Saturday, February 26th, 2022
10 am – 5 30 pm
Argyros Forum Room 201
386 N Center St Orange CA 92866
Chapman University
Map of Chapman University
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10:15 am Opening Remarks
10:30 am Talk 1
Husserl on constitution of abstract objects: from timeless to omnitemporal
Mirja Hartimo, University of Jyväskylä, Finland
This talk examines Husserl’s view of how we constitute abstract objects. In Logical Investigations, in Ideas I, and still in 1917 lectures on logic, the abstract objects are understood to be timeless, platonist objects. In Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929) Husserl finds them as “objects existing for us at all times” (§73), that is, as omnitemporal. This talk, very much work in progress, examines the nature of constitution of abstract objects in the mentioned texts. It suggests that the shift from the timelessness to the omnitemporality of abstract objects is related to the shift from genetic to generative phenomenology. The metaphysical implications of this shift will be discussed, and it will be suggested that Husserl’s view in Formal and Transcendental Logic is that while mathematical objects are in reality constructed in an intersubjective and historical practice, within this practice the abstract objects are constituted as unchanging objects.
11:00 am Discussion 1
11:45 am Talk 2
Husserl and Avenarius: the Constitution of the Ideality of the Noema and the Life-World as Foundation of Meaning
Kyle Banick, Chapman University/CSU Long Beach
In this work-in-progress, I will roughly sketch some aspects of the relation between Husserl’s thought and the epistemology of Avenarius’ empirio-criticism. By tracing both the shared motivations and the inflection point at which Avenarius and Husserl part ways, I will contemplate the constitution of the ideality of the noema as an ideal intensional entity constituted in acts of transcendental reflection–and I will attempt to shed light on Husserl’s motivations in the period of the Crisis, as he reflects back on the task Avenarius had long ago articulated to lay bare the “natural concept of the world”. The comparison between Husserl and Avenarius therefore corroborates the California semantic interpretation of the noema by applying a kind of Besinnung on Husserl’s own work and contributes to the discussion surrounding the constitution of ideal objects.
12:30 pm Discussion 2 (45 mins)
1:15 pm Lunch (1 hour 45 mins)
3:00 pm Talk 3
Mathematical Empathy
Stella Moon, UC Irvine
In Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl introduces the method of Besinnung for scientific practice. In order to exercise Besinnung (i.e. reflection on experience), Husserl claims we must `[stand] in, or [enter], a community of empathy with the scientists’. In this talk, I will characterise the ‘community of empathy’ within mathematical practice. Starting with Husserl’s broad notion of empathy as an intentional experience of other, the mathematical community (i.e. consisting of mathematicians) is a community of subjects who empathise with each other’s mathematical experiences — e.g. defining, proving, etc. By considering Wiles’s proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem, I describe the different degrees of empathising with other’s experience of the proof: a case study in mathematical empathy.
3:30 pm Discussion 3 (45 mins)
4:15 pm Talk 4
Structuralism in Husserl: On the Formal and Material Dimensions of Mathematics
Erich Reck, UC Riverside & Clinton Tolley, UC San Diego
Recent work on Husserl’s philosophy of mathematics has emphasized the extent to which his discussions, both early and late, incorporate features of what has come to be known as structuralism about mathematics. This is motivated by Husserl’s sympathetic discussion of Hilbert’s axiomatic method and his interest in the categoricity of axiomatic theories, as well as by his discussions of the centrality of form in both logic and ontology more generally. As Mirja Hartimo’s recent book helps to bring out, however, throughout his career Husserl’s account also includes the identification of a further ‘material’ dimension or layer beyond the formal determinations which belong to its subject-matter. For mathematical cognition this materiality is not given in terms of axiomatization but through some more ‘intuitive’ means. In this talk we explore: what the materiality of mathematics consists in for Husserl; what the means are by which he thinks such materiality is given for cognition; and how Husserl’s account of the nature of this materiality might affect or qualify the judgment that he is a structuralist. Along the way, we use comparisons with Kant, Frege, Cassirer, and Carnap to help sharpen the sense of options around these questions.
4:55 pm Discussion 4 (30 mins)
5:30 pm Closing Remarks