Sandra Huber, Critical Unmaking: Divination, the Algorithm, and the Practice of Automatic Writing
What exactly is automatic writing, and why, after 150 years since the Spiritualists put it into practice, does it still persist? Furthermore, how can a reclaiming of automatic writing put forward an alternate ontology that changes the way we interact with writing and the systems it empowers? This presentation will start by complicating ideas around creativity, automaticity, and the act of divination by comparing examples of classic automatic writers, such as medium Geraldine Cummins, with contemporary writing automata, such as Horoscope Bot. Borrowing Matt Ratto’s term “critical making,” I’ll discuss how automatic writing offers a tactic of “critical unmaking”: a radical act that revises, among other things, the range of perceived interactions between humans and technology. To do this, I’ll examine cases where automatic writing has emerged from its habitus of parlour rooms and séances to appear in the theatres of law and cognitive science — here, its associations with divination and trance allow automatic writing to work as a disorienting force within these epic institutions, opening a space to unmake traditional systems. In her essay “Reclaiming Animism,” Isabelle Stengers calls for a move to reclaim concepts such as “magic,” for, she says, “magic undercuts any such version of the epic”; so, too, with divination and its embodiment in automatic writing, which resists explanation and is often gendered. “Long before our contemporary fascination with the beautific possibilities of cyberspace,” writes Jeffrey Sconce in Haunted Media, “feminine mediums led the Spiritualist movement as wholly realized cybernetic beings.” In an age where 70% of Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk labour force is female, and where bots such as Siri are often tamed by being gendered female, is this “cybernetic being” as utopic as Sconce makes out? Or are different faculties of knowledge ready to be divined outside those that romance the (feminine) automaton?
Asma Mansoor, DE-ANTHROPOLOGISING THE HUMAN AND ITS IMPACT ON RACISM – telepresentation
My paper explores how contemporary disanthropocentric accounts of human and non-human agency impact question the ways racialized bodies are seen and interpreted as well as their implications in a post-ecological world, particularly through their depictions in literature. With material ecocriticism destabilizing binaries between the human and the non-human as we enter the era of the posthuman, both have come to be seen as co-extensive enmeshments in a state of radical immanence. The world is thus a non-hierarchal collective where humans and non-humans interact as material-discursive entanglements across tenuous boundaries. Human bodies thus become processual assemblages, as human embodiment undergoes a radical prosthetic enhancement. Race, or skin color, are thus held up to a revisionary scrutiny. Therefore, in engaging in an onto-epistemological account of how racialized bodies are to be re-read, the theoretical notions of Bruno Latour, Karen Barad, Val Plumwood, Jane Bennett and Arthur Bradley are pivotal to this exploration, despite their divergent trajectories. The deconstruction of a holistic Anthropos opens up unique possibilities for questioning how racialized bodies are socially constructed and known. The important question is that if the human is de-anthropologised and humans and non-humans are seen as equal citizens, then race-based boundaries become equally unstable. The epistemological disbanding of anthropocentrism in turn leads to the subversion of the White/non-White binary, so that the possibility of a new world view may be explored which could lead to an altered ethics of race. Using Gerald Vizenor’s The Heirs of Columbus to illustrate the possible alterations in this world view, my paper explores how such a disanthropocentric approach initiates an onto-epistemological revision of race-based embodiment and its scope in the contemporary world.
Josh Berson, The Age of Vigilance
This is the age of vigilance—of coordinated attacks and drone warfare but equally of attention disorders and modafinil. At every scale of our lives, from the long-distance movements of weather patterns, disease vectors, and human beings to the regulation of wakefulness in our bodies, vigilance has become a modal theme of self-care. For Bodies of Knowledge, I propose a panel exploring what this means for us as individuals and collectives.
Vigilance has two senses. There is vigilance in the sense of preparedness or threat readiness, an attunement to signs of incipient violence—or simply demands for social synchronization—in our perisomatic space. But vigilance has a second sense. In this second sense, vigilance is a dimension of nervous physiology that characterizes the relationship we enact in our bodies between motoricity and attention. The challenge here is to unpack the politics of this second kind of vigilance. More precisely:
1. How do vigilance outliers, individuals and communities whose attentional-motoric styles diverge from social norms, suffer or benefit? How do the enforcing and troping of vigilance norms function in the enactment of social power?
2. How do the types of vigilance operative at different scales of social life flow into one another? How do the rate and rhythmic character of demands on our attention, be it for threat assessment or simply social synchronization, shape our attentional-motoric style over time?
3. What role does the acoustic environment play in shaping our habits of vigilance? As a lifelong monaural hearer with continuous tinnitus and recurring hyperacusis linked to episodes of hypomania, this is a question of personal significance.
Jessie Wirkus, John Locke’s Hands: The Tools of Embodiment in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
John Locke turns to thought experiments involving the hand in service of both the simplest and most perplexing of questions in the Essay. Holding a flint in your hand makes the quality of solidity self-evident (II.iv.6). Considering what makes the hand write or lie still reveals both a simple answer (the will) and one of nature’s greatest mysteries—the interface between intention and action (IV.10.19). The hand’s functions in the text are varied and multivalenced: they further arguments for both the accessibility and difficulty of knowledge while also dramatizing the complex, and sometimes troubling, nature of action. Hands are at once seats of agency and tools for thinking: subject and object in one.
Locke’s use of hands changes the focus from the anatomist’s practice of reading the structure of hands metonymically so as to understand the movement of the soul, to considering the larger structures and forces within which the hands of the individual act. In the essay “Anatomia,” Locke lays out the limits of anatomy, forcefully arguing that structures do not reveal causes, providing, instead, only surface knowledge. Locke’s critique of the limits of anatomy mirrors in some ways Locke’s discussion of “fantastical uneasiness” (II.xxi.45) which, like “Anatomia,” multiplies the powers that determine action (or in the case of “Anatomia,” health), but that one would be hard-pressed to capture via dissection or under a microscope. Like Jonathan Kramnick has argued concerning Locke’s theory of action, health, as well as action, is an experiential thing. As the hands that appear in the Essay to illustrate the principles of power both shape and respond to these forces—forged by education, fashion, and custom—hands trouble the boundary between subject and in part by drawing to the forefront the object-ness of the hand.