Fiscal Capacity, Railway Federalism, and German Railway Development 1835-1885 (Last updated November 19, 2024)
This paper analyzes the relationship between fiscal capacity and railroad development in Germany. German states understood the benefits of railroads but faced budget constraints when supporting network construction. Using newly constructed fiscal capacity and railroad ownership datasets, I estimate the effect of state revenue growth on the decision to grant concessions to private companies or expand public firms. I find that increases in government revenues led to a significant switch away from public construction towards a concession based system without changing the overall rate of construction. I hypothesize that this is because revenue shocks were not large enough to fund new public railroad projects, but could subsidize significant private investment. This may have allowed states to meet capital demands for consistent levels of construction while issuing less debt.
Presentations (click to expand):
- Southern Economic Association Annual Meeting (Joint Clio-EHA Session), 2024
- Economic History Society PhD Thesis Workshop, 2024
- Rijksuniversiteit Groningen Financial, Economics, and Business History Summer School, 2024
- Cliometrics Conference, 2024
- Public Choice Society Conference, 2024
- European Historical Economic Society Conference, 2023
Princes, Merchants, and Prelates: City Growth in the Holy Roman Empire 1400-1800
(last updated March 2023)
Abstract (click to expand):
I explore whether the local political institutions of the Holy Roman Empire had an influence of the growth trajectories of German cities. Using newly available data on the territorial histories of German cities, I compare the construction activity observed in cities within territories ruled by secular (hereditary) princes to those within territories ruled by either merchant oligarchs (a.k.a. republics) or ecclesiastical (elected) princes. Although all three regime structures were relatively autocratic, the constitutional law of the latter two types institutionalized noteworthy constraints on the executive. Using two-way fixed effect regressions, I find evidence suggesting that oligarchies have an ambiguous effect on growth relative to hereditary monarchies, whereas ecclesiastical institutions have a positive effect, although not always precisely estimated. I hypothesize that this is because the election procedures in the ecclesiastical territories were resistant to capture and thus functioned as a significant constraint on rent-seeking, particularly after the Reformation.
Presentations (click to expand):
- Cliometrics World Congress, 2023
- Public Choice Society Conference, 2023
- Max Planck Summer School on the Political Economy of Conflict and Redistribution, 2022
- 19th Session of the Institutional and Organizational Economics Academy, 2022
