Vestiges of War

The Philippine-American War and the Aftermath of an Imperial Dream 1899 - 1999

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The Philippine-American War: 
Friendship and Forgetting

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The 1899 Philippine-American War is not the sort of topic the Filipino public likes to talk about. To imagine Filipinos warring with Americans simply contradicts the dominant tropes of the Philippine-American relationship. In popular, and to some extent, official discourse as well, the Philippine-American relationship has been a special one, expressed in kinship terms like "compadre colonialism" and "little brown brother." "Mother America" is owed a lifelong inner debt, or utang na loob, by the Filipino people she nurtured.

Why is it so difficult to speak of the relationship in terms such as invasion, resistance (so readily applied to the Japanese in World War II), war, combat, colonialism, exploitation, discrimination? There are a number of explanations for this attitude, but from a historian's perspective the "problem" persists mainly because a special relationship with America has become an intrinsic part of the history of the Filipino nation-state's emergence and development. The recent Philippine centennial celebrations of the revolution against Spain in 1896 and the birth of the republic in 1898 show quite clearly how a war with the United States simply does not fit into the historical trajectory from colonialism to independence, tradition to modernity.  

The goals of the ilustrado leaders of the 1898 revolution were apparently fulfilled through U.S. intervention. The repressive, anti-liberal regime of the Spanish friars was apparently replaced by U.S. tutelage towards eventual self-rule. Good government was established in Taft's New Era. By the time of Gov. Francis Burton Harrison's policy of Filipinizing the bureaucracy, and the passage of the Jones Bill promising eventual independence, it looked like the goals of the 1898 revolution were within reach through peaceful means rather than war.

In the context of an emancipatory history of the twentieth century, a history of forward movement from what was pictured as Spanish medievalism toward a modern nation-state via an enlightened U.S. colonial regime, is it any surprise that the Philippine-American War became somewhat of a nonevent, a glitch in an otherwise smooth progression?
The Philippine-American War broke out when the U.S. Army moved to take possession, in February 1899, of the territory it had procured from Spain two months earlier. The Filipino republican army fought a defensive war for the next three years. If successful, this action would have been taken as a demonstration of the nation-state’s maturity. But, as we all know, it failed. The poorly trained and underequipped Filipino army was repeatedly beaten in setpiece battles, so that by late 1900 it had to shift to guerrilla warfare. By May 1901, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo and most of the top brass of the army either had been captured or had heeded Aguinaldo’s call to surrender and take the oath of allegiance to the United States. By May of the following year, 1902, Gen. Miguel Malvar and the rest of the army command in southern Tagalog, Ilocos, and Samar had surrendered.

The process of turning the war into a nonevent began immediately after the official end of the war on 4 July 1902. In the earliest textbooks written for the newly opened public high schools, the revolution of 1896–98 and the Philippine-American War were clearly differentiated. American educators encouraged Filipinos to remember 1896–1898 as the time when Filipinos, inspired by the ilustrados, rose against their feudalistic colonial ruler, Spain. The 1898 republic was represented as the high point of Filipino development. It was also disapproved, however, as lacking in maturity. The U.S. takeover was deemed inevitable because the revolution, to paraphrase James Leroy, was led not by genuine revolutionaries but by local bosses or caciques; furthermore, U.S. observers liked to emphasize, the government and citizens alike had clashing views about what independence really meant. The most glaring evidence of lack was no less than the republican government’s resistance to U.S. occupation—the war itself. As textbook writer Barrows put it, the war (or rather, insurrection) was a great misunderstanding. If Aguinaldo and his generals had been mature or intelligent enough to understand the intentions of the United States (which was to help the Filipinos complete their revolution under their tutelage), they would not have put up a resistance.2

In short, the generations of Filipinos who learned their Philippine history in American colonial schools did not see the war as the U.S. suppression of their cherished revolutionary and nationalist dreams. Instead it was more of a misguided, even stupid, rejection of a gift of further enlightenment. The fact that many Filipino officers who had fought against the Americans came to hold public office under colonial rule, only reinforced the view that the war of resistance was a waste of effort, an event that was best forgotten.

On the American side, the myth generally persists that there was merely a “Spanish-American War” in 1898 which almost magically landed the Philippines on Uncle Sam’s lap after some treaty in Paris and the payment of a check to Spain. Filipino resistance was termed an “insurrection” against duly constituted authority.
By 1902, any further resistance was termed banditism, or banditry. Perhaps the myth of a "splendid little war" persists because it helps to conceal a profound contradiction. One of the senior officers in the Schwan expedition that invaded southern Luzon in early 1900 was Col. Cornelius Gardener, commanding the Thirtieth Infantry of U.S. Volunteers. Gardener was no ordinary participant in these events. In a year's time, when it was thought that Tayabas had been "pacified," he would be appointed the first colonial governor of the province. A liberal and reformer, he also sympathized with the goals of his nationalist "enemy," reminding us that there were anti-imperialists even among the American troops. Gardener's private correspondence reveals the extent to which official justifications for the takeover of the islands had been internalized by members of the U.S. Army.

Even as he was leading a regiment invading Tagalog towns in February 1900, Colonel Gardener was trying to clear his conscience. Something was not right when they were opposing a people whose goal was familiar to any American who knew his history. "Let us guarantee independence to Luzon," he wrote to his fellow libertarian, Governor Pingree of Michigan, for it is "in every way capable of self-government... We then wait till the rest of the islands are more or less civilized." After granting independence, "let us apply the Monroe doctrine to the entire Philippine archipelago and say to the nations of Europe hands off, this is our foster-child, a republic in Asiatic waters. Let us become a leaven to overcome tyrants and monarchs in the orient, this our children will be more proud of than the role we are now playing." These words clearly echo the pronouncements of President McKinley and Philippine Commission Chief Schurman; these were the official, moral, and paternalistic justifications of the Philippine war.

Having engaged the Filipino revolutionaries in battle and tested their resolve, Gardener was sensitive to the ironies of the U.S. position. "When Spanish power was crumbling, when [the Filipinos] had taken prisoner every Spanish soldier on all these Islands, except Manila and one other place, there came a stronger power with limitless wealth to take Spain's place and undo all that had been done for independence. The thousands and tens of thousands who died for ultimate Filipino independence they now believe 'to have died in vain.'"

The remembering of a gruesome war of occupation and resistance would only undermine the myths of the special Philippine-American relationship that prevailed throughout the twentieth century. Gardener's liberal dilemma probably constitutes the limits of official remembering since it allows for the existence of an anti-imperialist position that neutralizes the brute facts of military occupation. But it would be well worth remembering, as well, the nonofficial matters that Gardener narrated in his private correspondence.

Grand questions about benevolent assimilation would have been too unreal or distant for the Filipinos defending their towns or hiding from the American cavalry. What they would have seen in the towns occupied by the Schwan expedition were American soldiers on the rampage. Gardener knew all too well the gap between the official discourse of a civilizing mission and the actual behavior of his army: "Of course the best houses in every town were occupied by them, and every hidden place ransacked in hope of the booty of Eastern lands, so often read of in novels; dreams of buried treasure in graveyards, churches or vaults."
I do not know that the American is worse than other soldiers, but surely it was bad enough, and a month’s campaigning against the Ngeros—so-called is very demoralizing, and bad for discipline. To the visitor belongs the spoils as an aphorism, has perhaps done more harm than the saying that no Indian is a good Indian, except a dead one.  

Gardener claimed that one of the regiments in the Schwan expedition, all raw recruits, had set a bad example for his men; "they looted everything and destroyed for the fun of it. Every church and some graveyards were thoroughly gone through." These are the sort of details that remind us of the real war that gripped the towns of southern Luzon—similar to the experiences of the Japanese occupation which, in contrast, are well remembered.

In the sections that follow, I address further issues about the forgetting of the war by focusing on two of the towns initially occupied by Colonel Gardener’s regiment: Tiaong and Candelaria. Whether the historical details about these towns and their leaders can be regarded as "representative" or not is beside the point. The myths of the "splendid little war" can be challenged effectively only by resurrecting local events and knowledges that have been marginalized or forgotten.

**AMIGO WARFARE**

The years 1900-1902 constitute a lacuna in our knowledge of the war. In nationalist historiography the focus is on the fate of the republican government and army. By the end of 1899, many of the republic’s wealthy and educated supporters had defected to the Americans, and its most capable military commander, Antonio Luna, had been assassinated by Filipino soldiers allegedly under orders from General Aguinaldo. Textbook histories generally trace the gradual retreat of Aguinaldo to the north until he is captured in early 1901 and takes the oath of allegiance to the United States in April.

The problem with presenting a history of the war at the regional and local level is that, in contrast to the Aguinaldo narrative, nothing much seems to have happened in terms of conventional warfare. For almost two years after the U.S. invasion of their region, the guerrilla columns of Lt. Cols. Norberto Mayo and Ladislao Masangcay dominated the hinterland of Tiaong and Candelaria. For a year the townspeople lived alongside them. But with the defeat of the anti-imperialist William Jennings Bryan in the November 1900 elections, most of them moved back to their homes. Mayo and Masangcay remained in the field throughout 1901, not to confront the Americans directly with their meager resources but hoping for succor—in the form of weapons from the Japanese, perhaps, or a German fleet that would come to the rescue, or an American shift in policy.
Question: What was the object of the insurrecto forces?
Lieutenant Cadiz: What the insurrectos wanted was tranquility and independence.
Q: So you preferred to gain independence by concealing yourselves every time you saw an American and to get your living from the poor people of the barrios?
Cadiz: Because the lieutenant colonel [Maungsay] told us to have patience and to hide ourselves; that this would not last long and we would be given our independence. 6

In such circumstances, much could easily be forgotten about the war, because the usual battle stories just were not there to memorialize.

What seems to be brought out in the local history of Tiaong and Candelaria is the Filipino experience of dealing with a superior force through various mechanisms, like feigning defeat, playing dead, shifting identities, allowing oneself to bend with the wind like the bamboo (to use a cliche quite common about Filipinos). Townspeople straddled both regimes, colonial and nationalist, with relative ease. The problem for the U.S. post commanders in so-called pacified towns was not that there was much danger of American soldiers being harmed by those pesky guerrilla bands which could not shoot straight, but that the Americans could not be certain that the friendly, cooperative presidente, or local mayor, they were dealing with in the daytime, was not the chairman of the town’s revolutionary committee at night. This was not what the U.S. Army wanted or expected. The enemy had to be visible and stable, an object of confrontation that could be destroyed, yes, but possibly also turned into willing subjects and even friends. After all, the official ideology of the U.S. takeover of the islands was “benevolent assimilation”—conquest construed as a moral imperative to adopt and civilize the “Orphans of the Pacific.” 7

“Amigo warfare” was what the Americans derisively called the Filipino style of resistance. The Filipinos were friends during the day or when confronted, but at night or when no one was looking, they were guerrillas. When the cavalry approached, most of the enemy disappeared, or their uniforms were shed for peasant gear. Even more frustrating was when they donned American uniforms. In frustration, Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, who took over the pacification of Southern Tagalog in November 1901, wrote: “In order to confuse their identity and thereby able them more safely to conduct their skulking operations, they have adopted the uniform of our Army and native troops without any plain, striking, and uniform mark of distinction of their own, in violation of section 63.” 8 American patrols incurred several mishaps as a result of mistaken identity.

Knowing more about the dynamics of amigo warfare, the ability to shift identities in changing contexts, should enlighten us about the whole issue of collaboration—collaboration not just during the war itself but throughout the whole period of colonial rule. It might even explain why Filipinos today seem to be so adept at handling tricky situations that demand shifting or multiple identifications and commitments.

**Describing Leadership: Ilustrados and Caciques**

While there is no lack of national heroes stemming from the revolution of 1896–1898, Philippine-American War heroes are surprisingly sparse, considering that the war lasted almost three and a half years. Apart from Antonio Luna, Gregorio del Pilar,
Manuel Tinio, and perhaps a dozen others, the majority of leaders in the war have yet to be properly researched. One obvious reason for their neglect is the very fact that they fought the Americans, "our" sentimental allies in World War II. Another reason is that both Filipino and American scholarship has tended to be critical of the ilustrado principal (rural gentry) or cacique origins of most of these military leaders. What is generally forgotten is that the U.S. Army itself, in justifying harsh measures in 1900-1902, deployed the notion that the ordinary guerrilla soldiers and their families needed to be emancipated from their despotic and feudal leaders.

Noberto Mayo, one of Tiaong's colonels, would be a good candidate for dismissal on the basis of social origins. If one were looking for a ready label to affix to him, then "mestizo" it must be— but not Chinese, nor Spanish, nor even a combination of both. His great-grandfather was an Irishman in the British expeditionary force that invaded the Philippines in 1762. He married a Chinese mestiza from Lipa and settled down there, making his fortune in the coffee industry.

Mayo is also described as "quite accomplished for a Filipino" and con instrucción, able to speak and write in both Tagalog and Spanish. A fourth-year enrollment record at the University of Santo Tomas reveals that he studied Spanish, Latin, geometry, trigonometry, and even a bit of English. He was once spotted in the hills of Tiaong clutching his "little red book"— a copy of Rizal's seditious novel, Noli me tangere. No doubt Mayo was an ilustrado or more accurately, a rural ilustrado.

The ilustrados of the Philippine-American War period have been punished in history owing to the "capitulation" in 1899 of many wealthy, highly educated, and mestizo legislators and officials of the republic. The names Pedro Paterno, Felipe Buencamino, and Manuel Arguelles count among them. But this Irish-Chinese mestizo named Mayo represented another variety. Attached to the Banahaw Battalion, he saw action in many parts of the Southern Tagalog region and was seriously wounded in late 1899 (a fact which became well known). After a period of recuperation, he was back in action in 1900, rising quickly through the ranks. Mayo acted as a rallying point for soldiers and officers being abandoned in the surrenders that took place in 1900 and 1901. He wisely based himself in the barrios of Tiaong where his brothers maintained the family ricelands. By 1901, his brother Martin, a schoolteacher, and his sisters Micaela and Amanda, were living in the relative security of the población. Micaela was then caring for a little boy, a future vestige of the war, the feisty anticolonial politician Claro Mayo Recto.

The other colonel of Tiaong, Ladislao Masangcay, equally begs forgetting on the grounds that he was a local boss. He hailed from an old family of Tiaong and bore a very indio surname. He owned some land, was a former headman, and became gobernadorcillo in 1892, all of which mark him out as a principal. But he neither spoke nor wrote in Spanish, so an ilustrado he was not. In fact, all of his correspondence was handled by a secretary. All of these qualities seem to mark him out as a cacique— a local chief.

But let us take a closer look. Caciques were not necessarily rapacious bosses or manipulative patrons. The problem in the existing literature on the subject is that we hardly ever hear these chiefs speak. The anti-Marcos literature on "guns, goons, and gold" has effaced the varieties of caciques that existed and the contexts in which they operated. Masangcay may have been ignorant of Spanish, but he was a proficient Tagalog speaker and so was able to rouse his men and keep up their morale. He was the original
“filibuster” in the town, earning a reputation by squabbling with a Spanish lieutenant of the Guardia Civil in 1891 and joining the revolution early. A commissioner from the capital, in confirming his election as revolutionary mayor in 1898, wrote that Masangcay was “the initiator of the revolution in this town, whose moral and material sacrifices offered up to the Motherland are most certainly worthy of this humble recommendation: he is and has always been a separatist through his political acts.” From mid-1900 through early 1902, Masangcay built up his column by attracting scattered soldiers who refused to surrender with their officers. They all stood somewhat in awe, if not in fear, of this “man of prowess” they called “My Colonel” or “Capitan Islaq.”

War and Friendship in Pacified Towns

The fact that just about all of the town centers or poblaciones in the Philippines were under U.S. civil or military control by mid-1900 has facilitated the war’s forgetting. For unlike the similar situation in 1942, when the Japanese army ruled the poblaciones, only to be booted out two to three years later, U.S. control was not followed by a “liberation” phase that would have necessitated a recovery of war memories. Instead, U.S. pacification and education programs after 1902 managed to transform resistance in the “boondocks” into a condition of banditry while the American towns came to signify progress and democratic tutelage.

The complexities of Filipino behavior in the “pacified” towns have yet to be brought to light. To start with, comparisons should be made with the “evacuation” period following the Japanese invasion. There is a ring of familiarity about the fact that only a fraction of the Tiaong evacuees returned to their homes in 1900. For almost a year after the Americans invaded, the bulk of them were still holding out in the hills and isolated barrios. As late as November, only fifty people could be found in the poblacion, not many more than the American soldiers themselves. The rest, as during “Japanese times,” were in the guerrilla zones. Only in early 1901 did the populace return en masse to the town as a result of the ravages of malaria, the loss of William Jennings Bryan in the U.S. elections, and a conscious shift in guerrilla strategy.

The “pacified town” was, in reality, under a dual government—a companion strategy to amigo warfare. When the American government, either in its democratic zeal or because General Aguinaldo had finally been captured, allowed local elections to be called in mid-1901, the revolutionaries in the field realized that they could actually use electoral politics for their own ends. And so Malvar ordered his chiefs to go along with elections, but to see to it that they got the right officials in place, meaning “those who knew best how to get around the heads of the Americans.” Call this crass manipulation, or cacique democracy, but this was a time of war. The office of presidente was crucial because he had to deal with the commanding officer of the American garrison. After a couple of failed attempts to find a suitable person, young Pedro Cantos was finally elected presidente of Tiaong on 20 July.

Cantos was not a local “big man,” but by 1890 he had gained a college education in Manila. He was a typical rural ilustrado, working in clerical posts in the colonial as well as republican bureaucracies. Since he had no military or revolutionary background—neither guns nor followers—one might ask why he became presidente in a time of war. In a real sense, he was meant to be a “secret weapon” of the guerrilla chiefs, as was shown a month after the election when he went to confer with Colonel Mayo, his patron, who urged him to “use all
the influence he had to induce the people of the Pueblo to act against the Americans."24

What eventually made Cantos important in his own right was his growing influence (or at least his perceived influence) over the commanding officer of the local garrison. Working with Captain Moore could not have been easy, for this American was clearly disdainful of the ordinary tao or hombre. As he once explained to a visitor, these black niggers would have to take their hats off when he passed. He would walk over to anyone who failed to do so, pull off his hat and throw it to the ground, cursing in Spanish. This rule of saluting officers applied also to the principales, who detested it because "it reminded them so much of the arrogance of the Spanish government."22

Captain Moore’s behavior partly confirms Gardener’s allegation that "almost without exception, soldiers and also many officers refer to the natives in their presence as niggers."23 But not all natives were lumped in this category. Moore was very friendly with the Spanish-speaking poblacion dwellers, some of whom were part Chinese or Spanish (or Irish). He was seen chatting with them often, attending their dance parties, getting caught up in relationships he only partly understood— for among themselves, the principales spoke in Tagalog. He got along particularly well with Cantos, whom he so trusted that he was heard to say— at a time when suspicions were growing about the "deception" of the town principales— "that as far as he observed Pedro Cantos, the latter was loyal."24 Through this relationship, Moore’s appalling behavior toward the tao was somewhat redeemed by the presidente’s mediation.

Being in touch with the "inside" as well as the "outside" of town, Cantos was regarded by Moore as a prime source of information. And he obliged, feeding the captain regularly with information about the insurrectos. But this was always misleading or dated: not a single guerrilla was captured in the expeditions of which Cantos himself sometimes acted as guide. Still, the presidente had to keep both Moore and the colonels relatively happy. At one point, when the provincial government was moving to assess the property of the guerrilla chiefs prior to confiscation, Cantos suggested the surrender of ten men and rifles "in order to gain the confidence of the Commander of the garrison." However, "Lt. Col. Masangry refused to permit it, saying moreover that we were all stupid because they also were looking for rifles to buy and they could pay more than the Americans pay for the rifles surrendered."25

Even if Cantos was sincere about helping Captain Moore and the American government, there wasn’t much he could do to sway the notables of the town. We can be sure that U.S. military pressure was taking its toll in late 1901; even members of the municipal council were beginning to have doubts. When revolutionary agent Ciriaco Gonzales announced at a council meeting in August that "Malvar was disposed to remain in the field although alone as Washington did in order to secure the independence of his people," an unidentified councilman quipped, Malvar is very different because Washington was a wise man, who made laws and orders.26 Despite such misgivings, however, the council wasn’t about to take positive measures against the guerrillas. Some believed in the cause of independence; others were simply scared. There was no explicit warning from the chiefs, but "by a rumor among the people" policeman Luciano Alabastro was convinced that if anyone gave information to the Americans of the insurrectos’ presence, he would be killed.27

Once, Cantos got the principales to attend a meeting at his office but "none of them made proposals concerning the pacification of the pueblo." On another occasion,
they “agreed to the job that had to be done but they left without complying.” All this foot-dragging would have been frustrating when Moore was expecting results. They are very indifferent, complained Cantos, they don’t share in the work of good government and order.28

President Cantos played a delicate and often dangerous role in dealing simultaneously with the principales, the guerrilla chiefs, and the American commander. Ultimately, his goal was to keep the lines of communication open between the town and the countryside. Supplies, gifts, relatives, lovers, and even the soldiers themselves moved in and out of town, thus easing the burden of the increasingly difficult life sa labas, outside. When we could no longer suffer the country, we came into town assured that we would not be informed upon. (Cadiz)

“Dual government” meant straddling the divide between the colonial and revolutionary orders. Without adequate documentation, as we are privileged to have in relation to Cantos, it is difficult to determine whether characters like him were collaborators or freedom fighters. The linear history of either the revolutionary struggle or colonial progress is interrupted by the “duality” of much of Filipino behavior during this particular war. Thus the ease of its forgetting.

**COUNTER-AMIGO WARFARE AND THE NEW COLONIALISM**

What, then, to do when the natives constantly blurred the division between friend and foe? American solutions were often draconian, blatantly contradicting the imperial ideology of “benevolent assimilation” and other myths of a benign occupation. There were many frustrated army officers like Lieutenant Parker who proposed the following solution in May 1900: “Serve notice thoroughly that all who live in Dolores, Tiaong and San Pablo must return to their proper homes at once in order to prevent destruction; serve notice that hereafter all natives must stand and face American Soldiers, either to fight or in a friendly manner, and that all that do not, but run away, will be killed.”29 Sentiments like this help explain why the war is memorialized in U.S. textbooks as simply “the Spanish–American War,” conjuring up images of armies and navies in battle rather than natives being shot on the run.

American frustrations intensified as the months wore on and “peace” was not in sight. Looking back on the latter part of 1901, Maj. Gen. Lloyd Wheaton concluded that the policy of “benevolent assimilation” had not worked because of certain intractable qualities in the Filipino psyche. “Surrounded by a dense population of semi-civilized natives belonging to a race whose every impulse is to treachery and perfidy, it was attempted to reduce them to obedience to law and order by the gentlest and most conciliatory methods.” But the result of this benevolence was “a condition without parallel in the history of any country long occupied by an invading and conquering army.”30 To quell the guerrilla activity that flourished in the provinces of the Third Separate Brigade, General Bell, having successfully “pacified” the Ilocos provinces, was put in command at the end of November. He promptly announced that amigo warfare would be terminated,

and to effect this every barrio in Batangas and Laguna will be burned, if necessary,
and all the people concentrated in the towns.... Henceforth no one will be permitted
to be neutral.... The towns of Tiaong, Dolores and Candelaria will probably be
destroyed unless the insurgents who take refuge in them are destroyed.31
This was "a policy of permitting no neutrality"—meaning to say one had to be for or against, not just in words but in deed. I realized that it would do no good to try to force the inhabitants to be our friends (Bell). The alternative was to force the inhabitants to stop aiding the resistance in order to save themselves from destruction. In order to apply pressure on them, they would be herded into "protected zones."

At first glance it appeared to be a voluntary thing. As friendship cannot be created in order by force, I deemed it best not to compel the people to enter these zones... but merely to offer them the opportunity and permit them to decide for themselves whether they would be friends or enemies. Could they practice "free choice" and still save their skins? Bell assumed that those who didn't come in were either guerrilla supporters who would be treated accordingly, or were being forced against their will to stay outside the towns. An ominous discourse was developing in U.S. Army circles as to why many of the two remained outside the American towns.

Bell explains: "A reign of terror long existed in the mountains of Loboo, where ladrón (bandit) chiefs have held some of the people under domination as complete as ever existed in the days of feudalism." So the U.S. Army was to "hunt these intimidated people and bring them with their families into protected zones." They were to liberate the masses and protect them from their oppressive caciques.

What we notice in Bell's speech is how a discourse of emancipation emerges alongside a discourse of native duplicity, despotism, and backwardness. One needed the other in the context of the imperial war. But the former is remembered as the precursor of the colonial hallmarks of "tutelage" and "development," while its complement of orientalism and racism are pointedly forgotten.

We also notice a play on the notion of friendship. Amigo warfare was an attempt to come to terms with the new colonizer—to deflect its massive power by being friends and negotiating with its representatives in the town centers, while maintaining commitment to the revolutionary project. Bell, in a pointed reference to amigo warfare, pronounced friendship to mean full submission to U.S. rule. One cannot force Filipinos to be friends, he says, but those who do not submit will be treated as enemies and destroyed.

Since the Philippine-American relationship is celebrated today in terms of "friendship," it is hardly surprising that its disciplinary origins are best forgotten.

The establishment of "true" friendship required the delineation of firm boundaries between the American "inside"—the town centers—and the "outside" which would be turned into a no-man's land. Dual government would no longer survive if communications were totally cut. The U.S. Army, in a throwback to Spanish army methods in quelling the revolution in 1897, implemented a "protected zones" or "reconcentration" policy in December 1901. Bell ordered everyone to transfer to the town poblaciones bringing all their food and property. Everything left outside would be either confiscated or destroyed.

The hub of the protected zone was the church and the U.S. garrison. On each of the streets surrounding the center a barrio was relocated, properly labeled and all. It was like a theme park where a vast and variegated landscape consisting of barrios and sitios with their own histories and physical features, was reproduced in the pueblo center, the better to be watched and controlled by the U.S. Army. In one of the documents concerning the zones in Batangas, the word "concentration camp" appears but is crossed out. While the benign term "protected zone" connotes protection against external threat—i.e., the bad insurgents—"concentration camp"
more fittingly describes what the zones were all about. Within the bounded confines, the population could be systematically viewed and counted street by street. In such a controlled environment, dependency relations could be established by distributing food and other necessities. Individual houses and tents could be penetrated in the name of hygiene and sanitation.

General Bell reckoned, as well, that in the zones he and his fellow officers would be better appreciated without the alleged distortions of gentry influence. Lieutenant Colonel Crane in Lipa complained in late 1900 that benevolent American intentions were not getting through to the masses: "It is to the interest of the priest and of the rich to keep the black Tagalo in utter ignorance, and thus prolong the war." \(^{37}\) Things would be different with reconcentration. Bell noted with satisfaction that hundreds of people were being brought into intimate contact with Americans, whom they had never seen or known before: "As a consequence no one will again be able to mislead them as to the real character of Americans." \(^{38}\) The redemptive process could now begin.

Curiously enough, Bell seemed unaware that his actions were replicating what Spain and its missionaries had achieved two centuries earlier. Through the policy of reducción, scattered settlements were reconcentrated in Spanish-style pueblos dominated by a church-center. This center was the embodiment not just of a superior Hispanic-Christian order, but of civilization itself. By occupying the church-centers in the protected zones, the U.S. Army was in effect recolonizing the landscape. There the American commanders installed themselves as the new padres, representatives of a powerful nation bringing a new religion of modernity. An anonymous rural ilustrado in Candelaria penned the following description of the new era:

> By order of the Provost, every morning all of the town dwellers had to assemble in front of the Provost's headquarters to listen to his orders or speeches. This popular convocation, which the respectable Señor Provost regularly adorned with his victims, was preceded by the pealing of the church bells. \(^{39}\)

**A "Howling Wilderness"**

The forgetting of the war has been helped along by the intervention of a new set of memories of war and occupation in which the Japanese loom as the clear enemy. Researchers in the 1960s and 1970s who interviewed veterans of the Philippine-American War noted with some exasperation that their accounts of atrocities, reconcentration, interrogation, and so forth were attributed to the Japanese invaders. The violence perpetrated by the U.S. Army in 1900, clearly evidenced in written records, seemed to have been purged from these veterans' memories by the acts of the Japanese Army in 1944. To top it all, Gen. Douglas MacArthur managed to install himself in the popular imagination as the returning hero, the Great Liberator of 1945. Could this same army of liberation have been the invaders and destroyers of 1900, led by Gen. Arthur MacArthur, the beloved Douglas's father?

Those who are at all aware of the real war that constituted the "Philippine insurrection" will have heard of the "Balangiga massacre." This was initially a reference to the treacherous killing, on 28 September 1901, of forty-five American soldiers in Balangiga, Samar, by guerrillas attached to Gen. Vicente Lukban. So enraged was the
American commander, Brig. Gen. Jacob Smith, that he ordered a "kill-and-burn" operation to punish the people at large—men, women, and children—for their crime. This was, or could be, another referent for the term massacre.

Balangiga was not an isolated incident. Other parts of the Philippines could be called a "howling wilderness" in 1901 and 1902 but these have been obscured by the myth of "a splendid little war." From late December through early April, dozens of search-and-destroy operations were mounted throughout the jurisdiction of General Bell's Third Separate Brigade. For example, in one operation alone lasting twelve days, Lt. H. Richmond and his First Cavalry troop based in Lucena, in combination with infantry units, combed the countryside "destroying all livestock of every description, houses and supplies encountered." To be precise, a total of 540 houses, 5500 bushels of rice, 87 native ponies, 70 cattle, 14 carabaos, and 125 hogs were either confiscated or destroyed. By Richmond's own admission, it was usually a cavalry troop like his which was sent off the road, mounted or dismounted, "to burn a house or barrio, or kill animals, while waiting for the Infantry to rest."41

As early as December, complaints began to flood Governor Gardener's office in Lucena about "the bad treatment that the people of the barrios had received when the American officers wished to obtain news concerning the whereabouts of the insurrectos, or to secure arms.... The complaints were that not finding arms, the gente of the barrio were caught and detained in jail, or they put water in their mouth or their noses, and at times burned their houses."42 This prompted Gardener to openly complain to Manila about the U.S. Army's atrocities in his province. He cited the "extensive burning of barrios in trying to lay waste to the country so that the insurgents cannot occupy it, the torturing of natives by so-called water cure and other methods, in order to obtain information, the harsh treatment of natives generally.... If these things need to be done, they had best be done by native troops so that the people of the U.S. will not be credited therewith."43

Let us be more specific. How many barrios of Tiaong were burned?, Masangcay was asked. All the barrios. Constabulary inspector Herrera actually witnessed American soldiers putting a Tiaong barrio to the torch. The same fate befell seven barrios of Candelaria. Gardener was right, the Ilocanos should have been made to do all of it. For by the end of the year the seeds of perpetual hatred against the Americans—to paraphrase the governor—had been sowed:

From your conversations with the people of those towns (Tiaong, Candelaria, Sariaya, Tayabas) what could you say were their feelings towards the Americans in the latter part of 1901?
Herrera: The majority say they are displeased with the Americans.
Did you hear what was the cause of their displeasure?
The people say that the cause is the burning of some of the barrios of those towns and some tortures that they had in those places.
Are these cases of abuses generally known in those towns which you have visited?
That is what they say.44

The "protected zones" were not necessarily immune from the horrors of war. In early April 1902, the local constabulary under the command of Inspector Julio
Herrera spread the word that Lieutenant Trent, Eighth Infantry, prosecuting attorney, was going to pass through Candelaria. Here was an opportunity for people to present their complaints against the military. It was not long before an anonymous Spanish document summarizing the abuses of the U.S. Army arrived at the headquarters of the Constabulary. The Americans suspected that Herrera himself, an ex-revolutionary colonel now "collaborating" with them, had instigated the complaint. Whatever its provenance, the document contained damning accusations which the U.S. Army had to deal with, such as the following:

The Provost of Candelaria, having brought about the incarceration of the whole Municipio and almost all of the pueblo, including a hundred or more women married, widowed, and single, submitted the men to cruel torture, forcing them to confess what he wanted, and proof of this is that no one who has been the victim of this cruel venting of fury, has denied his imaginary guilt owing to the sorrow and pain he has suffered...

During the interrogations almost all of the inhabitants of Candelaria proper had been detained, which meant that "the unfortunate young women of the poblacion were defenseless. They began to commit a thousand atrocities; the women were molested by officers and soldiers alike without any kind of consideration; those who resisted such barbarity were threatened with imprisonment, deportation, or death, and those who were disgraced had succumbed to force."

Looting was rampant, as well, when nearly no one was around to protect their homes. The best horses, furniture, household effects, saddles and trappings, and other property fell into the hands of the Scouts, and no one dared to reclaim them for fear of the threats which were actually carried out when the occasion warranted.

Names were given of some of the victims: Basilio Martinez, "shot dead because he did not confess what he was obliged to confess"; three other men who died after torture; two men with broken ribs and permanent injuries from being hit by rifle butts; eight women, raped. Many others had been killed, maimed, or raped but their cases had not come forward; meanwhile, enough had been said "to make the pueblo weep."

Finally, the complaint listed the names of fourteen citizens who had been sent into exile in Guam. One of them was Padre Gregorio Alma, whose main crime must have been setting a table in the church of Sariaya for the Virgin of the Immaculate Conception, their patron saint, on behalf of the insurrectos "to give them freedom and valor in their fight against the Americans." And there was a lone woman on the list, Serapia de Gala, an insurgent supporter, whose store had earlier been looted by American soldiers.

The detailed investigation subsequently conducted by the brigade provost marshall, Capt. D. H. Boughton, attempted to water down the complaints by pointing out inconsistencies in testimonies and exaggerated claims. Basilio Martinez was found to be very much alive still; perhaps he had survived the gunshot wound, we do not know. Others had allegedly been shot dead while trying to escape, or died of natural causes. Imprisonment was justified, said Boughton, "by the state of war existing at that time." The accusations of rape were sometimes twisted around so that the woman was held to blame, or the cases were left unresolved, passed on to higher
authority. The thrust of Boughton’s official investigation is not unexpected, but his findings are nonetheless valuable for their details about what the Candelarians went through in the protected zones.

The purpose of interrogations in the protected zones was not just to identify “elites” and “tarn” so that the patron-client or “feudal” relations between them might be broken. It was also to exploit family ties, to take spouses and kin as hostage in order to force surrenders. Gregorio Manibolo was confined when it was discovered that he was the brother of soldier Eulogio, of Mayo’s command. When Capt. Policronio de Luna’s wife heard that the Tiaong authorities were arresting the families of insurrectos, she escaped and went back to the countryside, leaving her daughters in the poblacion. In Santa Rosa, they captured the wife of Col. Nicolas Gonzales, Malvar’s second in command. Knowing that many guerrilla families had sought refuge in the Loboo mountains, the U.S. cavalry ferreted out a total of 495 women and children in a sweep of the mountains in March. They were herded into the protected zones, some to be used as hostages.46

Of the hundred or so women confined in Candelaria (and more in Tiaong), some had been charged with aiding or communicating with the insurrectos. Others were there as hostage while some male member of the family went in search of guns which he had confessed about. When Cayetano Umali, whose father was a soldier, was released in order to go out to secure a gun, he left his wife and his mother in the guardhouse.

Obviously, the women were vulnerable at different levels. According to investigator Captain Boughton, a rumor circulated that “if a scout presented himself at a house and a woman of his choice did not accede to his wishes, the husband, father, or male member of the family would be imprisoned, deported, or shot.”

Laura L., whose husband was in the Malagi prison camp, claimed that “she had been violated by Scout Clement against her will by means of threats and intimidations.” Boughton interviewed Clement who admitted that “he had on several occasions sent for women to be brought to his room at night but in no case was a carnal relation maintained against their will.” Why did Laura L. visit Clement unaccompanied? Why didn’t she make an outcry then? Raising such doubts, Boughton concluded that the charge was without merit. However, he did inform Lieutenant Trent, the prosecuting attorney, of the cases of Laura L. and three other women who had filed similar charges.

Another case was that of a thirteen-year-old girl who testified that an American lieutenant tried to rape her in his quarters but was foiled by her resistance. The lieutenant admitted the truthfulness of the statement, “with the exception of attempting to forcibly ravish the girl.” The charges were repeated publicly by Rustica de Gala, acting as interpreter for the girl and her mother, in the presence of the accused, other army officers, and about seventy women of Candelaria who had assembled at Boughton’s invitation to air their complaints. Mrs. de Gala declared that on the day following the occurrence of the alleged violation she found the girl and her mother hiding under her house. When asked why they were there, they informed Mrs. de Gala that “they were afraid of being taken to the officers’ quarters for the purpose of administering to their carnal desires.”

A more complex case involved the commanding officer of Candelaria himself. In late February, Alicia C. was confined by the provost judge as a hostage for the return of some relative who had been sent out to secure guns. While in prison, the
girl was approached by the GO's interpreter, a Filipina, with the proposition that she become his mistress. "To this she finally consented, the relation being consummated after her release.... The father of this girl was a prisoner at the same time, and it appears that she requested his release from Lieutenant N. but was refused."

Alicia C.'s case is different from the rest because, although her story was initially brought up as a case of violation and became "public and notorious," Boughton's interviews of the woman, her parents, and the lieutenant seemed to point to the fact that "the relation was entirely voluntary on the part of Alicia and that she still wished it to continue." Her parents had furthermore given their consent. Therefore, concluded Boughton, there was no ground for the charge of violation.47

We should reflect further upon the meaning of Alicia C.'s case. It can be read as an allegory of the Philippine-American relationship as it was evolving at the turn of the century. Gardner's words in the early stages of the war were prophetic: the Philippines did become "our foster-child, a republic in Asiatic waters," Filipinos seemed in the end to accept America's tutelage willingly. Throughout the past century we have seen all sorts of variations on the theme of stewardship, tutelage, partnership, alliance, and the "special relationship." It seems voluntary, like Alicia C.'s relationship with Lieutenant N. which was ongoing as well. Yet we can easily forget that Alicia C.'s story began when she was in detention and then "invited" to be the white lieutenant's mistress. Her consent was followed by a request for the release of her father, also in detention. Hovering over the voluntary and special relationship are the circumstances of war.

SURRENDER, REDEMPTION, FORGETTING

Philippine history textbooks identify Miguel Malvar as the last Filipino general to surrender to the Americans. Sometimes the date is even mentioned: 16 April 1902. But not much else is said, for by this time the focus of attention is on the political campaigns of the pro-American Federalistas, and on the positive hallmarks of the new regime: sanitation, health, education, and political tutelage. Of course, there continued to be resistance and unrest of all sorts, but whatever cannot be assimilated into the discourse of national development is left to wallow in its colonial representations: banditry, religious fanaticism, ignorance, caciquism, and so forth.

In reconsidering this historical period, it would help us to remember the circumstances of Malvar's surrender: the imprisonment of guerrilla supporters or their relatives, mass destruction in the countryside, a cholera epidemic spreading out from Manila, people languishing in protected zones and unable to engage in agriculture, the spectre of famine. Surrender was not, this time anyway, a willing acquiescence to the benefits of tutelage and partnership with the United States.

What broke up your forces and caused your soldiers to surrender their guns?

Masangcay: They had no money to spend or food to eat and they had no clothes to put on.48

Gabino Quizon came across his former chief, Masangcay, moving through the forest in the outskirts of barrio Pury, accompanied only by a lieutenant and five soldiers. He begged Masangcay to surrender, "protesting that the pueblo wished and begged for it and many more suffered enough in the Colebros (jails)." Masangcay replied each time that he wished to be faithful to his oath, that is to say, to be in the revolution until he dies in the field or is captured. (Quizon)49
Masangcay was soon abandoned even by his sole lieutenant. He continued to hide out in the forest, living under the care of some revolucionarios who had been disarmed by their officers but had not surrendered. He finally presented himself to the commanding officer of Tiaong on 26 April. I had only one gun and one revolver, because the rest were taken away from me by my soldiers. (Masangcay)\textsuperscript{50}

Norberto Mayo had surrendered in Lipa a week earlier. His revolutionary column had been doing well, he said, until "the American troops began to reconcentrate the people and... at the same time pursuing us constantly." Our troops became disorganized and demoralized. At the time I surrendered on account of this demoralization I scarcely had thirty guns left with me. (Mayo)\textsuperscript{51}

Bernardo Marques, who had surrendered in Tiaong on 16 April, explained to his American interrogator why those who had sworn to resist "until they had accomplished their independence" eventually gave up as well: "They surrendered for various things; some because they were tired of staying in the field; some through fear and because they lost hope; because some of them had been injured or lost their health through life in the field; and some because their families obliged them to surrender. I do not know more."\textsuperscript{52}

There was something about the way the war ended, at least in the area I have studied, that encouraged the forgetting of the experience. Much of the Southern Tagalog provinces was a wasteland by March of 1902. The rice stocks that could not be brought into the protected zones (fortified hamlets) were destroyed by the U.S. Cavalry. Granaries and houses were razed by the hundreds; one does not need to go beyond official U.S. Army reports to reconstruct the carnage. Furthermore, in April, at about the time General Malvar surrendered, cholera had spread from Manila to the provinces, facilitated by the movements of U.S. troops. An epidemic, coupled with a subsistence crisis, was about all that the populace of Batangas, Tayabas and Laguna could bear. The U.S. garrisons soon began receiving emotional letters from barrio heads pleading for assistance.\textsuperscript{53}

What interests me here is the way that the U.S. Army was able to turn a situation of utter destruction and suffering, for which it was largely responsible, into a redemptive situation. With the destruction of crops, the loss of farm animals and implements, and the overall breakdown of agriculture, the Southern Tagalog region became dependent, for eight years at least, on the importation of food. Only the colonial regime, of course, was capable of importing food stocks, the commissaries in the U.S. posts becoming the local distribution centers.

In such a situation of utter dependence on the occupation forces for such basic necessities as rice and medicine, it is not difficult to imagine how "resistance" could be forgotten, and the generosity, the kindness, of the U.S. commissaries remembered. The U.S. Army played the role of benefactor extremely well. Sentiments of utang na loob then came into play as lives were actually saved through interaction with the Americans, When the population was on its knees, the use of force was lifted. There were no mass executions, no long-term imprisonment, just a rigorous disciplining as befitted a people under tutelage.

To understand the deeper implications of "surrender" in the towns of Tiaong and Candelaria, therefore, we have to look beyond the officers and soldiers who laid down their weapons in April 1902. We should note the wives and relatives of the hundreds of
detainees who approached American officers, day or night, to seek their release; the
townsmen who lined up at the U.S. commissaries to receive their allocation of food.
Ultimate surrender took the form of a rather quick forgetting. In the meeting where
seventy women of Candelaria were told to file formal charges of violation against
native scouts as well as their American officers, no one came forward. As Captain
Boughton reports, "Some of the better class, when asked why it was that no complaint
was made against any individual scout, replied that it was probably due to the fact that
the war being over, the people were disposed to let the dead past bury its dead."54

What does it mean to bury the past? At one level, it could mean that the women
wished to erase a tragic and shameful event from public memory. But since this erasure
seems to have been contingent upon "the war being over," it seems also to reflect
the acceptance of a new era by the people of Candelaria. Señora de Gala's eloquent
speech, the provost marshall's invitation to file complaints, the "collaborator"
Inspector Herrera's behind-the-scenes work to get the investigation going, all indicate
the extent to which communication had been established with the invading army.
Forgetting the "dead past" can be taken to mean that the ravages of war had not
diminished the Candelarian's ability to come to terms with another set of impositions
from an outside power— to establish relationships of hierarchy and indebtedness
with the Americans and thus, ultimately, to domesticate them.55 One final explanation
we might thus consider for the forgetting of the war is that the townspeople of
Southern Tagalog could not be burdened by history as they commenced still another
period of accommodation to colonial rule. Perhaps, with more research, we might
even find the notion of "amigo warfare" useful in understanding this new period in
Philippine history.

NOTES:
1. See Reynaldo C. Ileto, Filipinos and Their Revolution: Event, Discourse, and Historiography (Quezon City,
2. See Reynaldo C. Ileto, Knowing America's Colony: A Hundred Years from the Philippine War (The Burns
Chair Lectures, 1997). Occasional Papers Series, Center for Philippine Studies University of Hawai'i
at Manoa, 1999, chapter 1.
3. The best account thus far of the Schwan expedition and of the various stages of the war in southern Tagalog is Glenn A. May, *Battle for Batangas* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, 1991).


5. Ibid., 100.

6. Cadiz, Juan. Testimony, Lucena, 3 June 1902, United States National Archives (USNA) Record Group (RG) 94 Adjuant General’s Office (AGO) 421607.


10. Librio de Matrcula de Estudios Generales de Segundo Enseñanza, 1890–1891, Archives of the University of Santo Tomas (AUST).


13. The Batallon Bonahau was organized by Miguel Malvar shortly after the successful nationalist siege of the Spanish stronghold of Tayabas, capital of the province by that name, in August 1898. The experience of the siege had brought together revolutionaries from different towns in the region, including Tiaong. Appointed commander of the Battalion was Eustacio Maloles, Malvar’s brother-in-law and a pharmacist by profession.

14. The information on Mayo is scattered throughout the US archival material. The most significant document is his testimony taken at Lucena, 9 May 1902, USNA RG94 AGO421607; see also Renato Constantino, *The Making of a Filipino* (Quezon City, Philippines: Malaya Books, 1989), 3.


19. The Tagalog word bundok (mountain) was brought back to the United States by returning soldiers and as “boondock” has entered the American lexicon.

20. Malvar, Miguel. Testimony, Lucena, 02/6/16 to 02/6/19, RG94 AGO421607, 44 pp.


23. Gardener to Civil Governor of PI. Lucena, 16 December 1901. "Report of conditions in the
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province since U.S. occupation,” RG 94 AG 421607 encl. 99.
24. Herrera, Julio (Santaya police Lt.) Testimony. Lucena, 23 May 1902. RG 94 AG 421607.
25. Cantos, Declaracion.
26. Trial of Sancho Capuli (Lt. of Police) and Councilors Cayetano Gonzales, Martin Mayo, Eulalio Recto. Court of First Instance (CFI), Tiaong, 19-26 April 1902. USNA RG 94 Enc. 4 to AG 421607.
27. Trial of Pedro Cantos, Zacarian Umali (Chief of Police) and Ysidro Dia (councillor). CFI Tiaong, 26-28 April 1902. USNA RG 94 Enc. 4 to AG 421607.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
40. As Judge James Blount termed Balangiga after Smith’s “punishment”; see Corpuz, II, 475.
42. Unson, Gervacio (provincial secretary, Tayabas). Testimony. Lucena, 1-3 June 1902, USNA RG 94 AG 421607.
43. Gardener. 16 December 1901.
44. Herrera. Testimony, Masangcay, Testimony.
45. Attachment to Boughton, Investigation.
47. Boughton. Investigation.
49. Masangcay, Testimony.
50. Mayo, Testimony.
51. Marquez, Bernardo. Testimony. Lucena, 10 May 1902. USNA RG 94 AG 421607.
54. Recent work, particularly by Rafael, on the Spanish colonial period could be applied to the Philippine-American War; see Vicente L. Rafael, Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Obliteration in Tago Tong Society under Early Spanish Rule (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1993).