to extend the franchise where income distribution was more equal and capital more mobile.

In the period from the end of World War II until about 1980, however, most authoritarian regimes governed countries in which increasingly important parts of the economy were state-owned. In fact, dictatorships carried out much of the expropriation and state investment that resulted in these high levels of state ownership. Such strategies helped them consolidate political power. Dictators who rose to power via the military or leadership of a nationalist or revolutionary party had strong incentives to seize the assets of private wealth holders who might have become sources of opposition, and many of them did. In communist countries, of course, governments owned all large firms and important resources, but nearly all developing countries began pursuing state interventionist development strategies in the mid-twentieth century. Oil and other key natural resources were either state-owned or foreign-owned and heavily taxed in virtually all. In countries endowed with natural resources, government revenues came primarily from either the export of state-owned resources or taxes on foreign-owned ones. These revenues could be used to reward supporters, and additional intervention in markets created many more opportunities for trading benefits for support.

State ownership makes possible both the accumulation of wealth by political leaders and also the distribution of benefits to supporters, and in some cases ordinary citizens, without high taxation of private wealth. Rulers who have acquired wealth through access to state resources, in contrast to those who hold political power because they own private wealth, have to fear losing most of their assets if they are deposed, regardless of the income distribution or other factors that might affect future taxation.

As long as the state interventionist development strategy remained feasible, these regimes were not challenged by development. In fact, those that provided good long-term economic performance have been remarkably stable (cf. Przeworski et al., 2000). Some of these regimes increased equality through the expropriation of traditional elites, land reform, the spread of education, and rapid industrialization, which made it possible for many poor rural workers to obtain better paying factory jobs. Others, however, worsened income distribution; they left traditional unequal land-owning patterns intact, and urban bias inherent in import-substitution industrialization strategies increased the wealth gap between rural and urban areas (Bates, 1981). Citizens who became better educated, got jobs in factories, or moved into the middle class were not formally excluded from politics in these regimes, however; most of them held regular universal suffrage elections. In many, upward mobility was available to the talented, who were co-opted into dominant parties. Thus, educated, ambitious citizens who might have led the demand for democratization according to modernization theory were often accommodated by mid-twentieth century autocracies.
The loss of the ability to intervene profitably in their economies, rather than factors linked to development, challenged autocracies reliant on state ownership and other forms of state intervention. As they were forced by changes in the international economy to reduce regulation, end subsidies, and sell state-owned assets, they lost the ability to continue delivering benefits to their supporters, whether elite or mass. To the extent that these economic reforms gave ruling elites the opportunity to transform state assets into private property – as for example, during the economic reforms in Hungary before the collapse of communism – elites feared the loss of office less since their wealth was secured. They were thus more willing to go along with democratization. Fears of losing office may also be allayed by enforceable bargains not to prosecute for corruption and human rights abuses (i.e., amnesties, allowing outgoing rulers to take their ill-gotten gains into friendly exile) or institutional bargains that give them a good chance of returning to office in competitive elections in the future.

Most transitions from oligarchic rule to democracy in market-dominated economies occurred during the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. Most transitions in the second half of the twentieth century involved autocracies that intervened heavily in their economies, owned significant productive assets, and regulated capital outflows. A number of the empirical disagreements described above make sense if we take these differences into account. The strongest empirical support for the idea that the causes of democratization might differ depending on levels of state ownership of the economy comes from the very careful Boix and Stokes (2003) study showing a strong relationship between development and democratization before 1950 and a very weak relationship from 1950 to 1990. The Przeworski et al. study (2000), based on a sample drawn entirely from the period of heavy state intervention, shows almost no effect of development on democratization. Although the evidence on the effects of income inequality is not conclusive, in my judgment the bulk of it suggests that less equal income distributions did not hinder democratization during the second half of the twentieth century. Capital outflows in the very late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries seem to have no effect on the likelihood of democratization, as would be expected if dictators regulate capital outflows (Wong, 2007).

**International influences**

International forces have always influenced domestic politics through trade, international prices, diffusion, and conquest. Big changes in both the international economy and world politics occurred in the late twentieth century, and there are theoretical reasons to think these changes influenced democratizations. Globalization increased the weight of international economic forces on national decision making. Changes in the international economy following the debt crisis of the 1980s undermined the survival strategies of a number of autocratic governments.

Several geopolitical changes have also affected the likelihood of democratization. Although it is rarely mentioned in studies of democratization, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, authoritarianism was maintained in large parts of the world through conquest. Empirical studies of democratization exclude these areas because colonial possessions are not included in standard data sets, but many decolonizations resulted in democratic government (often brief). The Cold War contributed to the maintenance of dictatorships, and its end seems to have contributed both to democratization and to transitions to milder forms of authoritarianism.

**Changes in the international economy**

During the period of state interventionist development strategies, governments' control over economic assets provided the resources that held coalitions supporting autocracy together. State ownership provided jobs for party cadres. Ruling families and their close allies became rich from the creation of monopolies, subsidies, privileged access to restricted imports, and other regulatory interventions. In a strategy reminiscent of Henry VIII's treatment of the monasteries, the expropriation of traditional and foreign wealth holders made possible
the use of these resources to create new elites beholden to the dictatorship. The debt crisis undermined this political strategy because it challenged the economic strategy upon which it depended.

To understand how the debt crisis forced changes in the state interventionist development strategy, we need to think about how the strategy worked in practice. State interventionist development strategies typically included high tariffs to protect domestically produced goods from foreign competition; overvalued exchange rates to shift resources from the export sector (agriculture and minerals) to the industrial; and high state spending on investment, subsidies, social programs, and public employment. Since state spending outran tax collection, budget deficits were very common, as were trade deficits caused by the overvalued exchange rates. An inflow of foreign capital in the form of investment, loans, and/or aid was routinely needed to balance these deficits. During the 1970s, the sharp rise in the price of oil increased the availability and lowered the cost of international borrowing, as capital rich oil exporters put their excess into developed country banks. The banks then lent it to developing countries at low but variable interest rates. With interest rates so low, most developing countries borrowed heavily so that by the late 1970s, borrowing covered the need for capital inflows in most countries. When, in response to the second oil price shock in 1979, northern policy makers raised the interest rates to which developing country debt was linked, debt repayment became unmanageable. When Mexico declared itself unable to meet its debt obligations in 1982, the lending bubble burst. Both lenders and investors fled developing countries.

Without these inflows, the state interventionist economic strategy caused hyperinflation and recession. Many governments resisted economic reform because rulers understood the political difficulties it would create, but failure to change caused economic crises, which also challenges regime survival. Crisis and the neoliberal reforms undertaken in response to it reduced dictators’ ability to continue buying support and thus contributed to the fall of many of them, as erstwhile supporters deserted them and ordinary citizens mobilized against them.

When foreign lending dried up, developing country governments faced intense economic pressure to adopt policies conducive to attracting private investment. Prior to the debt crisis, governments had a choice between relying primarily on state investment or private investment. Those that chose state investment did not have to offer credible commitments to provide public goods, predictable economic policy, or policies favorable to private investors in order to secure revenue flows, and thus the economic pressure to initiate institutional constraints on rulers’ arbitrary powers was low. Since the 1980s, the state investment strategy has become unworkable except possibly in countries reliant on the export of oil or other high priced natural resources. Consequently, governments have sought to attract private investment. In short, changes in the international economy changed the costs and benefits associated with choices made by dictators, political elites, and ordinary citizens.

Attracting investment depends on credible policy commitments and secure property rights. As noted by North and Weingast (1989), Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), Escribà Folch (2003), and others, policy promises made by dictators inherently lack credibility. Dictators can increase the credibility of these promises by creating institutions that give capital holders a say in policy-making and that increase the constraints on the dictator's arbitrary power. Democratic institutions such as legislatures and multiparty electoral competition can create those constraints if the commitment to the institutional change is itself considered credible (Roberts, 2006). If the institutions benefit both the ruler, by increasing revenues, and the ruled, by increasing productivity or welfare, then the institutional bargain is self-enforcing and thus credible. The need to attract private investment suggests why democratization and economic liberalization tended to vary together in the late twentieth century (Hellman, 1998).

The political effects of the economic crisis of the 1980s and subsequent economic reforms are described and analyzed in numerous country studies, notably Magaloni's (2006) analysis of the effect of economic crisis on the fall of the PRI in Mexico. A number of multi-country comparisons of democratization experiences also emphasize
the importance of economic crises in the 1980s and 1990s (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). In large-N studies, the effect of the economic dislocations of the 1980s and 1990s is captured by coefficients for the effect of growth on the likelihood of transition. Most empirical studies have found that autocratic governments are destabilized by poor economic performance (e.g., Gandhi and Reuter, 2007; Geddes, 2003), though Przeworski et al. (2000) are an exception.

**Geopolitical changes**

During the Cold War, one superpower or the other provided resources to help many autocrats survive in power. With the Soviet collapse in 1990, the Soviet threat to invade nearby countries that took steps toward democratization ended, and aid to dictatorships from both sides fell. For recipient countries, the drop in aid further reduced the resources available for distribution to the dictator’s supporters, compounding the problems caused by the debt crisis and its aftermath.

For countries in the former Soviet sphere of influence, the desire to enter the European Union increased incentives to democratize. Developing countries have been more influenced by international financial institutions (IFIs), which have pressured dictatorships that need their help to adopt democratic political institutions along with neoliberal economic reforms. Many autocrats did follow at least some of the IFIs' prescriptions, though – as with economic reforms – rulers have strong incentives to undermine in practice the reforms they adopt on paper. In response to this pressure, many African autocrats agreed to hold multiparty elections for the first time since achieving office. Some were defeated in those elections, which ushered in democratic governments. Others managed through various means to hang onto power despite multiparty elections and thus avoid transitions.

So far, the effects of these geopolitical changes have been tested only in limited ways. In a sample of hegemonic party regimes, Levitsky and Way (2005) find that since 1990 alliance with the US or Western Europe leads autocrats to adopt democratic-seeming institutions, but not to democratization. Gibson and Hoffman (2007) show that fungible aid, that is, aid that is not earmarked or monitored by donors contributes toward the survival of African dictators. Dunning (2004) shows that foreign aid contributed to democratization in Africa after the end of the Cold War but not before.

Many scholars focused primarily on the domestic causes of regime change have discussed and tried to assess the importance of the international influences and changes described above. The scholars most interested in international influences on transitions, however, have focused on other issues, especially the effects of war, civil war, sanctions, international organizations, and diffusion from neighbors. These topics reflect the core interests of international relations scholars and data availability. Gleditsch and Choung (2004) and Gleditsch and Ward (2006) interpret their finding that having democratic neighbors reduces the coefficient on level of development to insignificance as a challenge to arguments linking development to democracy. Without an explanation of why there are more democratic neighbors in some times and places than others, however, their results add little to explanations of democratization. Other international influence findings do not challenge the predominance of domestic explanations of regime change, though they make the picture more complete.

What has been lacking in most of the efforts to link international causes to regime transition are theoretical arguments about the interaction between international factors and the behavior of domestic political actors. Empirical tests of the effects of international factors have treated domestic politics as a black box that might be shoved this way or that by neighbors, sanctions, or whatever. Instead, domestic political leaders should be modeled as strategic actors who respond to price changes and other international trends that change the costs associated with various choices they can make, as well as to the equally strategic actors in other countries who seek to influence them. The elaboration of such theories, along with tests of them, could potentially transform
the study of democratization.

**Characteristics of the old regime**

If authoritarian regimes with different kinds of leadership tend to have different institutional structures and different relationships with supporters and ordinary citizens, then we would expect them to break down differently because different institutions privilege and disadvantage different groups. A simple and intuitive way to categorize the kinds of autocracy most common since World War II is as rule by the military as an institution, hegemonic party rule, personal-istic dictatorship, and monarchy. Defining regime characteristics emerge from struggles among elite contenders with different backgrounds, support bases, and resources, often after seizures of power. They do not derive in an obvious way from underlying social or political structures, and all have been compatible with a wide range of economic ideologies. These types were common in the late twentieth century while oligarchy was not, which might help to explain why post 1950 democratizations have been different from those that came before.

I have argued elsewhere that these different kinds of autocracy break down in different ways (Geddes, 1999, 2003). To summarize, rule by the military as an institution is more fragile than other forms of authoritarianism because officers’ dread of factional strife causes them to prefer returning to the barracks to remaining in power when factionalization threatens to destroy military unity. Consequently, the first moves toward liberalization often arise within the military elite, as noted by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986). Furthermore, stepping down is relatively costless for intact militaries because they can usually return to their military careers unpunished.

In contrast to the military, several scholars have noted the robustness of hegemonic party regimes (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; Geddes, 2003; Magaloni, 2007). Rule by hegemonic party regimes tends to be stable and long-lived because party institutions encompass a broad range of citizens and also create strong incentives for the continued cooperation of both elites and masses. The loss of their monopoly over office is costly to dominant parties but not disastrous, since most of them can transform themselves into successful competitors in democratic systems.

In personalist dictatorships, the autocrat trades private goods for the support of a relatively small group of allies. The loss of resources to distribute to supporters can destabilize such regimes, as can the leader’s death, since personalist rulers resist creating institutions that might dilute their personal control. Loss of office, however, can be catastrophic for personalist dictators and their closest allies. Many of them have suffered exile, prosecution for corruption and human rights violations, or assassination (Kaminski et al., 2006), though a few of them have transformed themselves into successful democratic politicians.

Less systematic research has been done on regime change from monarchies. The stability of the authoritarian monarchies that currently exist is often attributed to possession of oil, but in fact not all monarchies export oil, and some that had oil were overthrown decades ago. Herb (1999) shows that monarchies that include the whole extended royal family in decision making and distribution last longer than those in which power is concentrated. His argument thus explains why a number of monarchies were overthrown within a decade or two of independence while others have persisted for a very long time. Lust-Okar and Jamal (2002) argue that monarchs are more likely to take initial steps toward democratization, such as agreeing to multiparty elections, than single-party leaders because their own rule is less threatened by these institutional changes.

These basic characteristics of different kinds of autocracy affect the likelihood of democratization. Poor economic performance more quickly destabilizes military regimes than other forms of autocracy because disagreements over how to respond to economic crisis lead to factionalism and thus back to the barracks (Geddes, 2003). Regime leaders who face relatively low exit costs (i.e., military and dominant-party leaders) are more willing to negotiate transitions than are personalist dictators who risk losing their lives and fortunes if they step down (cf.
Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). Democracy is a second-best political outcome for monarchs, military rulers, and dominant-party leaders who face serious challenges to their rule. Military rulers prefer negotiated democratization to revolution, popular uprising or civil war. Dominant parties prefer democracy, in which they have a good chance of competing successfully, to autocracy that excludes them. Monarchs prefer constitutional monarchy to ouster. Most personalist dictators, however, care little about what kind of regime follows them; if they negotiate their exit, it is usually with foreign leaders who can offer them safe exile.

These differences in willingness to negotiate and second-best choices affect the likelihood that democracy will emerge from authoritarian collapse. Negotiated transitions lead to democracy more often than violent ones. Because they refuse to negotiate or renege on agreements made earlier, personalist dictatorships more often end in revolution, popular uprising, civil war, invasion, or assassination than do other kinds of dictatorship. The new rulers brought to power by these means are less likely to opt for democratic institutions than are those who negotiate transitions.

These observations are consistent with the model of regime change proposed by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). They expect dictators supported by small coalitions to respond to challenges with repression and by further narrowing their support base, as personalist dictators tend to do. When rebellions overthrow dictators, Bueno de Mesquita et al. expect the new regime to become autocratic regardless of earlier promises its leaders may have made to supporters. In contrast, they expect dictators supported by large coalitions to further increase coalition size when challenged. In the real world, we see negotiated transitions from hegemonic to multiparty government. In short, the Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) model seems to fit the experience of late twentieth century transitions from personalist and hegemonic party rule, though it fits older transitions and contemporary transitions from military rule less well.

These arguments have a reasonable amount of empirical support, though they have also been challenged. The finding that military regimes are relatively fragile has been confirmed by Smith (2004) and Gasiorworski (1995). Geddes (2003) shows that regimes ruled by dominant parties last substantially longer than other non-monarchic forms of autocracy, though this finding is challenged by Smith (2004). Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) show that dictators supported by single parties survive longer. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) find that dictatorships that allow more political competition, a category that overlaps what I label hegemonic party regimes, are more likely to democratize than those that do not.

Regimes in which power has been personalized under one individual are more likely to be replaced by a new dictatorship than by a democracy (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). Transitions from personalist dictatorship are seldom initiated by regime insiders; instead, popular opposition, strikes, pressure from IFIs, and demonstrations often force dictators to allow multiparty elections (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). Personalistic dictators are more likely to be overthrown in revolutions, civil wars, popular uprisings, or invasions (Geddes, 2003; Goodwin and Skocpol, 1989). Linz and Chehabi (1998) have described the difficulties of democratization following what they call sultanistic regimes. Wright (2007) shows that aid contingent on steps toward democratization persuades the leaders of single-party regimes to hold multiparty elections, but that contingent aid has no effect on personalist leaders, as would be expected if personalist dictators have much more to fear from loss of office than do dominant-party rulers.

CONCLUSION

Nearly all arguments about the causes of democratization are contested. No store of knowledge accepted by most analysts has accumulated during the decades of research on the subject. In the discussion above, I suggest that one of the reasons for this continuing disagreement is that democratization occurs through several different processes, depending on basic features of the economy from which the autocracy draws resources,
international economic and political pressures that have varied over time, and characteristics of the old regime itself.

A number of the theoretical arguments and empirical findings summarized above fit some of these processes quite well, but do not apply to all democratizations. Of course, no theory ever explains all outcomes, but I argue that there are systematic reasons why these theories explain only some democratizations. Consequently, I suggest that the domains of theories of democratization should be limited to cases that fit their basic assumptions about conditions in the old regime. If a model assumes that the central actors in the struggle over democratization are rulers endowed with private wealth and relatively poor citizens, then the domain of the argument should be defined by old regimes that fit those assumptions. Since many modern autocracies do not, the model should not be expected to explain democratization in them.

Models that emphasize the conflict of interest between rich rulers and poor ruled, such as those proposed by Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) are plausible simplifications of reality during pre-World War II transitions from oligarchy to democracy. These transitions occurred in market-oriented economies at a time when international economic and political forces were probably less intrusive than they have since become. In short, these early democratizations fit the implicit assumptions on which these models rely as well as the explicit.

Models that emphasize conflict between revenue-maximizing rulers and their support coalitions (for example, Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) capture elements of reality in many recent transitions in developing countries. Their focus on redistribution from the ruled to rulers as a central feature of dictatorship fits well with what we know about many of the autocracies labeled personalistic, sultanistic, or patrimonial by different authors.

Similarly, some of the differences in empirical findings can be explained by differences in samples used. Since democratization processes have tended to vary over time, and types of autocracy have been somewhat regionally concentrated, samples drawn from different time periods or different regions can yield different results. 20

Nearly all empirical research on democratization has focused on post-1950 experiences because data for earlier periods requires great effort to gather. During the post-war period, no single kind of autocracy was the most common starting point for democratization; state intervention in the economy rose for the first thirty years and then fell rapidly; and international influences not only increased over time but reversed directions. These important influences on democratization have not been included in most large-N studies.

The failure to include them may explain why so few uncontested findings have emerged from this research. The Boix and Stokes (2003) finding that development has a big influence on democratization before 1950 but little after 1950 provides strong evidence that the modal transition process prior to 1950 differed from that after 1950. Scattered empirical evidence suggests that early democratizations may well be explained by the arguments proposed by modernization theorists and the modelers who emphasize the importance of income equality and capital mobility (i.e., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Bates and Lien, 1985; Boix, 2003; Rogowski, 1998). For the post-1950 period, however, empirical findings are either negative or inconclusive. That is, Przeworski et al. (2000) and Boix and Stokes (2003) show little effect of development on democratization, but this finding does not take us very far toward explaining what does cause democratization. Other results remain contested.

If there are theoretically relevant differences among authoritarian governments themselves and in the ways that they interact with their economies, the international context, and the ruled, then progress explaining democratization will require theoretical arguments and empirical studies that either incorporate these
differences or limit what they claim to explain to particular kinds of processes. As Diamond (2002) notes, ‘if we are to understand the contemporary dynamics, causes, limits, and possibilities of regime change (including future democratization), we must understand the different, and in some respects new, types of authoritarian rule’ (p. 33). If we have fairly well developed theoretical reasons to expect the economy, the international context, and institutional characteristics of the old regime to affect both the likelihood of democratization and how it takes place, then the research frontier for the study of democratization should include: the development of theories of democratization that explicitly identify the contextual domain to which they apply; the development of theories of how particular kinds of contextual and regime characteristics affect democratization; empirical investigations of implications of these models; and the incorporation of more nuanced model specifications to accommodate contextual and regime-type differences into large-N statistical tests.

NOTES

1. Along with several less developed Latin American countries (the Dominican Republic in 1978, Ecuador in 1979, Honduras in 1981, Bolivia in 1982, El Salvador in 1984), to which less attention was paid.

2. Polychotomous measures include multiple discrete categories. I use this term because the most commonly used democracy scales are made up of scores that are not equidistant from each other (as in interval scales) and may not even be ranked ordinally in the middle areas of the scales. See Gleditsch and Ward (2000) for a demonstration.

3. Though serious questions can and have been raised about what the numbers between the end points of the most commonly used scales really mean. One of the issues is that the same scores can be achieved in multiple ways, and it seems reasonable to doubt that one combination of yes answers to questions about political characteristics is equivalent to other combinations that yield the same score. Another issue is that many users of these scales implicitly assume that every one-unit change in the scores is equal in effect to every other one, which is empirically implausible. Gleditsch and Ward (2000) have shown that nearly all the explanatory power of the Polity scale, the one most commonly used, resides in one component, Executive Constraint. Little explanatory power is added by using the full ten or twenty point scales. This result is what we would expect if the intermediate scores are made up of varying combinations of characteristics, the individual importance of which is unknown.

4. This is Barrington Moore's summary of Marx (1966: 416).

5. Larry Bartels (2005) has christened the real life low-income voter who favors more social spending but who nevertheless opposes the estate tax Homer after the famous Homer Simpson.


7. But see Bravo (2006) for evidence that the exit of those citizens most dissatisfied with a ruler's policies may increase the probability that he survives in office – thus giving the ruler a reason to provide policies that induce the exit of those citizens most likely to join the opposition.

8. He does not test the effect of sanctions on economic performance and growth is included as a control variable in the test of the effect of sanctions, so it is quite possible that sanctions do affect authoritarian survival through their effect on growth. In democracies, though, sanctions affect leadership survival even with growth controlled for.

9. See, for example, Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2003) for evidence that Latin American democratizations do not fit generalizations made by Przeworski et al. (2000).
10. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) are a partial exception in that they expect the likelihood of democratization to be affected by the size of the winning coalition in the pre-existing authoritarian regime. This is a step in the right direction, though in my view, size is not the most important characteristic of the autocratic support coalition that affects the likelihood of democratization.

11. This logic, in other words, provides a reason for expecting institutional bargains to be more credible than offers to provide desired policies in the absence of institutional change, which the Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) model does not.

12. Milner and Kubota (2005) argue that the causal arrow points in the other direction, that is, that the median voter in new democracies demands economic liberalization, but empirical research on public opinion in these settings does not support this view.

13. Gleditsch and Ward (2006) are a partial exception in that they catalog a number of ways that international forces can influence the relative power and preferences of domestic political actors. They do not test any of these specific arguments, however.


15. Hadenius and Teorell (2007) argue that personalism should be seen as a characteristic that varies independently of regime type. They have a point since personalism results from struggles to monopolize power and resources within the ruling elite. See Svolik (2007) for a very insightful model of this struggle between the dictator and ruling elite. Personalist dictatorship, as I use the term here, refers to the set of institutions that are created by the dictator to maintain his dominance as he wins this struggle.

16. Linz and Stepan (1996) offer an alternative though somewhat similar theoretically based classification that might help explain differences in democratization processes. They expect the usual characteristics of the different kinds of autocracy they identify to have systematic effects on different aspects of democratic consolidation, but their expectations have not been tested.

17. For detailed discussions of how this works in practice, see Lust-Okar (2005a, 2005b) and Magaloni (2006, 2007).

18. Gandhi and Przeworski fail to find a relationship between military rule and regime survival because their definition of military rule is different from that used by most others. They code any ruler who ever wore a uniform as a military ruler, regardless of whether the military institution supports or participates in ruling.

19. Hadenius and Teorell (2007) find different survival rates than do most other scholars because their coding rules do not distinguish between what most other analysts would identify as regime changes and smaller institutional changes that occur while a regime, in the usual sense, survives.


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