



# Concert of Europe

Open Agenda

# UCIMUN 2020



Welcome Delegates,

We are Hana Schlosser and Angie Lo, and we are the Secretaries-General for the UCI Model United Nations 2019-2020 school year. We are honored to serve as part of your Secretariat this year and are excited for everything we have planned for the conference. We truly hope you find our conference to be enjoyable as well as engaging and educational in nature.

Hana is a 4th year Biomedical Engineering major with passions in both biology and politics. This is her fourth year participating as part of the UCIMUN Conference Staff, previously serving as Assistant Director of Ad Hoc on Terror, Director of SOCHUM, and Director-General. She originally joined UCI's MUN program because she wanted to continue intellectual discussions outside of STEM after participating in Speech and Debate throughout high school. Hana truly loves the MUN program at UCI because it allows her to improve upon skills such as public speaking and diplomacy while also providing her a family at UCI. Outside of her studies and MUN, Hana enjoys playing music, cooking, and playing basketball.

Angie is a 3rd year Sociology and Political Science double major. She has been involved in MUN since freshman year of high school, and loved her experiences there so much she wanted to continue it onto college. She served as Secretary-General of her high school MUN club in her senior year and as a part of UCIMUN, has been an Assistant Director and a Director for General Assembly, and Under-Secretary-General of Mains. When not busy with her school, UCIMUN and work, she likes drawing, playing video games and doting on her pet fish.

This year, we really hope for you all to take to heart the paramount nature of coming up with solutions to the topics we have chosen. Our theme this year, “*addressing global human security and its impacts*”, was carefully selected because we would like to emphasize the number and severity of global issues which affect everyday people. With your research and your resolutions, we would like you all to delve into ways to benefit as many people as possible, because global issues go beyond nations and governments—they affect all of us.

Our staff's goal, as always, is to provide delegates with high quality debate and an opportunity to immerse themselves in an intellectual discussion of issues that are relevant to the community around them. Please feel free to reach out to us, our USGs, or our Directors anytime between now and our conference. We are here to help you in any way we can.

Thank you for your time, and we look forward to seeing you in the Spring!

Sincerely,

Hana Schlosser and Angie Lo

Secretaries-General

UCIMUN Secretariat 2019-20

[ucimunsg@gmail.com](mailto:ucimunsg@gmail.com)



Greetings Delegates,

A very warm welcome to the 28th Annual UCI Model United Nations High School Conference! My name is Ashima Seth, and I am looking forward to serving as your Under-Secretary-General for Specialized Agencies. Like you, I have been an active participant in the MUN tradition since high school, with this conference marking eight years of experience attending and organizing conferences. The time spent with my fellow delegation members, delegates and dais members has helped me forge lasting bonds and gain invaluable experience and skills. It gives me great pleasure to have the opportunity to be a part of your MUN experience and to, hopefully, make it as rewarding as my own has been.

For the last year, I have been working tirelessly with your Secretaries-General, Hana Schlosser and Angie Lo, and the Under-Secretary-General of Mains Committees, Kyle Petersen, in addition to the Directors, Assistant-Directors, and Administrative staff in researching, organizing and preparing all the material you will be seeing in the coming two days of the conference. The theme of this year's conference is "Addressing Global Human Security and its Impacts". I hope to see this theme reflected in the debate as delegates come together in crafting solutions to the topics being discussed in their respective committees. Our committee topics for this year aim to challenge you and your fellow delegates' problem-resolution skills in areas that have either been a source of dissension in international politics in the past or present (Security Council and Concert of Europe, respectively), that have impacted those who are more vulnerable (the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women), and that have become increasingly worrisome due to their critical nature (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime).

MUN affords a unique format of debate that not only helps you develop and showcase your skills in research and public speaking, but which also facilitates a dialogue that unites us all in the quest to find effective solutions. To me, a successful committee is comprised of delegates who are well-versed in the subject matter, who have opinions on the said matter, and who voice these opinions in a diplomatic manner, engaging in teamwork to come up with solutions that are in the best interests of everyone involved. I strongly believe that all of you will more than rise to the challenge. I eagerly anticipate seeing you all during the conference and hope that it will be a pleasant and enriching experience for you!

Sincerely,  
Ashima Seth  
Under-Secretary-General of Specialized Agencies  
UCIMUN Secretariat 2019-20  
[usgspecials@gmail.com](mailto:usgspecials@gmail.com)



Salutations!

My name is Kimo Gandall and I am the Director of the Concert of Europe, a geopolitical entity empowered to maintain the balance of power between 1871 to 1914. This will mark my eighth year of MUN, and as such, I am quite seasoned in these affairs, participating from the more broad General Assembly committees, down to midnight-crisis sessions counseling the Pharaoh of Egypt. In high school, I traveled internationally to Bath in England, gaveling for the Security Council. Nationally, I've competed in the Forensics National and State Championships, and qualified for the Tournament of Champions. It is with these experiences that I advise delegates, many of you are struggling, to remember that it is the maxim of the victor to never give up: "Not only so, but we also glory in our sufferings, because we know that suffering produces perseverance..." Romans 5:3.

Of course, many of these experiences have helped shape my paradigm. Indeed, as a political science major, Professional Registered Parliamentarian, mover in local politics, and gaming nerd, I've incorporated these experiences into my career at UCI. In June of 2018, I was approved to begin drafting my undergraduate thesis *Parliamentary Procedure as a Function of State Hegemony*, which focuses on the intersection between procedural rules and the corresponding effect on policy and coalition building. Additionally, I am a Judge in UCI's Student Government.

This topic synopsis will guide delegates through these perspectives, and their corresponding application to unfolding events of the late-1800s to the dawn of the Great War. Delegates are recommended to both, review this content, as well as understand the mechanics and procedures of the committee. To reflect a realistic world, delegates are advised to be flexible in understanding their national policy, and more so, in negotiating peace; a failure to negotiate with a major power may result in the delegate's country becoming occupied. Even potentially worse, a failure of a major power to negotiate with a smaller state may result in those states falling into the infamous, and arguably preventable, Thucydides trap. The goal of the committee is to avoid war and to maintain the conservative-monarchical framework of Europe. Delegates are encouraged to research deeply into the politics and interests of their state. Bluff, underplay, negotiate, and forge alliances - the choice is yours, but so are the consequences.

The intent of this committee is to reflect on the lessons of the past, and to mark the current debate on international relations: can America and China, who are growing great powers, avoid this alliance trap? Is war inevitable? If it is, can collateral damage be limited? Fundamentally, I ask delegates to frame the advancement of global issues as a function of negotiation: how do we prevent conflict between emerging powers?

Wise delegates who will inevitably have questions are encouraged to contact me - even if merely to get PDFs of any sources I mention. I am excited to see all the delegates in April.

*Politics is the art of the possible.*

- Otto Von Bismark, Chancellor of the German Empire

Sincerely,  
Kimo Gandall  
Director, Concert of Europe  
ucimuncoe@gmail.com



## Position Papers

As delegates are likely aware position papers ought not to emphasize extensive details of the background. Furthermore, while I referenced theoretical perspectives on international relations, I only seek to inform delegates of very basic overviews. While delegates should understand basic distinctions, such as realism and liberalism (see, e.g., Pekkanen, Mastanduno, M., Ravenhill, J., and Foot, R. (2014)), no delegate will be required to explain complicated theoretical ideas, either in their papers or in committee. Instead, delegates, in comprehending the tension between self-interested survival-driven mentalities (realism) and those emphasizing mutual benefit and international rules (liberalism), should focus on applying them in practice. The following details are specifically recommended for delegates writing papers for the Concert of Europe. You have the option to follow these section guidelines or those provided on the UCIMUN website for the conference; neither set of guidelines will receive more points than the other for position paper grading, but I highly suggest that you use the ones I have outlined below in order to fully grasp the topic.

1. *Background* (⅓ of position paper): Focus on a topic that specifically interests your nation. Avoid vague details. Delegates need not explain the historical or legal implications of the Concert, as I have already briefly outlined them in this synopsis.
2. *International Involvement* (⅓ of position paper): Delegates ought to research treaties, obligations, and Congresses that affect your background specifically. Delegates should ask themselves which rules or precedents their states may be obligated to follow, and how they can justify their actions to the Concert. This may be of special importance to



minor or observer powers, which will need to navigate the Concert to avoid retaliation by the Great Powers. Alternatively, Great Powers must make sure not to rally a coalition of minor powers, which while separate may be weak, but together could pose a real and tangible danger. Inherent to this short but important section is the idea of relative and absolute power. Delegates are encouraged to research and apply these ideas to this section.

3. *Policy* ( $\frac{1}{3}$  of position paper): Delegates should emphasize domestic, international, and regional interests of their state. As I emphasize in the bloc positions, research how your given state benefits from comparative military and economic advantages (e.g., the British navy, Russian manpower, or the German army). Equally important, outline important and strategic colonies or territories one may wish to pursue, either in Europe or abroad. If an observer state, such as the United States or Japan, perhaps ask yourself how you can keep European states out of your theater, or at least, minimize foreign interactions. This policy section of extensive importance to understand the portfolio powers delegates will have in committee.
4. *Solutions* ( $\frac{1}{3}$  of position paper): Delegates should explain how they wish to solve a pressing issue or pending crisis. A good rule of thumb for solutions exists as follows: first, the actor. This address the who. The ‘who’ includes the actor’s resources, their capabilities, and their historical successes. Second, is the action. This includes the ‘what’, and would explain the specific outline and implementation of the policy. Usually, delegate’s will provide historical or empirical examples of prior success, or explicitly warrant why such an action will work. Third, especially in the case of a military or



individual directive, a delegate will provide a timeline. This timeline should be specific, and explain the logistics of any operation. Be specific! Additionally, delegates should remember that this committee will persist until the opening of WWI - which practically means the committee date will span from 1871 until around 1914. Furthermore, if room permits, delegates should explain roadblocks to their proposals, and how their policy will overcome predicted difficulties. Finally, remember to roleplay! Neither WWI or WWII have occurred yet. Thus, unlike in other, less formal committees, instances of historical revisionism or ‘knowing the future’ will not be tolerated (e.g., the German delegate suddenly conceiving, on the eve of 1914, of arresting all German colonels by the name of ‘Hitler’ and executing them).

## Parliamentary Procedures and Setting

The Committee’s starting date is June 1871 and will end around 1914, on the eve of the first world war. All times, dates, and actors in committee shall reflect this period.

The concert of Europe developed under a unique set of parliamentary functions;<sup>1</sup> indeed, while the first Vienna Congress of 1814 had voting actors, those actors had no standardized procedural processes.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, in 1814, the set powers constituting the informal pentacacy represented but a small sect of allies: Austria, Britain, Russia, Prussia, and France - although the latter was largely a newly formed government upon the restoration of the Bourbons in 1814 after the signing of the Treaty of Paris ended the Napoleonic wars. In addition, the Congress of

---

<sup>1</sup> By parliamentary procedures, I simply mean the task of how a deliberative assembly carries forth business: RONR (11th ed.), p. Xxx: “The term parliamentary procedure, although frequently used synonymously with parliamentary law, refers... to parliamentary law as it is followed in any given assembly or organization, together with whatever rules of order the body may have adopted.” In layman terms, parliamentary procedure references both the customs and the explicit rules followed by an assembly (Loveland 2018).

<sup>2</sup> See RONR, pages xxix to xxxiii for a rough review of the deployment of parliamentary procedure in Europe.



Vienna was not a continuing body but adjourned *sine die*, or would end the session in totality, after a resolution of met. For practical purposes, this Committee will not adjourn at the end of each session, so as to maintain the fair coherence of the speakers list and composition of resolution groups.

Consequently, due to the lack of a standardized rules of order, or that of a distinctly homogeneous set of customs - as existed in Britain or America - the Concert of Europe would function off two separate functions of rules: those established by custom, and those codified as a special rule of order. For practical purposes in this committee, there will be three functional sets of rules. First, are the UCIMUN Rules of Order. While the Concert of Europe clearly did not follow all of these rules, these generalized sets of procedures are standardized amongst MUN conferences, and suitable as a starting place for delegates. Second, are the special rules of order. These are rules that modify the existing UCIMUN rules of order, and are explained in depth below. These may be amended by a two-thirds ( $\frac{2}{3}$ ) vote, which reflects the changing procedural motions of the 18th to 19th centuries. And finally, third, are the customs and traditions of the assembly. These may, in fact, seemingly contradict the special rules and UCIMUN rules, and are permissible until they either fall to the ground from a point of order by a delegate, or voted upon appeal.

Ultimately, it is the hope of this committee that the very procedures and functions of the Concert of Europe portray the evolution of diplomacy; namely, that from informally established customs to, what would eventually be, the United Nations stance of total equality under the law.

### **Observer States**



For practical purposes, observer states will be allowed to make motions, albeit not to debate. However, similar to other states, if the Concert wishes not to hear from these states, or wishes to label them as pariahs, a motion to censure is in order.

### Special Rules of Order

In contemporary parliamentary procedure, special rules of order modify the rules of order in a given assembly: (RONR (11th ed.), p. 15, ll. 25 - 30. These, in effect, supercede any other rules of order in the UCIMUN handguide. These procedures, at the start of the committee are as follows:

#### 1. *Voting.*

- a. *Voice Vote.* Normal UCIMUN protocol requires a counted vote to handle all motions. However, to reflect European customs, voice votes will be taken. These votes, in form, will have the Chair ask the assembly for all aye votes, then all nay votes, and the opinion of the Chair will hold, unless upon a call of *division*.
- b. *Roll Call.* Normal UCIMUN protocol prohibits the use of the roll call vote. However, because the Concert of Europe is predicated on the important concepts of recorded ratification, a call of *division* by any state during a substantive vote on a main motion will result in the calling of each state (aye, nay, or abstain).<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> There is an enormous debate that continues to be made whether ‘procedural votes’ and ‘substantive votes’ are different. In the UN, there is no distinction; for instance, in the Security Council, the 1945 San Francisco Agreement requires that all procedural votes were subject to substantive voting criteria, which in effect made procedural votes subject to the veto (Smith, 2007, p. 194; Malone, 2004, p. 193; Higgins, 2010, p. 174). However, for UCIMUN specifically, the distinction is obvious: “substantive votes are votes on directives and resolutions” (UCIMUN Staff Guide, p. 3). Simply put, on any committee directive or resolution there will be a substantive vote subject to a call of division. On procedural motions - which is anything not a committee directive or resolution - a call for division is not in order. While not technically in line with either contemporary rules or legal philosophy, this allows the committee to operate efficiently.



2. *Motion to Set the Agenda.* Similar to the setting of the agenda of a normal committee, the Concert of Europe, to constrain debate, may at any time move to set the agenda of the committee to a certain topic. In effect, this motion, which requires a two-thirds vote and is not debatable, would set the Concert's focus towards a particular subject, and would constrain debate to solving it, unless the item is postponed. Please note that delegates are not required to set the agenda, and may leave the Concert simply in general debate.
3. *Speaking Times.* While there is little record of the method of speaking formally in the Concert of Europe, in an attempt to reflect first hand accounts, all speeches, once the agenda is set, are subject to germanity - that is, they must be relevant (Sweet 1941; Elrod 1976). If the content of the speech is not relevant to the topic at hand, a delegate may raise a point of order, and the Chair will rule on the question. If the delegate disagrees with the Chair, he may raise an appeal, which is undebatable and subject to a majority vote. Alternatively, delegates may set a specific speaking time by a 2/3rd vote, which is in effect creating a special rule.
4. *Executive Session.* Often times, negotiations were held in secret. To simulate this, a delegate may move for executive session for a specified period of time; at which point, the assembly will be barred from passing notes, moving into informal caucus, or submitting directives. This motion may be submitted to the assembly in the following form: "The Ottoman Empire moves to executive session for 15 minutes." Please note that if the time expires during a speech or other formality, the executive session will persist until the end of that speech.
5. *Censure or ratify.* Any power found to be in violation of a Concert resolution may be subject to a formal censure. This censure would, in effect, designate the power a pariah state and



rescind their voting rights (such as, for instance, occurred with France under Napoleon).<sup>4</sup> This requires a majority vote, and is debatable for two delegates for and two delegates against.<sup>5</sup> This is an extreme action that should be made as a last effort. States may be equally ratified once their aggression has been constrained. This motion may be submitted to the assembly in the following form: “The Ottoman Empire moves to ratify France.”

Should delegates wish to amend these special rules, or add additional rules to refine the committee, they may do so by a two-thirds vote. All special rules must be adopted and turned in to the chair in writing, and are handled as a debatable motion.

### Customs and Traditions

The idea of custom and tradition as the premise of European order has been long established in conservative European literature; central to these new norms was a dichotomous hierarchy, one which divided states between those seen as a ‘great power’, endowed with the responsibility for maintaining international order, and those whose job was more so to narrowly govern the regions directly under their sovereignty.<sup>6</sup> Amongst these customs, a new line of norms emerged under *bellum justum*, of which maintained a strong line of solitary amongst monarchs, especially those considered to be great powers. More specifically, this conception of international norms was premised on a Christian, moral right under Aquinian natural law; such asserted, simply put, that a just war may be waged not only to preserve a positive human right,

---

<sup>4</sup> This is not a procedure in normal parliamentary procedure, in which a censure is merely a condemnation or disapproval (see, e.g., RONR (11th ed.), p. 125). In the United Nations General Assembly more specifically, the formal expulsion of a member requires a 2/3rd vote (UNGA Rules of Procedures, §84).

<sup>5</sup> If this motion passes, delegates themselves are not expelled from the committee, but their country loses the ability to vote, make motions, etc. This does not, however, prohibit the delegate from sending in personal directives, or agreeing to other joint directives. To actually change the diplomatic composition and policy of that delegate, the Concert - or another state unilaterally - must force the government of that state to comply. Such extreme actions will likely be seen as acts of war, and go against the traditions of the Concert.

<sup>6</sup> This hierarchy, to some extent, has been formally codified in the United Nations; see, e.g., Security Council P-5.



but to correct a wrong perpetuated against a natural, ‘inalienable’ right - in this case, the divine rights of a monarch (Miller 1964, p. 260; Bodenheimer 1932). The following procedures and general customs of the committee reflect these assumptions of the Concert:

1. *Voting Rights.* Only the Great Powers shall cast votes during roll calls.
2. *Mandates.* A unanimous signing of any resolution by the Great Powers shall immediately trigger a vote, regardless of debate. This resolution is binding, unless explicitly opposed by a minor state through a directive, and bounded by his given jurisdiction.
3. *Directives and Resolutions.* It is a generally recognized custom that Great Powers will not institute military force without consulting the Concert (minor powers are not constrained to this, as their military’s are not seen as threatening). Furthermore, powers are generally seen as required to adhere to all directives and resolutions passed.

While these customs are not codified, and fall upon a delegate raising to a point of order, such a deviation would represent a decay in the traditional authorities in Europe, which is against the inherent interests of major powers. To avoid immoderate conduct, Great Powers are advised, short of intentionally starting conflict, to avoid modifying these customs. And while minor states may be incentivized to modify these customs to assert their claims of sovereignty, aggressive attempts to change the European order may be met with coercive intervention, or even invasion, by the Great Powers.

Finally, the definition of a ‘Great Power’ is within itself a custom and not codified. The composition can change, given the Concert decides to recognize a minor power as a Great Power by resolution. However, the Concert should temper this power, as minor powers being promoted as Great Powers without the corresponding economic or military capabilities that are inherent to



Great Power status may delegitimize the concert, or worse, inspire nationalist sentiments among actual Great Powers, which could lead to war.

## Directives and Resolutions

### Resolutions

All voting members of the Concert are expected to adhere to all resolutions passed. A resolution may include a treaty, appropriate territory and funds, create military coalitions, or any other action deemed necessary by the Concert. Minor powers that are voting members are expected to de facto adhere to resolutions, and if in explicit violation, may have their voting rights rescinded by a majority vote, under the debatable motion to *censure*.

### Committee Directives

The Concert may, at its discretion, issue a full Committee directive. In effect, the Concert, and any signers, will adopt the stance of the directive and act in force. These directives, while not holding the binding power of a treaty under a resolution, may assist in mitigating current harms, or in collecting information. Finally, these directives may be useful in informing other states of Concert action, or in preparing for a full resolution. Often times, these directives are used to allocate troops from a given nation, direct forces, in a manner that is recognized by all the Great Powers. Committee Directives have the following characters:

1. *Jurisdiction*. They are not binding on those who vote against them and do not sign. Any Great Power voting against the Committee directive is de facto recognized to refuse enforcement. Minor Powers are assumed to act in compliance with any Committee directive, although they may refuse by issuing a personal directive.
2. *Vote Required*. Such directives only require a majority vote.



3. *Restrictions.* Cannot form or create any new international body or coalitional force, although it can direct individual national forces.
4. *Form.* A Committee Directive consists of only operative, not preambulatory clauses.

### Joint Directives

Similar to a committee directive, these directives are cosponsored state by state, and are often used to maneuver military forces. However, unlike a committee directive, these directives do not require a vote by a committee; likewise, they are not recognized by the Concert, and are likely subject to discretion by national leaders. Thus, they may be declared null, depending on their content.

### Individual Directives

Unlike the Committee or Joint directives, individual directives allow a delegate to use his individual national powers. Delegates are reminded, however, that they act as dignitaries for peace, and not as military leaders, in their capacity in the concert; thus, directives deemed to violate Concert decorum, e.g. attempting to assassinate fellow leaders, invading states, etc. will not be tolerated. That being stated, national leaders will listen carefully to the advice of delegates, and, barring exceptionally aggressive acts, will often heed such directives, at least in part. Individual directives have the following characteristics:

1. *Jurisdiction.* These directives are binding asofar the statement issuing it has the authority to do so, and national leaders in said state concur with the given directive. Alternatively, individual delegates do have some personal authority - for instance, in releasing press releases.
2. *Vote Required.* Such directives only require only the signature of the state issuing the directive.



3. *Form.* An individual directive consists of only operative, not preambulatory clauses; however, in issuing such actions, delegates are permitted brief explanations to explain to nation leaders why such a directive should be implemented.

Please note that while the crisis will answer personal directives for information, that this information should not be obnoxiously specific: crisis will not answer questions such as ‘the specific demographic breakdown of ‘x’ city at ‘y’ time’. Nor will crisis entertain directives that are hyper-specific military deployments. While delegates may inquire and request their state’s to employ certain actions to achieve desirable outcomes, the delegates of the concert are to be reminded they are diplomats, not military generals.

### **Portfolio Powers**

At the opening of the committee, delegates will be given profiles outlining their state’s material and political capabilities. While delegates are free to verbally inform other states of their capabilities, they are encouraged to be discreet: indeed, especially for states with extensive spy networks and military fortifications, it may be in the interest of that state not to reveal further information. Negotiations, while built off trust, also require the ability of delegates to offer ‘sticks and carrots’, not just ‘carrots.’ Delegates may assume portfolios will include the following, detailed information:

1. *Overview.* This will outline an outline of the delegate’s state, including the name, population, economic output, and other features relevant to an overview of the state. Finally, the state will be marked as a ‘Great Power’, ‘Minor Power’, or ‘Observer Power.’
2. *Military.* This will outline the military status of a delegate’s state, divided by six theaters: Europe (North, South, and East) Africa (North, Central, and South), Asia (North, Central, and



South), North America (East and West), South America (West and East), and Pacific (specified by area, e.g. Australia). Military status will be divided into five levels.

3. *Economic.* This will outline the economic status of a delegate's state, given industrial output, economic equality, government debt, and several other indicators. For this committee, we recognize that sheer, raw economic data is not useful for delegates, and thus, delegates, similar to military capability, will be provided five levels of economic prosperity for each corresponding indicator. For example, government debt may range from the first level, or 'Extreme deficit' to 'Extreme surplus.'

4. *Political.* This outline the willingness of the domestic public, along with the regime type of the state, to engage in intervention. This will designated by five levels, ranging from 'Isolationist' to 'Jingoistic.' Delegates should also note that the public sentiment of intervention may not reflect the given administration. Delegates, as such, will need to balance these interests in achieving peace.

5. *National Interests.* Delegates will be provided rough goals set forth by their given administration. Meeting these goals will provide credibility to the delegation, furthering enabling the use of troops, appropriation of resources, etc. Equally, a failure to meet national interests will result in delegates being constrained, as domestic administrations lose trust in the delegations to fulfill national objectives.

Please note that for several of the indicators, such as aggregate debt or income, we may denote numbers as to represent the scale of the economy compared to other states (for instance, an 'Extreme surplus' Spain does not have the economy to bail out 'Extreme deficit Britain, despite the opposite perhaps being true). Equally, this will exist for military or political interests



(the size of the British navy is difficult to compare to say, Greece, without the use of aggregate numbers. Simply put, Greece can improve its navy, but it will be improving its navy for a significant period of time before it can even think of competing with Britain).

Finally, it is possible for state's to become occupied. If a state becomes occupied, they will be offered an opportunity to either collaborate with occupiers or go into exile. The dias will exchange their placard, and their portfolio powers will be updated. While occupying a perceivably annoying state or delegate may seem like a good idea for a Great Power, intervention will likely be met by international condemnation, or worse, ethnic and nationalist sentiments arising in the region and threatening the traditional order. Delegates are incentivized, therefore, to maintain domestic regimes, even if that means they persist only in name.



## Topic A: The Concert of Europe

### Introduction

It was in the year 1789 that geopolitical conceptions of ideology, function, and practice would change forever under the simple, but eloquent, phrase: *Liberté, égalité, fraternité* (Stephen, 1993, pp. 219 - 226; Censer, 2008, pp. 22 - 27). The chief result of this revolution, even prior to the wars of the 19th century, was the suppression of traditional, feudal institutions of authority, and the transition to national identities, radical social change, and evolving ideas that would move Europe towards, as Tocqueville observed, “[abolition] of the ancient common law of Europe” (Tocqueville, 1856, pp. 19 - 21). Indeed, Europe in the 19th and 20th century was a tumultuous and tensioned zone of political unrest and insurrection; and, within approximately a century, the great powers of Europe would, while adding 8,880,000 square miles of territory, fall into an alliance trap that would result in the first world war (Stuchtey, Anghie, 2005, 347 - 48, 363). Even beyond this time, imperial powers on other continents, especially the United States and Japan, would extend their influence while threatening European powers (Wesling, 2011, pp. 120 - 132).

Between 1799 and 1814 the Napoleonic wars consumed Europe, further shaking the established monarchical order and collapsing the *ancien regime* of feudalism across the continent (Thompson, 1994, 37 - 58; Perkins, 2004, pp. 96 - 105). By late 1814, however, Napoleon, facing a defection by Prussia and invasion by Britain, was forced to surrender and consequently exiled to Elba (Grab, 2005, pp. 13 - 18, 202 - 37). At this time, coalition forces, reformed themselves into the Vienna Congress, which acted as grounds to restore the European order



(Vick, 2014, pp. 16 - 39). Between 1814 and 1815, the Congress established several important focuses: first, that international law was a function of interests and relative power amongst the Great Powers, and that the body of these powers, known as the Concert, in balancing both strengths and interests, would achieve a just outcome. Second, the Concert successfully provided a forum and body to adjudicate imperial struggles, both over territory and land (Crawford, 2011, pp. 507 - 09). Third, in conjunction with the anti-liberal Carlsbad degrees in Germany, the Concert reimposed the conservative order of European monarchies (Smith, 2015, pp. 243 - 45).

The Concert, between 1830 through the 1850s and into the Crimea War, which shortly pitted Great Powers against each other, would play an important role in the peace process (Lambert, 1991; Copeland, 2014, pp. 388 - 93). But, as the Concert slowly moved towards centralizing the norms and interests of major powers, reactionaries began to emerge. In Germany in particular, nationalists, disillusioned with the marginalized place of the German Confederation as a result of both late unification and industrialization, began to increasingly make aggressive demands, and such demands began to inspire others (Manjapra, 2014, pp. 16 - 39). By the end of the 1860s, the German confederation had not only established several African colonies, but soon came to dominate European military affairs, decisively defeating the French in 1870 during the Franco-Prussian war (Grimmer-Solem, 1998, pp. 153, 170 - 75). Shortly thereafter, Prussia dissolved the confederation of states, and became a single unified nation-state. The rise of Germany, confounded with the developments of an independent Greece, increasingly active foreign wars, and unrest in Spain, thereby left the concert in a precarious predicament: as imperial interests, both in the colonies and mainland Europe, nationalist rhetoric and the paradoxical interest in liberalization increasingly came at odds with the traditional order of



European affairs. The Concert, by 1870, was thereby tasked with not only balancing these interests, but constraining them to maintain the ancient order (Schroeder, 1984, pp. 16 - 25).

## Description

### Prelude to the Concert

The age of Napoleon, and ultimately the war that would lead to the creation of the European Concert, occurred between 1803 to 1815. During this period, Napoleon, who was crowned Emperor of France in 1804, removed several prominent political figures, including Joseph I, the King of Spain, who was replaced by Napoleon's brother, Joseph Bonaparte (Woolf, 2015, pp. 1 - 15, 26). The French military, opposed to the fifth coalition of traditional European powers aimed at restoring French monarchy, effectively routed allied forces (Schroeder, 1984, pp. 16 - 25). As a result, coalition states, which included Austria, were forced to sign the Treaty of Schönbrunn, a disastrous treaty for coalition forces that required the cession of important Adriatic ports on the Mediterranean sea (Breuilly, 2014, pp. 120 - 26). Austria, along with Denmark, Spain, Italy, and German states - which then included the Rhine Confederacy and Prussia - were forced to apply for Napoleon's Continental system, effectively instituting a massive economic embargo on Britain, and solidifying power under the French administration (Rose, Hecksher, and Westergrad, 1923, p. 89).<sup>7</sup> By 1806, Napoleon, seeking to cripple Britain, issued the Berlin Decree, thereby codifying the embargo on Britain. As a result of such massive instability, and especially wary of the violence of the French revolution, the European nobility--both scholars

---

<sup>7</sup> Interestingly, there never existed a united political coalition in Britain against France; unlike the eventual world wars, which fostered a strong sense of unity and nationalism in Britain, Napoleon's conflict did not. Such a phenomenon continues to be of interest to scholars in IR theory, and remains debated (Hall, 1999, pp. 53 - 57).



and diplomats alike--grew the consensus that the conservative monarchical order was under threat (Driault, 1919, pp. 603 - 24).

The background of this enormous change in European geopolitical structures, while surprising to most powers at the time, wasn't impossibly remarkable given the context; indeed, Europe had been in a state of perpetual war against Revolutionary France between 1793 - 1801, with limited success in border regions along the Rhine (Merriman, 2014, pp. 456 - 70). European powers, in conjunction with Austria, Prussia, Spain, Britain, and a number of other states, sought to alleviate this situation and had therefore initially constituted the First Coalition, which had aimed at containing unrest in France (Rose, 1903, pp. 287 - 302). Such a coalition, which had decayed to insolvency by 1798, was replaced by the Second Coalition, which, in contrast to the First, had desired to actively counter a now unified France (Sperber, 2017, pp.121 - 23, 140 - 46). While the Second coalition succeeded in driving Napoleon out of Egypt, this merely resulted in returning French forces to overthrow the Directory and install Napoleon as de facto dictator (Woloch, 2001, pp. 10 - 25). Worse yet for the Second Coalition, forces led by Napoleon decisively defeated Coalition forces at the Battle of Marengo, forcing Austria to sign the Treaty of Lunéville in 1800 (Hodge, 2008, pp. 95 - 6). Thus, while diplomats scrambled to make sense of geopolitical change, Napoleon continued to encroach on neighboring states, defeating Spanish King Ferdinand VII and replacing him with Joseph Bonparte I, while also seizing territory in Italy (Davis, 2009, pp. 71 - 93). These military victories thereby established the framework for Napoleon's continental system, while shocking the traditional European hierarchy (Ongaro, 2010, pp. 174 - 90).



Relevant to the eventual concern of the Concert are two important foreshadows to the downfall of Napoleon. First, the decline of the continental system was in part due to the inability to implement Napoleon's system of licenses, while the implementation of contrary orders--such as the import of British cloth for Napoleon's military--further the continental system (Davey, J. 2012, pp. 117 - 24). To make matters worse, the economic panic of 1810 tangibly hurt all of Europe, and undermined the ability of domestic governments to enforce embargoes--especially in France, in which grain shipments, that while on paper were prohibited, were simultaneously permitted by licenses called 'permissions', and resulted in the simple translation of grain cost to French peasants (Findlay, 2006, pp. 361 - 63; Neal, 1998, pp. 4 -7). By 1812, especially with numerous armed conflicts, including the full defection of the Russian Empire, Napoleon was forced to issue new licenses for more British goods to boost tariff income, thereby providing an informal admission that the blockade was a failure (Cunningham, 2014, pp. 55 - 64). Overall, this technical failure of policy implementation strengthened the European assumption that a decay in traditional order equated to a decay in the capability to domestically govern, and thus, maintain the conservative monarchical order.

Secondly, the continental system was undermined by a number of rebellions and military losses. In Austria, Tyrol revolted in 1809, forcing French garrisons to crack down; as conflict grew in the Austrian provinces, French control over Italy began to decline, and by 1809 the lack of French order resulted in a wave of crime and rebellions, especially in the Kingdom of Naples (Davis, 2009, pp. 295 - 316; Thornhill, 2013, pp. 219 - 28). In Spain, while the 200,000 strong garrison maintained order, regular raids and attacks by guerrilla troops became a strain on French manpower (Horward and Tone, 1996, p. 35); and indeed, while French marshals were able to



drive the British-Portuguese expeditionary force out of Spain and back into Portugal, both the war in Russia and increasingly aggressive internal rebellions led by nationalists would undermine French control (Bowen, and José, 2007, pp. 16 - 21). By 1813, French forces had retreated from Spain back into France, resulting in Napoleon stripping Joseph Bonaparte of his throne (Broers, 2015, pp. 236 - 39). Finally, the French invasion of Russia, which had initial success in the opening of 1812, became a quickly disastrous campaign (Esdaile, 2019). However, extensive Russian resistance, including the use of scorched earth tactics, would result in a mere, short lived pyrrhic victory for the French; and while Napoleon would seize Moscow in late 1812, dwindling supplies and the freezing winter would force retreat (Adams, 2014, pp. 374 - 413). By the opening of 1813, French forces had suffered a loss of almost 380,000 men (Lieven, 2017). Worse yet for the French, while internal dissent strained supplies and manpower, the Sixth Coalition, which emerged as opportunistic powers--such as Prussia, Austria, and several other German states--sought to finally defeat Napoleon (Lüke, 2009; Kuehn, 2012; Dwyer, 2008, pp. 623 - 30). The allies, who had offered peace accords under the Frankfurt proposals in 1813, rescinded efforts for peace as French forces began to crumble (Riley, 2000, pp. 203 - 07); indeed, while Napoleon won a number of victories against the Germans in 1812, by late 1813, British troops, successful in the Peninsular War, convened from the South, forcing Napoleon to defend France (Fisher and Fremont-Barnes, 2001). With less than 80,000 soldiers to the Coalition forces of over 400,000, Napoleon was forced into surrender under the Treaty of Fontainebleau, effectively banishing him to the island of Elba and marking an end to his reign (Mikaberidze, 2011; Grant, 1984, pp. 134 - 48; Young, 1914, pp. 37 - 41) .



These systemic problems in Napoleon's system would lead to a greater consensus among the international community: not only that revolutionary regimes were existential threats, but economic and military action against fellow European states, in contrast to international norms, would not be beneficial. While this consensus, as evident by a number of conflicts in the Balkans, and eventually by the 1870s unification of Germany and defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian war, held little practical existence, it provided a foundation for the Concert of Europe (Wawro, G. (2010, pp. 12 - 21; Saunders, 2000, pp. 85 - 90) . Worrying, however, was the precedence of the war: nationalists, emboldened by the perceived existential threat of the great powers, and with a number of minor powers in decay - especially the legitimacy of the Spanish throne - increasingly made demands. No longer was discourse focused on 'war' but 'revolution' (Rogers, 2015, 77 - 79; Blanning, 2003, pp. 62 - 63).

Perhaps the largest effect of these wars, and corresponding lack of authority as a result of social instability in France and abroad, was the decay and subsequent centralization of customs. Empirical evidence substantiates this transition; between 1700 to 1789, customs of governance, measured in consistency in physical size of a territory and urban population, while heterogeneous in technical leadership--as evident by the constant shifting of power between kings--were otherwise homogeneous. However, beyond 1789 radical change emerged, with population and provincial governance rapidly transforming, especially in the Rhine. Such changes indicated a massive shift away from traditional feudal institutions, of which, would result in the institutional consolidation of power, and most impactfully, a growing sense of national identity (Dincecco, 2010). In response, while the Concert of Europe, under the Vienna Congress, met to discuss the



formalities of territory and rules, it evolved into a symbolic alliance against liberal and nationalist sentiments (Langhorne, 1986, pp. 313–324).

### **Formation of the Concert and the Congress of Vienna**

The formation of the Concert led to a corresponding call to order of the Congress of Vienna in 1814. This body, in its function, allegedly sought to resolve power conflicts and thus prevent another great war. However, disputes emerged between delegations upon the procedural function of the Congress, with a number of powers fearing that indecisiveness would permit minor powers the ability to interfere with territorial settlements. The procedural questions of the Congress--such as voting rights, operation, and method of transacting policy discussion--thereby became of significant importance.

At this point, two primary views emerged: the first, propelled by British delegate Castlereagh, proposed a delegation system of powers to special commissions under the Great Powers, although overseen by the whole body of Europe. Castlereagh, argued that such a system would balance the interest of individual rights for minor powers and the practical necessity of enforcement by the Great Powers. The second view, propelled by Prussian delegate Humboldt, contended that the distribution of territories out of the Napoleonic wars ought to be solely decided by the Great Powers. Moreover, Humboldt contended that Germany, which was responsible for its own independence and rebellion against France, ought to therefore have a unique and autonomous control over the unification of its confederacy. In response, a compromise was reached: while the Great Powers would make initial decisions as to the territorial divisions, with Germany operating autonomously, lesser states of Europe would be able to comment and delegate further authority (Jarrett, 2016, pp. 69 - 71, 89 - 94).



The peace in Europe would be short lived, with Napoleon escaping Elba in 1815 to return to France. Shortly after his arrival, French troops sent to arrest him defected against the newly restored Bourbon Monarchy, and within weeks Napoleon marched on, and seized control of Paris, effectively exiling the French government (Connelly 2006, pp. 200 - 16). The response of the Vienna Congress was swift: almost 150,000 troops were assembled, and the united voice of the Great Powers unanimously concurred that peace could not exist with Napoleonic France. As a result, the Seventh Coalition was convened, and by June of 1815, crushed French troops at the battle of Waterloo, effectively ending any hope of Napoleonic France (Barbero, 2006; Fremont-Barnes, 2016, pp. 47 - 55).

The effective response of the Congress to a perceived threat to international stability, whose purpose was now substantiated by Napoleon's attempt to seize power, served to reinforce the fears held by many in the European conservative order.

### **Collapse of the Congress System and Revival**

Between the 1820s and 1830s, the Congress system began to significantly decay, both in perceived power and actual authority. As the Napoleonic wars came to an end, numerous powers began to reimpose national interests over the common good. For instance, the United States enforced the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America and Britain opened trade routes, actively preventing France or Russia from intervening against Spanish colonial revolutionaries that sought independence (Jarrett, 2016, p. 343). Colonial disagreements grew to parliamentary disagreements, and by late 1818, at the Congress of Aix-la-Chap, Britain forced a closure of discussions on the Spanish colonies. This effectively nullified the informal agreement of Great Powers to mediate conflict through the Congress system; perhaps yet worse for the Congress



system, the parliamentary de facto exclusion of minor powers, and in the case of Latin America, Spain, delegitimized any real compromise (Webster, 1915, pp. 632 - 37). Most importantly, this example set forth the dangerous precedence of national interest over maintenance of the traditional order (Waddell, 1987, pp. 16 - 18).

Scholars generally identify five potential explanations for these occurrences. The first is rather obvious; namely, that the very purpose of the concert ceased to exist: to act to minimize the transaction cost to suppress revolutions and rebellions. It is possible that the assembly, not specified in nature, assumed to cease existence after every adjournment (Jarrett, 2016, p. 363).<sup>8</sup> This explanation seems possible, as the Vienna Congress lacked essential characteristics of a long-standing assembly, especially a formalized code of rules or powers (363 - 364). However, as evident by the large number of revolutions after the 1820s, it seems improbable that the purpose would have expired (Sperber, 2007, pp. 248 - 49; Brown, Paquette, 2013). Furthermore, a number of Congresses, while almost purely symbolic, were called even up to the 1870s (Rosenau, Czempiel, 2010).

The second explanation is the other side of the coin to the first: that the assembly, rather than succeeding in its goal, was doomed to failure by the wide differences in opinion by different European powers (Jarrett, 2016, p. 364). For instance, the Russians envisioned the Congress system as a world government, with binding decisions; in contrast, western Europeans,

---

<sup>8</sup> If one was to understand the Vienna Congress as a special committee in form, this would make sense, as it has long been agreed by parliamentary scholars to cease in existence once the explicit objective has been performed: “A special committee appointed by the society to do a piece of work continues in existence until its duties were performed...” (Robert, 2001, p. 463). *See also:* (AIP, p. 188; RONR, pp. 491 - 92; Demeter’s, pp. 87, 269 - 70). Later, this idea would be codified in the UN Charter under Article 13, paragraph (1)(a), which established the ability to create special committees. In this perspective, the Vienna Congress acted as the first real international, ad hoc body. However, this perspective would also assert the Vienna Congress had indeed succeeded in its objective, as it would follow that success is a necessary condition to dissolution. This is clearly not the case, as evident by the number of revolutions occurring thereafter, e.g., the 1821 rebellion in Serbia.



especially the British--whom could never actually commit to decisions by the Congress without consulting parliament--saw the Congress system as a number of conferences that established norms rather than actions (Jarrett, 2016, p. 364; Cowles, 1990, pp. 691 - 97, 715 - 19). The procedural debates between the British Castlereaghian system, which emphasized the opinion of the entire assembly of delegates and called for moderation, in contrast to the Prussian Humboltian system, which focused on concrete decisions enforced by the Great Powers, foreshadowed and substantiated this view (Jarrett, 2016, p. 364 - 65; Holbraad, 1971). These differences were not particularly surprising, as Britain and France held constitutional governments, while Prussia and Russia operated as autocracies. However, as the League of Nations would later portray in their inability to constrain Japanese aggression in the Pacific, the mere agreement to procedure was not sufficient to solve world problems or legitimize an institution. Empirical literature also calls into question the assumption of different systems lacking in political durability, with a Gurr (2013) finding that, in a study of 336 political systems, ‘pure systems’, or those were either largely democratic or largely autocratic, remained significantly more stable than systems that attempted to maintain a balance (Gurr, Gurr, 1984). If heterogeneity of policies did occur, it is thus unlikely that policy instability that emerged in the 1820s was related to insecurity of domestic political systems.<sup>9</sup> Thus, both the historical and empirical trends tend to indicate that it is unlikely that the failure of the Congress system can be fully attributed to the mere differences in systems.

---

<sup>9</sup> It would be misleading to state this is a completely representative picture; indeed, Gurr’s study persists into the 1970s, during the period of decolonization. However, it does portray that systems of ancient tradition or structure tend to persist better over extended time frames.



A third explanation, largely provided by constructivists, contended that the failure of the Vienna Congress was due largely to being dependent on a small number of individuals (Jarrett 2016, p. 365; Schimmelfennig, 2012, pp. 1 - 4). Delegates and monarchs, who had founded the assembly died or were replaced, as well as their their replacements, did not hold similar notions of international unity. By 1822, Lord Castlereagh had died, and his replacement, Lord Canning, did not hold internationalist sentiments (Jarrett, 2016, p. 365 - 67; Webster, C. K., & Temperley, 1929, pp. 83 - 4, 91 - 2). Likewise, Tsar Alexander of Russia, who died in 1825, was replaced by his brother, Nicholas, who similarly did not hold the Congress in high esteem (Rendall, 2000, pp. 59, 61 - 77). While this explanation is possible, the immediate nature of its predictions fails to account in history. For instance, when the United States Congress failed to ratify President Wilson's League of Nations, such a failure did not immediately doom the organization (Ginneken, 2006, pp. 125 - 92; Clark, 1947, pp. 265 - 73) . Regardless, it is very possible that the change in the personal composition of the Congress did contribute to its decline.

A fourth explanation relies on a constructivist argument on socioeconomic changes in the times: indeed, as England progressively industrialized between 1820 and 1840, gaps began to widen between west and east (Jarrett, 2016, p. 366 - 67; Cannadine, 2011, pp. 82 - 87). Furthermore, ideas of liberalism and nationalism, largely byproducts of the European enlightenment, continued to polarize societies, both culturally and systematically, between east and west (Jarrett, 2016, p. 367). A number of scholars frame such an argument similar to the classical liberal democratic peace theory: that similar states get along easier, and that homogeneity between regulatory regimes, institutions, and administrations incentivizes



cooperation through a reduced transaction cost. Ultimately, this mutual trust is reinforced through transaction, which is in turn inferred to create a climate of peace (Doyle, 2005).

Of course, this explanation relies on a classical liberal model of mutual benefit. However, as evident by the first world war, this seems to lack sufficient historical evidence; by 1914, both Britain and Germany were industrialized, and both held colonies and European institutions (Gordon, 1974, pp. 191 - 266). It seems, therefore, that the notion of Thucydides trap, or a phenomenon driven by the polarization of state factions as a result of the dual concerns of power and insecurity of power among rational actors as to the intentions of their peers, creates a perverse incentive for military alliances that are self replicating (Rosecrance, Miller, 2014, p. 77). As was in the first world war, this alliance system only creates larger more infrequent wars, rather than preventing them (Rosato, 2003, pp. 586, 599 - 600).

Despite these many conflicts and practical insolvency, the Congress system did not dissolve, even after disagreements over Spanish colonies in the Americas. In 1820, the Troppau Congress established the formal concept of *ipso facto*, which expelled states from the European identity whose governments had changed through revolution (Clark, 2007, 94). A year later, the Laibach Congress created a nearly unanimous consensus that violent revolts in any European state were a threat to the whole, and in doing so, created a *cassius bellius* for intervention against perceived usurpers to the traditional authority. (93 - 97). However, despite these symbolic sentiments, the Concert failed to intervene in a number of crises, including the Crimea war between Britain and Russia from 1853 to 1856, the Polish Revolution in 1863, and, most recently, the Franco-Prussia war of 1870 (Jarrett, 2016, p. 368; Wawro, 2010, pp. 16 - 29, 315 - 21).



While not fully revived yet, the Congress system began to reemerge in legitimacy by 1871. While the Berlin Conference in response to the scramble for Africa has yet to be called, the German unification under the Treaty of Frankfurt and subsequent conception of *weltpolitik*, or global hegemony, had begun to be developed by Chancellor Bismark of Germany, and such a fluctuation in the relative power of continental Europe, as was recognized by the great powers, threatened the traditional order (Taussig, 1928, p. 178; Dedinger, 2011, pp. 1032 - 41; Greisman, 1994, pp. 41 - 6). Other critical events, including withdrawal of French troops protecting the Pope and the subsequent and probable unification of Italy under the *risorgimento*, shift power in South Europe away from traditional authorities, and represent a transition of power away from the Catholic Church and towards nationalist identities (Riall, 2006, pp. 11 - 28; Kertzer, 2005). As such, while the Committee has not formally declared an agenda or policy, the growing need for compromise over colonies and changing power has brought the Congress together.<sup>10</sup>

### Topics of Concern for the Concert

While the Concert will be allowed to consider topics outside of the synopsis, and respond as necessary, several pressing topics remain of significant importance, and will be difficult for any statesmen to ignore. However, delegates are encouraged to also at least consider other topics, especially the aforementioned unrest in Italy and Spain. Furthermore, even in lieu of Concert agreement, it is likely that states will interact with these crises, potentially leading to war. As always, delegates are encouraged, in an attempt to prevent armed conflict and maintain order, to mediate these disputes through the Concert.

---

<sup>10</sup> It is important to note that the actual Berlin Conference was not historically called until 1884. However, the Berlin Congress was called in 1878, and numerous other congresses were called prior, but simply failed to come to a consensus. It is fundamentally left to delegates to decide how to move forward.



### The Scramble for Africa

While European leaders have yet to formally draw regions of hegemonic influence, Africa has long been a bastion for European trade; indeed, Cape Town in South Africa, for instance, was founded by Dutch East Indian Company in 1652 in order to control shipping routes to India and Asia (Worden 2012). In North Africa, Italian states and Sicilian possessions included dozens of scattered colonies, including important bases in Algeria and Tunisia (Clancy-Smith, J. A., 2012, pp. 124-30). The Iberian Peninsula, once dominated by North African Muslim states, was under complete Christian control by 1491 after centuries of *Reconquista*, or ‘reconquest,’ thereby permitting the consolidation of power both in Spain and Portugal (Edwards, 2004, pp. 163 - 181). As a result of the vacuum left by Muslim states, these states colonized and partitioned areas in Morocco, the Mediterranean, and Algeria (Anderson and Bort, 1998, pp. 124 - 131; Kennedy, 2016, pp. 95 - 106). This transition of authority away from Muslim powers represented a new trend in European economic and social enterprise, especially as would become in the involvement of European officials in the legal system--this staunch contrast, Western civil code and Islamic Sharia law--would rapidly materialize as an erosion of indigenous and traditional authorities, allowing European powers to solidify not only economic, but cultural power projection (Christelow, 2016, pp. 13 - 17). Furthermore, as larger European states began to colonize North Africa, minor powers in Europe, especially in on the shores of Mediterranean, sought protection from Great Powers (Blockmans, 1996, pp. 244 - 250). For instance, on the island nation of Malta specifically, British interests in access to the Mediterranean would manifest not only as a voluntary agreement as a British protectorate, but as a fully annexed territory by the British empire. British influence would be secured in the 1815 Treaty of



Paris and reaffirmed by the Congress of Vienna, only further incentivizing British officials to take interest in North African enterprises, especially the Suez Canal (Chapman, 2006, p. 53). Other bordering territories, such as the Iberian ‘rock’ of Gibraltar, fell under British control as a number of disputes over the Habsburg-Bourbon dynasties resolved itself in 1783 under the Treaty of Versailles (Lancaster and Taulbee, J., 1985, pp. 252 - 53). These interests, in their totality, represented the British interest of controlling access to foreign markets, while balancing the increasingly aggressive foreign policies of Spain and France (Chapman, 2006, p. 51 - 55).

It is important to note that while these colonies functioned as extensions of these states, their method of governance was very different, and generally reflected the interests of those states; while Spanish, Portuguese, and French colonies functioned as virtual provinces of their homelands, British, Italian, and Dutch colonies maintained independent, largely autonomous governors sent under a policy of benign neglect (Strang, 1991, pp. 22 - 49). In turn, these methods of governing reflected a nearly dichotomous set of desires from their corresponding states: states from predominantly Southern Europe, especially Catholic states, set out to evangelize and assimilate natives into a single, largely homogenous empire; in contrast, British and Dutch interests rested in maximizing a return in profits to banking institutions, a policy that necessitated minimal intervention in day to day affairs to mitigate production deficiencies from local reactionaries (Lee, 2012, pp. 1 - 3).<sup>11</sup> Regardless of these differences, it is generally recognized that all European states practiced, in some variation, a form of cultural imperialism, which in effect sought to normalize and establish European power within those territories; as a

---

<sup>11</sup> This was not always the case, especially in Italy wherein prior to the unification in 1815, large numbers of Italian and Sicilian merchants used these bases as ports for trade, thus reflecting closer to a British system. Nevertheless, these never grew to the scope or capacity of other European expeditions that would follow at the end of the 19th century (Allen 1997; Fuller, M., & Ben-Ghiat (2008)).



result, these power projections would come to represent the interests of that state, with British jurisdictions autonomous but economically productive, while French and Spanish jurisdictions were controlled and autocrat, but in the process of assimilation (Blanton, Mason, and Athow, 2001, pp. 477 - 81).<sup>12</sup> Finally, until the latter part of the 19th century, many colonies in Europe existed as functions of trading companies granted charters under individual states; these charters, however, gradually decayed as companies called on their corresponding state to enforce their claims, leading to the corresponding state to seize the colony (Pearson, 1971, pp. 76 - 85). This emerged as a particular fact of African colonialism, for instance, in German colonies, with German East Africa, located in modern Tanzania, only falling into the German Empire after the German East African Company requested military assistance in suppressing local tribes (Friedrichsmeyer, 2011, pp. 7 - 12).

There groups were particularly interested in distinct regions of trade in informalized spheres of influence. By the 1850s, France had, for instance, strong ambitions to found an enormous North-West African Empire, which would reunite Timbuktu to control coveted access to Senegalese markets through the newly acquired Algeria; and while French losses in Europe would largely hinder the practicality of these efforts, French policy by 1870 securely laid a theoretical claim to the region, although it would continue to be practically stunted by the inability of French governance to operate in the paradigms of local, largely tribal government (Duignan and Gann, 1981, p. 144, 284 - 94). These interests, while politically centered on assimilation, were also economically concerned with cotton production (Diouf, 1998, pp. 676 -

---

<sup>12</sup> It is important to note that British policies were not necessarily benign; while French policies were always immediately autocratic, and often repressive, the long implications of British colonies trended towards racial segregation, and eventually, in particularly South Africa, apartheid (Njoh (2007), pp. 579 - 85).



78). By 1842, the total value of the textile industry accounted for 42% of total French industrial output, and with the outbreak of the American Civil War in 1862, and French policy makers were forced to invest heavily in cotton cash crops in colonial territories (Roberts, 1996, pp. 48 - 51).<sup>13</sup>

While these policies were functional while Africa was largely unclaimed, increasingly hostile border disputes, confounded with massive expansions in economic and social infrastructure, have lent a concern by statesmen that such a situation threatens to spark a war between major powers (Killingray, 1989, pp. 484 - 88). Several major developments have lent credence to this concern; in 1869 the opening of the Suez Canal revolutionized both trade to India and geopolitical implications of power projection. Both military convoys and trade vessels, for instance, could travel from India to Europe in record times; worse yet, localized unrest in the area, combined with enormous maintenance costs, has resulted in threats by British authorities to seize control of Canal from French investors (Gann and Duignan, 1971, p. 55). This threat is generally reasserted by the massive British investment in the region. Over 872 million tons of British yarn annually move through the Suez, and after the Second Opium War in 1863, tea imports significantly increased (Fletcher, 1958, pp. 556, 567 - 68).<sup>14</sup> Moreover, while both French and German economic interests equally require access to the Suez, especially from German East Africa, the Khedivate of Egypt, which is formally aligned with the Ottoman Empire, continues to technically control the canal, exerting military and economic hegemony

---

<sup>13</sup> It is important to note that these attempts to assimilation would be largely abandoned by the latter part of the 20th century during decolonization, in part because the assimilation began to imply not only western norms but western labor costs. (Belmessous, 1994, pp. 1532 - 36).

<sup>14</sup> The actual impact of Chinese trade is subject to strict academic scrutiny; indeed, as Dean finds, there is little empirical evidence to substantiate that China represented a significant part of the British economy (Dean, 1976, pp. 74 - 77).



(Porter, 2002, 51 - 55).<sup>15</sup> In turn, while European powers bicker for control of the canal, a united consensus amongst Great Powers observes that a European sanctioned invasion may be necessary to maintain economic security. As a result, this specific conflict represents the internationalized concern of originally small and localized affairs. This reality, while seemingly impossible in 1869, has emerged as a probable likelihood, as the French loss to the Prussian army in 1870 during the Franco-Prussia war has undermined continental French authority, while empowering the newly formed German state, thereby freeing Britain from the only neighboring, traditional competition; the vacuum left by French influence under Napoleon, especially in the Ottoman Empire, has further emboldened Austrian and Russian interests in the Ottoman, thereby leaving the Khedivate of Egypt weak and vulnerable and largely subject to British demands (Bartlett, 1996, pp. 55 - 58). Finally, with the Khedivate of Egypt owing close to £4 million (roughly \$400 million in contemporary measures), a number of European interests are competing for legal ownership of the canal (Wright 2009).

Of course, West Africa and Egypt consist of only a few of the many areas of consideration for delegates in Africa. In terms of resources, rich fields of diamonds discovered in South Africa during the 1870s has only served to enlarge the British mandate, and has justified territorial aggression, further incentivizing the opening of trade in Central and Southern Africa. By 1871, South Africa would be the largest international diamond producer, and by the end of the century, South African gold and diamond trade alone would net alone £89 million (Konczacki, Parpart, and Shaw, 1991, pp. 64, 66 - 72). Moreover, the necessity of inexpensive

---

<sup>15</sup> While Formally aligned with the Ottoman Empire, delegates should note the Khedivate practically functions as an autonomous political entity.



labor and tensions between localized forces became a matter of public policy for British colonialists, paving the way for the beginning of pass laws and racial apartheid in South Africa (Smalberger, 1976, p. 419). Simultaneously, while Belgian authorities have yet to formally make claims, economic pacts in Central Africa have solidified Belgian claims to the region (Wack, 2010, pp. 33 - 37). In these regions, vast sums of rubber and mineral resources provide a strong incentive for colonial interests by minor powers--especially those who have yet to partake in the riches derived from Egypt or Asian trade (Vos, 2013, p. 73).

In summary, while the establishment of European colonies in Africa have been a long existent fact, the formal separation of territories has both yet to be codified and continues to be under dispute. Delegates would be wise, in their course as a Concert member, to significantly invest in negotiating for territory, while also working towards consensus. A failure to do so will likely decay European legitimacy, thereby providing grounds for the undermining of European economic interests, and sparking border conflict in the region. Thus, all delegates, especially Great Powers, are incentivized to cooperate and consensus building in the division of African territories. Minor powers, likewise, are encouraged to use Great Power ambitions to focus on specific regions that they can control, while appeasing larger states.

### **The Eastern Question - The 'Sick Man of Europe'**

The Ottoman Empire has faced a long history of decay and internal struggle; between 1790 and 1830, a number of peasant revolts across Europe, and especially in the Ottoman Empire, under the peasant jacqueries weakened traditional aristocratic authorities and pressured authorities to recognize more nationalist characters.



The first disease afflicting the Ottoman Empire was internal rebellion. Unfortunately, the Sultan's attempt to crackdown on these rebellions made matters considerably worse; in 1795, the counteract rebellions in the Balkans, the Sultan ordered Janarissies, the Ottoman empire's primary elite guard, to crackdown. However, disgruntled janarisses from the failure of the 1789-92 Austro-Turkish war instead joined with Albanian irregulars and the *kircali*, or nomadic bandits, to raid Ottoman holdings, especially those in Bulgaria (Anscombe, 2006, pp. 87 - 97). The resulting conflict devastated the Ottoman empire both materially and politically; in Wallachia and Bulgaria, disaffected imperial soldiers seized imperial grain and tax storages, while irregular soldiers, who took captured Christian and Muslim women as sex slaves, while ornatng their horses in golden armor, stunned European states, whom saw such as a violation of international norms (Turhan, 2014, pp. 103 - 110; Glenny 2018). To further confound the issue, Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798, forcing the Sultan to withdraw troops. In response, rebel forces in the Balkans formed a semi-autonomous state, one which would impose dracian taxes on important agricultural products, especially pigs. By 1804, Christian peasants, disgruntled by Janissary rule, and empowered by liberalized gun policies instituted by the Sultan earlier, joined Ottoman forces and crushed Janissary rebels (Stefanović, 2005, pp. 465-69). In exchange for loyalty, Serbian leaders were permitted to form a proto-autonomous state; this arrangement, however, would not last and by 1810 the First Serbian Uprising would be crushed by an enormous Ottoman army. The resulting carnage of the Ottoman intervention would, again, alarm the Great Powers as reports of men being burned alive, women raped, and children murdered infuriated both domestic and international bodies (Aytekin, 2012, 197 - 201; Glenny 2018). In 1815, Serbian rebels would emerge again and quickly gain recognition as a proto-state by the



Ottoman sultan; this arrangement, however, would continue to decay Ottoman authority, by the mid-part of the Century, the Ottoman Empire, collapsing under the strain of foreign invasion by the Russian Empire and rebellion in Greece, would be forced to grant de facto independence to Serbia (Saracoglu, 2008, pp. 227 - 254; Glenny 2018).

The Serbians were not the only faction to rebel against Ottoman rule; in 1821, disgruntled Greek nationalists, emboldened by Serbian success, ideologically confirmed that independence from the Ottoman's was necessitated by religious autonomy and strongly supported by Russian arms, began a war of independence against Ottoman administrators (Hoffman, 1963, pp. 133 - 135). Initially, the Greek rebellion was largely successful, establishing the Senate of Messinia and ratifying a democratic government; however, by 1827 Greek finances were in disarray - and largely controlled by British and Russian financiers - while Greek forces were being worn down. Most significantly, the Sultan called upon his vassal in Egypt, Mehemmed Ali, who supplied thousands of troops to the Ottoman effort (Dakin, 1973, pp. 121, 164 - 91). By late 1827, Egyptian forces had largely pushed Greek forces from island strongholds in Crete; to make matters more desperate, by 1827 the Senate of Messinia had so thoroughly restricted Executive power that the President was unable to raise further war funds. While the situation remained desperate for Greece, European Great Powers remained astute in neutrality; however, by late 1827 British forces, concerned about Russian threats in Eastern Europe, intervened to block further Ottoman entry into Greece. Ottoman forces, in an alleged misunderstanding with European forces, open fired on a British gunboat, resulting in intervention by the coalition of French, British, and Russian vessels; as a result, in October of 1827, the Battle of Navarino ensued, devastating the Ottoman navy. More specifically, of the initial 89 Ottoman ships, 60 had



been destroyed, and hardly any survived the full trip back to Alexandria (Brewer, 2013, pp. 252 - 55). By 1830, the Greeks, under the Treaty of London, had secured full independence, and formed a new, internationally recognized state (Brewer, 2013, pp. 255 - 57; Aksan, 2007, pp. 260 - 72; Crawley, 2014, pp. 74 - 76).

These internal wars were worsened by explicit intervention by a Great Power: Russia. Between 1828 and 1829, the Russo-Turkish war in the Caucasus both undermined local control by Ottoman authorities while seceding territory over the Black Sea to Russia. The war was disastrous for the Ottomans: the Russian Empire entered the caucuses with over 100,000 troops, and defeated the Ottomans soundedly. Worse yet, the Treaty of Adrianople forced the Sultan to recognize the sovereignty of Greece, and western claims to Eastern Europe (Schneid, 2017). Worryingly, further Russian threats, in lieu of intervention by another Great Power, make another conflict probable (Šedivý, 2011, pp. 206 - 07; Jelavich, 1964).

This decline was worsened by several trends; first, demographic shifts, namely in the increasingly affluent and powerful Christian populace, threatened the traditional Islamic order (Goffman 2012, pp. 109 - 112). In part, this occurred because Ottoman conscription policy, which enslaved young Christian boys into the Janissary corps, which functioned as elite infantry, undermined the Sultan's practical grasp of the empire (Erdem, 2001); indeed, even with the loss at Danube in 1789, with 8,000 Russians routing 120,000 Janissaries, internal opposition by the Janissary corps to any reform prevented desperately needed reorganization (Hanioglu, 2010, pp. 44 - 45). Furthermore, most military revolts were confined to economic grievances, a growing sense of nationalism began to pervade discourse (Coşgel, Miceli, Rubin, 2012, pp. 357 - 71). Structurally, this divide became codified by the internal autonomy granted to Ottoman religious



communities; Christian communities within the Ottoman Empire, while being forced to pay special taxes, were permitted to oversee communal property and adjudicate internal judicial disputes (Göçek, 2002, p. 18). This schism, which had existed since the turn of the 15th century, only worsened with increased inequality. As such, the shifting demographics of the empire, and their corresponding regression, created a nearly unbreakable political stagnation.

Second, the Empire began inundated by debt. Throughout the 1840s, the Empire was forced to make serious economic concessions to European debtors; indeed, in 1844, the Empire debased its currency, and by the late 1860s had nearly a quarter of revenues going towards debt repayment. By the early 1870s, the empire was approaching complete economic ruin, and now, to the concern of European banking establishments, is actively contemplating a total default on debts (Hanioglu, 2010, p. 90; Birdal, 2014, p. 167). To conflate demographic issues, the Empire also had to deal with creditors demanding increasingly autonomous treatment of religious minorities, especially Christians; and while not established yet, the call for a Ottoman Public Debt Administration may legitimize religious grievances within minority populations (Göçek, 2002, pp. 25 - 27). Finally, as was prior noted, economic treaties have slowly evolved into territorial acquisitions; as was seen in European control of the Suez canal under the Khedivate of Egypt, Ottoman governors have been unable to resist calls of creditors for influence in local affairs.

Overall, the Ottoman Empire is teetering on the edge of collapse; and while Russia and other minor powers who have newly secured their independence eagerly await, western states such as Great Britain vye to maintain the Empire, both to protect European banking institutions, and to prevent an open door to the entire Middle East.



## Bloc Positions

### The Great Powers: Great Britain, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia

The policies of the Great Powers, while self-interested, have a generally agreed to consensus that the maintenance of the ancient order of Europe is of utmost importance. These powers generally seek to therefore maintain the relative power, or the military and material capabilities of a state compared to themselves, and oppose change. However, in doing so, these states also recognize the universal necessity to advance their own interests, as to stay up with other Great Powers. In general, these states therefore have to balance between their national interests and preserving global peace.

Defining a great power helps to understand their corresponding policy. Formalistically, scholars have noted three different viewpoints on identifying a Great Power: the first contends a Great Power state has a disproportionately large amount of relative material power. By this, scholars tend to see the power of the state as a function of the military capabilities in exerting a policy matched with the power of other states. In this aspect of international relations, the vast material power of the British fleet would be compared to the material power of a similar state, such as France. As explained by Waltz (1979:131) the material capabilities of a state follow a six tiered function:

Their rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory; resource endowment; economic capacity; military strength; political stability; and competence.



For Waltz and other scholars, this realist perspective had a strong explanatory strength, one that was easy to observe as states', either through diplomacy or espionage, sought to accurately estimate each others capabilities.<sup>16</sup>

The second view holds that while disproportionate relative power is a necessary condition to being a Great Power, it fails to be sufficient. More specifically, these scholars allege that the “nature of interests,” namely their global interests, suffice to push otherwise power but not great nations into the category of a *Great Power* (Bisley, 2012, p. 8). For British historian Tonybee, this simply meant exacting the internationalizing effect of a state's corresponding action (Tonybee, 1925, pp. 4, 7). For more contemporary scholars, this view meant the interaction of the state in more than mere military affairs, but to contemplate, implement, and enforce international rules, precedents, and institutions (Snyder, 1990, pp. 105 - 07). The intent to globalize, and as an incidental effect, hegemonize, meant to these scholars that a state had become a Great Power.

The third and final view asserts that Great Powers are distinguished by what they are not: namely, that Great Powers, whom following the first and second view, both hegemonize and confer rules and institutions, are not liable to follow the constraints of the former (Bisley, 2012, pp. 9 - 12). Under this paradigm, scholars assert that this contrarian system of ‘some states are more equal than others’ legalize hegemonic efforts to control states. Especially inherent to the implicit understanding of the European order, the notion of inequality was not only a necessary, but natural good: without the unequal status of a protector sovereign, these scholars argued, the

---

<sup>16</sup> Waltz is the renowned neorealist, rather than classical realist, scholar. These theories are distinct, and their differences are not merely academic (see, e.g. Donnelly's (2014) critique of Waltz's (1971) neorealism); however, for the purposes of this paper, assume that realism is simply the theory that states, existing in a world of perpetual anarchy, state's seek to maximize their relative power in an effort to survive.



naturally competitive state of man would translate to violence to control the distribution of power. Great Powers, under this view, therefore had a moral duty to maintain power to counteract the effect of the presumed fact of anarchy. To cite Bull (2002), the definition of a Great Powers manifested in their corresponding actions, “by managing their relations with one another, and by exploiting their preponderance in such a way as to impart a degree of central direction to the affairs of international society as a whole” (Bull, 2002; Bisley, 2012).

The world of 1871 Europe is a precarious opportunity for Great Powers. Delegates would be wise to understand their strengths and weaknesses prior to committee, so as to exploit them and to understand their contemporary domestic administrations. Knowing one’s policy means that each delegate will both be able to recite formalized policy changes within their state, as well as adjust to the ever changing nature of international diplomacy. In a multipolar system, as is the context of 1871 Europe, this view was of special preeminence, and defines the special, and common, the interest of all Great Powers: to maintain, and advance, their relative power, while maintaining the global order. Regardless of the particular academic view delegates subscribe to, they are encouraged to work towards this central goal.

**Minor Powers:** The Ottoman Empire, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Italy, Romania, Greece, Serbia

The minor powers of Europe are extremely heterogeneous, both in interests and material capabilities. Italy, a newly formed state, is at the height of its influence and power, with a military that, in the foreseeable future, could challenge a great power (Gooch, 2016, pp. 18 - 35, 73 - 7). In contrast, Spain and the Ottoman Empire are struggling for both financial and territorial



sovereignty, as crippling debt and rampant rebellions undermine their traditional, monarchical authorities (Taagepera, 1978; Lewis, 2000, pp. 215 - 21).

The state of minor powers as an interested geopolitical character remain varied as well. For one, while Great Powers seek to homogenize and stabilize regional authority, most scholars generally concur that minor powers, or those that exist within their region, seek to destabilize, and then second, dominate in an effort to expand influence and thereby survive (Godehardt, Nabers, 2011, pp. 19 - 25). Multipolarity of the international order, or the existence of multiple, competing great powers, only incentivizes this phenomenon, as minor powers can rely on different allies at different times to guarantee their sovereignty from another great power, whilst they pursue national objectives (Garzzn, 2015, pp. 27 - 9). Furthermore, in an effort to legitimize regional authority, minor powers tend to rely on those who set the rules of international affairs, i.e. great powers; in turn, the continued reliance on great powers creates a complicated and weaving web of alliances (Terhalle, 2015, p. 48). Paradoxically, Great Powers are also incentivized to systematically prevent their own allies from obtaining too much power (Terhalle, 2015, pp. 49 - 51; Gray, 2016, pp. 64 - 78). As such, the general interests and actions of minor powers are always subject to their context: while Greece and Serbia may work to lobby Russia to pressure the Ottoman Empire into further concessions, Britain, even if culturally and politically different, may cooperate with the Ottoman Empire to limit Russian expansion.

Again, each minor power is unique and different. Delegates, therefore, are encouraged to thoroughly research and understand their given state. Minor states, furthermore, are heterogeneous in their value to the status quo: while states such as Spain, in both seeking to protect their domestic monarch and foreign colonies, seek to maintain the order, other states,



such as Italy will seek to undermine it to secure foreign interests in foreign theaters, especially in Africa. Understanding and researching policy is therefore key for minor powers understanding their role in the Concert.

### **Observer and Emerging Powers: United States, Japan**

The role of observer powers is unique in both their relationship and interest to Great Powers. Functionally, these powers exist in significant areas of European economic and colonial interests, and both have drafted policies potentially threatening them. In America, the United States, under the Monroe Doctrine (1823), has prohibited European interventions (Murphy, 2005, pp. 32 - 35, 97). While the actual practical reality of military intervention against a Great Power is subject to scrutiny, many European powers, interested at the time either in the African or Asian theaters, or preoccupied with Napoleon, generally adhered to the doctrine (Gilderhus, 2006, pp. 8 - 11). However, for Spain specifically, this policy of non-intervention eroded traditional authority, as numerous Latin American states have since declared wars of independence, including Columbia (1810), Mexico (1821), Chile (1823), Bolivia (1824), and Argentina (1853) (Root, 2017, pp. 7 - 15; Burkholder, Johnson, 2010). Perhaps worst for the consistency of international law, while France was allowed to invade Mexico in 1861 with little protest from the United States, US diplomats have heavily pressured Spanish diplomats not to continue such policies in current Spanish colonies, such as Cuba. To further complicate matters, Great Britain has pressured European powers to stay out of America in an attempt to stabilize trade and undermine French claims, and as such, has dissuaded most minor powers from protecting colonies (Kaufmann, W. W. (1967, pp. 53 - 61, 182 - 200). Thus, the United States,



while recovering from a lengthy civil war, has emerged a virtually unchallenged hegemon in the Americas (Strang, 1990, pp. 849 - 50; Clark, 2009, pp. 18 - 25).

Perhaps worst for the European powers, the United States has taken a rather nationalist pending jingoistic approach to foreign policy under the narrative of ‘manifest destiny’ (Stephanson 1996, pp. 66 - 95). Having seized coast to coast, the United States has further exerted their hegemony over Latin American neighbors, under a policy of ‘gunboat diplomacy’. (Brewer, 2006, pp. 35 - 59; McPherson, 2013). To further compound the growing power of the United States, in 1858, American diplomats opened Japan to trade under the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, expanding the economic interests of both, at large exclusion of European powers (Bernhofen, Atsumi, 2011, p. 4; Auslin, 2009, p. 137).

The growing power of the United States has now opened and empowered another state: Japan. While the state of Japan has only recently begun to fully industrialize and draft a foreign policy, an isomorphic change has begun domestically within both its civilian institutions and military to westernize; as such, in mimicking successful policies both in Europe and the United States, such as professionalization of the military and industrialized production standards, Japan has successfully begun the process to access material capabilities necessary to power projection (Beckert, 2010, pp. 155 - 57; Bernhofen, Atsumi, 2011, pp. 15 - 16). While European powers continue to control trade routes, especially in South Asia, Japan holds an opportunity of being one of the major powers in the Pacific. Further engagements in Pacific islands, such as the still independent nation of Hawaii, along with Korea and the Chinese coastal regions, has provided Japan ample opportunities; and while Japanese diplomats must navigate the geopolitical arena of



the Pacific so as not to anger the Great Powers or a growing US fleet, there remains little to no western opposition in the region (Auslin, 2009, pp. 189 - 207).

There are numerous other conflating variables to these powers: indeed, as Japan struggles to overcome ancient practices holding back industrial efficiency (Bernhofen, Atsumi, 2011, pp. 1 - 3, 13 - 16), the United States must recover from a nearly diastrophic civil war (Engerman, 1966, pp. 189 - 192). Most importantly for the Concert of Europe, both Great and minor powers must negotiate and cooperate with these states so as to maintain the territorial integrity of their colonies. Moreover, while not a pressing concern, the sheer potential of the United States industrial output and manpower, and the relative proximity of Japan to vital European Asian colonies, presents a strong incentive for European states to lobby for their neutrality in the case of any outbreak in conflict. Thus, while not voting members of the Concert, European powers would be wise to, at least on paper, heed to their advice and requests.

## **Committee Goals**

### **Maintain the Traditional Monarchical Order of Europe**

As had been reiterated, it is the ultimate goal of the Committee to maintain order in Europe. Even for observer powers, a maintenance in relative power in Europe prevents costly and foreign conflicts. A balance, furthermore, threatens no individual state. More tangibly, this means that the Great Powers, in one manner or another, are incentivized to interact with minor powers to justify regional interference; for instance, while Russia may oppose Ottoman hegemony in Eastern Europe, they may fear the greater impact of nationalists emerging out of Ottoman rebellions. Equally, while Britain may oppose Spanish colonies and restrictive tariffs, an anti-monarchist revolution--especially one that echoes of the French revolution-- could prove



disastrous as civil unrest and liberalism undermines British imperial claims, and makes demands of domestic British labor reform. As such, merely ruling over a given state is not sufficient to maintain order: the Great Powers must ensure that the prior monarchs, or at least their administrations, were deposed in a matter suiting of European nobility. Elsewise, domestic opinion, especially of an occupied state, may begin to spread the common question: is monarchy a truly legitimate form of government?

However, while the explicit goal of the Concert of Europe is clear, it is expected that each delegate will carefully consider their individual national objectives, as well as their overarching pursuit of geopolitical survival. As was outlined prior, this will be subject to the status of each delegate's state; ultimately, however, almost all delegates, even those of newly fledgling democracies, seek to maintain order and avoid war.

### **Negotiate Agreeable Colonial Possession**

An unavoidably contentious topic of debate will be the division of territories, especially in Africa and Asia. Delegates are encouraged to specifically draw up maps and appropriate regions, as subject to a vote of the Concert, borders are not disputed in any theater. Furthermore, delegates ought to consider the economic and social impacts of agreeing to any colonial treaty and how they may affect Europe.

### **The Dying Man of Europe**

While not yet a question in Western Europe, issues of self-determination remain a forefront in prior and current Ottoman territories, especially Eastern Europe. The concert will necessarily have to decide the future of these states, and how to properly incorporate them to the



European community. Furthermore, each state will need to balance the decline of the Ottoman Empire with their own domestic considerations.

### **Negotiate Fair Trade Pacts**

An overarching concept of the Concert is trade and the corresponding impact of trade. Each delegate, in drafting long term proposals, should understand the impact of trade on national security policies; for instance, delegates can pass resolutions condemning or prohibiting tariffs that spark trade wars. Alternatively, delegate's could pass policies reaffirming mercantilism to prevent democratic and liberal ideas leaking into more authoritarian states. These interests, both to maintain social order and balance industrialization, will be important considerations for the concert.

### **Research Questions**

1. How far is your state willing to go to enforce an outcome? Is limited war an option? How can this be leveraged to achieve a peaceful outcome?
2. What are key demands of major parties involved in disputes? In the status quo, who currently occupies what territories, and how do cultural and social divides fit into an eventual compromise?
3. Who are the core actors in each problem, and what would be an acceptable outcome for all?
4. What could be the consequences of any territorial or economic shifts on the status quo of Europe?
5. Consider what George (1991), a scholar in coercive diplomacy, considers to be a platform for successful policy:



- a. Strength of party motives;
  - b. Asymmetry of motives;
  - c. Clarity of objectives;
  - d. Sense of urgency;
  - e. Domestic political support;
  - f. Usable military options;
  - g. Opponents fear of escalation;
  - h. Clarity concerning precise terms of settlement;
6. How can your policies, when applied to this criteria, achieve both a peaceful outcome and your national objectives?



## References

- Adams, M. (2014). *Napoleon and Russia*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing PLC.
- Aksan, V. H. (2007). The Ottoman Military and State Transformation in a Globalizing World. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 27(2), 257–270. doi: 10.1215/1089201x-2007-004.
- Allen, B. (1997). *Revisioning Italy: National identity and Global culture*. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press.
- American Institute of Parliamentarians Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure (AIP)*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2012.
- Anghie, A. (2005). Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law. *European Journal of International Relations*. doi: 10.1017/cbo9780511614262
- Anscombe, Frederick F. (2006) Albanians and “mountain bandits”. In: Anscombe, Frederick F., (ed.) *The Ottoman Balkans, 1750-1830*. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers. pp. 87-113.
- Auslin, M. R. (2009). *Negotiating with Imperialism: the Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Aytekin, E. A. (2012). Peasant Protest in the Late Ottoman Empire: Moral Economy, Revolt, and the Tanzimat Reforms. *International Review of Social History*, 57(2), 191–227. doi: 10.1017/s0020859012000193.
- Barbero, A. (2006). *The battle: a new history of Waterloo*. London: Atlantic.
- Bartlett, C. J. (1996). *Peace, war and the European powers: 1814-1914*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Beckert, J. (2010). Institutional Isomorphism Revisited: Convergence and Divergence in Institutional Change. *Sociological Theory*, 28(2), 150–166. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9558.2010.01369.x
- Belmessous, S. (1994). Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History. *The American Historical Review*. doi: 10.1086/ahr/99.5.1516
- Bernhofen, D. M., & Atsumi, T. (2011). The Effects of the Unequal Treaties on Normative, Economic and Institutional Changes in 19th Century Japan. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.1966051



- Birdal, M. (2014). *Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt, The: Insolvency and European Financial Control in the Late Nineteenth Century*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Bisley, N. (2012). *Great powers in the changing international order*. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Blanning, T. C. W. (2003). Aftermath: Napoleon and Beyond. In *The French Revolution* (pp. 62–63). Studies in European History.
- Blanton, R., Mason, T. D., & Athow, B. (2001). Colonial Style and Post-Colonial Ethnic Conflict in Africa. *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(4), 473–491. doi: 10.1177/0022343301038004005
- Blockmans, W. (1996). The growth of nations and states in Europe before 1800. *European Review*, 4(3), 241–251. doi: 10.1002/(sici)1234-981x(199607)4:3<241::aid-euro134>3.0.co;2-4
- Bowen, W. H., & Álvarez José E. (2007). *A Military history of modern Spain: from the Napoleonic era to the international war on terror*. Westport: Praeger Security International.
- Breuilly, J. (2014). Austria, Prussia and The Making of Germany. doi: 10.4324/9781315833064.
- Brewer, D. (2013). *Greece, the hidden centuries: Turkish rule from the fall of Constantinople to Greek independence*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Brewer, S. (2006). *Borders and bridges: a history of U.S.-Latin American relations*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
- Britten Dean (1976). British informal empire: The case of China , *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 14:1, 64-81, DOI: 10.1080/14662047608447250.
- Broers, M. (2015). *Europe under Napoleon*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Brown, M., & Paquette, G. B. (2013). *Connections after colonialism: Europe and Latin America in the 1820s*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Bull, H. (2002). *The Anarchical Society*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Burkholder, M. A., & Johnson, L. L. (2010). *Colonial Latin America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cannadine, D. (2011). *Making history now and then: discoveries, controversies, and explorations*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.



- Censer, J. R., & Hunt, L. (2008). *Liberty, equality, fraternity: exploring the French Revolution*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Chapman, T. (2006). *The Congress of Vienna: origins, processes, and results*. London: Routledge.
- Christelow, A. (2016). *Muslim law courts and the French colonial state in Algeria*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Clancy-Smith, J. A. (2012). *Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an age of migration, c. 1800-1900*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Clark, I. (2007). International Legitimacy: Encounters between International and World Society. *International Legitimacy and World Society*, 13–36. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297009.003.0002
- Clark, I. (2009). Bringing hegemony back in: the United States and international order. *International Affairs*, 85(1), 23–36. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2009.00778.x
- Clark, R. D. (1947). Lesson in persuasion: Factors leading to the rejection of the league of nations. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 33(3), 265–273. doi: 10.1080/00335634709381305.
- Connelly, O. (2006). *The wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, 1792-1815*. London: Routledge.
- Copeland, D. C. (2014). *Economic interdependence and war*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Coşgel, M. M., Miceli, T. J., & Rubin, J. (2012). The political economy of mass printing: Legitimacy and technological change in the Ottoman Empire. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 40(3). doi: 10.1016/j.jce.2012.01.002
- Cowles, L. (1990). The Failure to Restrain Russia: Canning, Nesselrode, and the Greek Question, 1825–1827. *The International History Review*, 12(4). doi: 10.1080/07075332.1990.9640564
- Crawford, J. (2011). *The creation of states in international law*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Crawley, C. W. (2014). *The question of Greek independence: a study of British policy in the Near East, 1821-1833*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Crouzet, F. (2011). Wars, Blockade, and Economic Change in Europe, 1792–1815. *Cambridge University Press*, 24(3).



- Cunningham, A. (2014). *British credit in the last Napoleonic War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dakin, D. (1973). *The Greek struggle for independence: 1821-1833*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Pr.
- Davey, J. (2012). *The transformation of British naval strategy: seapower and supply in Northern Europe, 1808-1812*. Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: The Boydell Press.
- Davis, J. A. (2009). *Naples and Napoleon: Southern Italy and the European Revolutions, 1780-1860*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dedinger, B. (2011). The Franco-German trade puzzle: an analysis of the economic consequences of the Franco-Prussian War. *The Economic History Review*, 65(3). doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0289.2011.00604.x.
- Demeter's Manual of Parliamentary Law and Procedure: for the Legal Conduct of Business in All Deliberative Assemblies (Demeter's)*. Boston, MA: Bostonia Press, 1950: 4.
- Dincecco, M. (2010). Fragmented authority from Ancien Régime to modernity: a quantitative analysis. *Journal of Institutional Economics*, 6(3), 305–328. doi: 10.1017/s1744137410000032.
- Diouf, M. (1998). The French Colonial Policy of Assimilation and the Civility of the Originaires of the Four Communes (Senegal): A Nineteenth Century Globalization Project. *Development and Change*, 29(4), 671–696. doi: 10.1111/1467-7660.00095.
- Donnelly, J. (2014). *Realism and international relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Doyle, M. W. (2005). Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace. *American Political Science Review*, 99(3), 463–466. doi: 10.1017/s0003055405051798.
- Driault, E. (1919). The Coalition of Europe Against Napoleon. *The American Historical Review*, 24(4), 603. doi: 10.2307/1835810.
- Duignan, P., & Gann, L. H. (1981). *Colonialism in Africa: 1870-1960*. Cambridge: Univ. Press.
- Dwyer, P. G. (2008). Self-Interest versus the Common Cause: Austria, Prussia and Russia against Napoleon. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 31(4), 605–632. doi: 10.1080/01402390802088440.
- Edwards, J. (2004). Reconquista and Crusade in Fifteenth-Century Spain. *Crusading in the Fifteenth Century*. doi: 10.1057/9780230523357\_11



- Elrod, R. B. (1976). The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System. *World Politics*, 28(2), 159–174. doi: 10.2307/2009888
- Engerman, S. (1966). The Economic Impact of the Civil War. *Explorations in Entrepreneurial History*, 3(3).
- Erdem, Y. H. (2001). *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and its demise, 1800-1909*. New York: Palgrave.
- Esdaile, C. J. (2019). *The wars of Napoleon*. London ; New York: Routledge, Taylor et Francis Group.
- Fatma Sel Turhan (2014). The Ottoman Empire and the Bosnian Uprising. Janissaries, Modernisation and Rebellion in the Nineteenth Century. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 68(8), 1453–1454. doi: 10.1080/09668136.2016.1230407.
- Findlay, R. (2006). *Eli Heckscher, international trade, and economic history*. Cambridge, MA: MIT.
- Fisher, T., & Fremont-Barnes, G. (2001). *The Napoleonic wars*. Oxford: Osprey.
- Fletcher, M. E. (1958). The Suez Canal and World Shipping, 1869-1914. *The Journal of Economic History*, 18(4), 556–573. doi: 10.1017/s0022050700107740
- Fremont-Barnes, G. (2016). *Waterloo 1815*. Toronto: Dundurn.
- Friedrichsmeyer, S. (2011). *The imperialist imagination: German colonialism and its legacy*. Ann Arbor, MI: Univ. of Michigan Press.
- Fuller, M., & Ben-Ghiat, R. (2008). *Italian colonialism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gann, L. H., & Duignan, P. (1971). *Burden of empire: an appraisal of Western colonialism in Africa south of the Sahara*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
- Garzzn, J. F. (2015). Multipolarity and the Future of Regionalism: Latin America and Beyond. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2567234.
- George, A. L. (1991). *Forceful persuasion: coercive diplomacy as an alternative to war*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Gilderhus, M. T. (2006). The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications. *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 36(1), 5–16. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-5705.2006.00282.x.
- Ginneken, A. H. M. van. (2006). *Historical dictionary of the League of Nations*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.



- Glenny, M. (2018). *The Balkans: nationalism, war, and the Great Powers, 1804-2012*. London: Granta.
- Göçek Fatma Müge. (2002). *Social constructions of nationalism in the Middle East*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Godehardt, N., & Nabers, D. (2011). *Regional powers and regional orders*. London: Routledge.
- Goffman, Daniel. *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Gooch, J. (2016). *Army, state, and society in Italy, 1870-1915*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gordon, M. R. (1974). Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World War: The British and the German Cases. *The Journal of Modern History*, 46(2). doi: 10.1086/241205.
- Grab, A. I. (2005). *Napoleon and the transformation of Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Limited.
- Grant, A. J. (1984). The Catastrophe of Napoleon. In *Grant and Temperley's Europe in the Nineteenth Century 1789-1905* (pp. 134–148). Routledge.
- Gray, C. S. (2016). *Strategy and politics*. London: Routledge.
- Greisman, H. C. (1994). The enemy concept in Franco-German relations, 1870–1914. *History of European Ideas*, 19(1-3). doi: 10.1016/0191-6599(94)90195-3.
- Grimmer-Solem, E. (1998). *The science of progress: the rise of historical economics and social reform in Germany, 1864-1894*. University of Oxford.
- Gurr, T. R., & Gurr, E. (1984). Polity Data: Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800-1971. *ICPSR Data Holdings*. doi: 10.3886/icpsr05010.
- Hall, C. D. (1999). *British strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-15*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Hanioglu M. Şükrü. (2010). *A brief history of the late Ottoman empire*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Higgins, R. (2010). *Problems and process: international law and how we use it*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hodge, C. C. (2008). *Encyclopedia of the age of imperialism 1800-1914*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Hoffman, G. W. (1963). *The Balkans in transition*. London: Van Nostrand.



- Holbraad, C. (1971). *The concert of Europe: a study in German and British international theory 1815-1914*. New York: Barnes & Noble.
- Horward, D. D., & Tone, J. L. (1996). The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain. *The American Historical Review*, 101(3), 861. doi: 10.2307/2169501.
- Jarrett, M. (2016). *The Congress of Vienna and its legacy: war and great power diplomacy after Napoleon*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Jelavich, B. (1964). *A century of Russian foreign policy: 1814-1914*. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott.
- Kaufmann, W. W. (1967). *British policy and the independence of Latin America, 1804-1828*. Hamden, CT: Archon Books.
- Kennedy, H. (2016). *Muslim Spain and Portugal: a political history of al-Andalus*. London: Routledge.
- Kertzer, D. I. (2005). *Prisoner of the Vatican: the popes secret plot to capture Rome from the new Italian state*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Killingray, D. (1989). Labour Exploitation for Military Campaigns in British Colonial Africa 1870-1945. *Journal of Contemporary History*, 24(3), 483–501. doi: 10.1177/002200948902400306
- Konczacki, Z. A., Parpart, J. L., & Shaw, T. M. (1991). *Studies in the economic history of southern Africa*. London: Cass.
- Kuehn, J. T. (2012). *Reasons for the success of the sixth coalition against napoleon in 1813*. Place of publication not identified: Biblioscholar.
- Lambert, A. D. (1991). *The Crimean War: British grand strategy , 1853-56*. Manchester: Manchester Univ. Pr.
- Lancaster, T., & Taulbee, J. (1985). Britain, Spain, and the Gibraltar Question. *Britain, Spain, and the Gibraltar Question*.
- Langhorne, R. (1986). Reflections on the significance of the Congress of Vienna. *Review of International Studies*, 12(4), 313–324. doi: 10.1017/s0260210500113877.
- Lee, A. (2012). Comparing British and French Colonial Legacies: A Discontinuity Analysis of Cameroon. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 7(4), 365–410. doi: 10.1561/100.00011022



- Lewis, J. E. (2000). *The American Union and the problem of neighborhood: the United States and the collapse of the Spanish empire, 1783-1829*. United States: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Lieven, D. (2017). *Russia Against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe, 1807 to 1814*. London: Penguin Books Ltd.
- Loveland, I. (2018). 2. Parliamentary Sovereignty. *Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, and Human Rights*. doi: 10.1093/he/9780198804680.003.0002
- Lüke, M. G. (2009). Anti-Napoleonic Wars of Liberation (1813-1815). *The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest*. doi: 10.1002/9781405198073.wbierp0090.
- Malone, D. (2004). *The Un Security Council: from the Cold War to the 21st century*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Manjapra, K. (2014). *Age of entanglement: German and Indian intellectuals across empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- McPherson, A. L. (2013). *Encyclopedia of U.S. military interventions in Latin America*.
- Merriman, J. M. (2014). *A history of modern Europe: from the Renaissance to the present*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Mikaberidze, A. (2011). Napoleonic Wars (1802-1815). *The Encyclopedia of War*. doi: 10.1002/9781444338232.wbeow441.
- Miller, L. H. (1964). The Contemporary Significance of the Doctrine of Just War. *World Politics*, 16(2), 254–286. doi: 10.2307/2009507
- Morel, E. D. (1969). *The black man's burden: the white man in Africa from the fifteenth century to World War I*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Murphy, G. (2005). *Hemispheric imaginings the Monroe Doctrine and narratives of U.S. empire*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Neal, L. (1998). The Financial Crisis of 1825 and the Restructuring of the British Financial System. *Review*, 80(3). doi: 10.20955/r.80.53-76.
- Njoh, A. J. (2007). Colonial Philosophies, Urban Space, and Racial Segregation in British and French Colonial Africa. *Journal of Black Studies*, 38(4), 579–599. doi: 10.1177/0021934706288447



- Ongaro, E. (2010). The Napoleonic Administrative Tradition and Public Management Reform in France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. *Tradition and Public Administration*, 174–190. doi: 10.1057/9780230289635\_13.
- Pearson, S. (1971). THE ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM OF THE ROYAL NIGER COMPANY\*. *Stanford University Food Research Institute*.
- Pekkanen, Mastanduno, M., Ravenhill, J., & Foot, R. (2014). *Oxford handbook of the international relations of Asia*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Perkins, M. A. (2004). *Christendom and European identity: the legacy of a grand narrative since 1789*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- PETERSMANN, E. R. N. S. T.-U. L. R. I. C. H. (2000). FROM 'NEGATIVE' TO 'POSITIVE' INTEGRATION IN THE WTO: TIME FOR 'MAINSTREAMING HUMAN RIGHTS' INTO WTO LAW? *Kluwer Law International*.
- Porter, A. N. (2002). *European imperialism: 1860-1914*. Houndmills: Macmillan.
- Quataert, D. (2013). *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Rendall, M. (2000). Russia, the concert of Europe, and Greece, 1821–29: A test of hypotheses about the Vienna system. *Security Studies*, 9(4), 52–90. doi: 10.1080/09636410008429413.
- Rendall, M. (2016) Defensive realism and the Concert of Europe. *Review of International Studies*. 2006;32(3):523-540. doi:10.1017/S0260210506007145
- Riall, L. (2006). *The Italian Risorgimento: state, society and national unification*. London: Routledge.
- Riley, J. P. (2000). *Napoleon and the World War of 1813: lessons in coalition warfighting*. London: Frank Cass.
- Robert, H. M. (2001). *Parliamentary law*. New York: Irvington Publishers, Ardent Media.
- Roberts, R. L. (1996). *Two worlds of cotton: colonialism and the regional economy in the French Soudan, 1800-1946*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Rogers, G. I. (2015). Waterloo, the Napoleonic Wars and the Recasting of the Global Iberian World. *The RUSI Journal*, 160(3), 76–81. doi: 10.1080/03071847.2015.1058072.
- Root, E. (2017). The Real Monroe Doctrine. *Cambridge University Press*. doi: 10.4159/harvard.9780674289321.c9



- Rosato, S. (2003). The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory. *American Political Science Review*, 97(4), 585–602. doi: 10.1017/s0003055403000893.
- Rose, J. H. (1903). France and the First Coalition Before the Campaign of 1796. *The English Historical Review*, XVIII(LXX). doi: 10.1093/ehr/xviii.lxx.287.
- Rose, J. H., Hecksher, E. F., & Westergrad, H. (1923). The Continental System: An Economic Interpretation. *The Economic Journal*, 33(130), 239. doi: 10.2307/2222859.
- Rosecrance, R. N., & Miller, S. E. (2014). *The next great war?: the roots of World War I and the risk of U.S.-China conflict*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Rosenau, J. N., & Czempiel, E.-O. (2010). *Governance without government: order and change in world politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ryan, S. (2000). *The United Nations and international politics*. Houndmills (Hampshire): MacMillan.
- Saracoglu, M. S. (2008). Some Aspects of Ottoman Governmentality at the Local Level: The Judicio-Administrative Sphere of the Vidin County in the 1860s and 1870s. *Ab Imperio*, 2008(2), 223–254. doi: 10.1353/imp.2008.0019
- Saunders, D. (2000). Russia, the Balkans, and Ukraine in the 1870s. *Russia and the Wider World in Historical Perspective*, 85–108. doi: 10.1057/9781403913845\_5.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2012). Constructivist Perspectives. *Oxford Handbooks Online*. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199546282.013.0003.
- Schneid, F. C. (2017). *European Politics 1815-1848*. Routledge.
- Schroeder, P. W. (1984). The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European System. *The International History Review*, 6(1), 1–27. doi: 10.1080/07075332.1984.9640331.
- Schulz, M. (2017). The Concert of Europe and international security governance. *Great Power Multilateralism and the Prevention of War*, 26–45. doi: 10.4324/9781315206790-2
- Šedivý, M. (2011). From Adrianople to Münchengrätz: Metternich, Russia, and the Eastern Question 1829—33. *The International History Review*, 33(2). Doi: 10.1080/07075332.2011.555387
- Smalberger, J. M. (1976). The Role of the Diamond-Mining Industry in the Development of the Pass-Law System in South Africa. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 9(3), 419. doi: 10.2307/216846.



- Smith, C. B. (2007). *Politics and process at the United Nations: the global dance*. New Delhi: Viva Books Private.
- Smith, H. W. (2015). *The Oxford handbook of modern German history*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
- Snyder, G. H. (1990). ALLIANCE THEORY: A NEOREALIST FIRST CUT. *Journal of International Affairs*, 44(1).
- Sperber, J. (2007). *The European revolutions, 1848-1851*. Cambridge: Univ. Press.
- Sperber, J. (2017). *Revolutionary Europe 1780-1850*. Milton: Taylor and Francis.
- Stefanović, D. (2005). Seeing the Albanians through Serbian Eyes: The Inventors of the Tradition of Intolerance and Their Critics, 1804-1939. *European History Quarterly*, 35(3), 465–492. doi: 10.1177/0265691405054219
- Stephanson, A. (1996). *Manifest destiny: American expansion and the empire of right*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Stephen, J. F., & Warner, S. D. (1993). *Liberty, equality, fraternity*. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
- Strang, D. (1990). From Dependency to Sovereignty: An Event History Analysis of Decolonization 1870-1987. *American Sociological Review*, 55(6), 846. doi: 10.2307/2095750
- Strang, D. (1991). Contested sovereignty: the social construction of colonial imperialism. *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*, 22–49. doi: 10.1017/cbo9780511598685.002
- Stuchtey, B. (n.d.). Colonialism and Imperialism, 1450-1950. *European History Online*.
- Sweet, P. R. (1941). *Friedrich von Gentz Defender of the old order*. Madison, WI: Univ. of Wis. Pr.
- Taagepera, R. (1978). Size and duration of empires: Systematics of size. *Social Science Research*, 7(2), 108–127. doi: 10.1016/0049-089x(78)90007-8.
- Taussig, F. W. (1928). The Tariff Controversy with France. *Foreign Affairs*, 6(2). doi: 10.2307/20028598.
- Terhalle, M. (2015). *The transition of global order: legitimacy and contestation*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Thompson, M. P. (1994). Ideas of Europe during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 55(1), 37 - 58 doi: 10.2307/2709952.



- Thornhill, C. J. (2013). *A sociology of constitutions: constitutions and state legitimacy in historical-sociological perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Tocqueville, A. de. (1856). *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*.
- Tonybee, A. (1925). The World After the Peace Conference. *American Political Science Review*, 19(4), 831–833. doi: 10.2307/2939177.
- Vick, B. E. (2014). *The Congress of Vienna: power and politics after Napoleon*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Vos, J. (2013). Of Stocks and Barter: John Holt and the Kongo Rubber Trade, 1906–1910. *Global Histories, Imperial Commodities, Local Interactions*, 77–99. doi: 10.1057/9781137283603\_5.
- Wack, H. W. (2010). *The story of the Congo free state: social, political, and economic aspects of the Belgian system of government in Central Africa*. La Vergne, TN?: Nabu Public Domain Reprints.
- Waddell, D. A. G. (1987). British Neutrality and Spanish—American Independence: The Problem of Foreign Enlistment. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 19(1), 1–18. doi: 10.1017/s0022216x00017119.
- Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of international Politics*. Long Grove: Waveland Prees, Inc.
- Wawro, G. (2010). *The Franco-Prussian War the German conquest of France in 1870-1871*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr.
- Wawro, G. (2010). *The Franco-Prussian War the German conquest of France in 1870-1871*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr.
- Webster, C. K. (1915). Castlereagh and the Spanish Colonies II. 1818–1822. *The English Historical Review*, XXX(CXX), 631–645. doi: 10.1093/ehr/xxx.cxx.631
- Webster, C. K., & Temperley, H. (1929). 2. The Duel between Castlereagh and Canning in 1809. *Cambridge Historical Journal*, 3(1), 83–95. doi: 10.1017/s1474691300002122
- Wesling, M. (2011). Empire's Proxy. *Empires Proxy*, 69–103. doi: 10.18574/nyu/9780814794760.003.0002
- Woloch, I. (2001). *Napoleon and his collaborators: the making of a dictatorship*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Woolf, S. (2015). *Napoleons integration of Europe*. London: Routledge.



Worden, N. (2012). *Cape Town between east and west: social identities in a Dutch colonial town*. Auckland Park: Jacana Media.

Wright, W. (2009). *A tidy little war: the British invasion of Egypt 1882*. Stroud: History.

Young, N. (1914). *Napoleon In Exile: elba from the entry of the allies into paris on the 31st march 1814 to the ... return of napoleon from elba and his landing at go*. Philadelphia : John C. Winston Co.